

Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Deal: The Gainer and the Loser

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ABSTRACT

The US-India nuclear deal of July, 2005, is a remarkable development in the framework of overall India-US relationship. The Indo-US Deal is a clear manifestation of the US' ultimate desire to recognize India as the leading power in the region, despite of the fact, that Pakistan is a close partner of US in the war against global terrorism, and major non-NATO ally. India came out as the principal beneficiary of this deal. The deal fulfilled India's long-standing geo-strategic objectives, its nuclear and missile predominance, and its aggressive and evil designs in the region.. Under the deal, India will get the capability to produce 50 warheads a year. The deal turns out to be unfair and discriminatory in the sense that it has bestowed India with all the benefits of a nuclear weapons state without any international obligations. The qualitative and quantitative improvement of India's nuclear arsenal would adversely affect the deterrence stability in South Asia. The nuclear deal will further enhance Indian capability to have pre-emptive attack against Pakistan. This study looks at the security concerns of Pakistan in the wake of this new relationship.

KEY WORDS: Se Deal, Nuclear, Missile, Deterrence, Qualitative, Quantitative, Weapons, Option, Strategy, USA, India, & Pakistan.

Introduction

Since 9/11, USA relations with India became more friendly, cooperative and cordial. In the changing regional and global scenario both countries need each other than before. Their common views and perception on the global war against international terrorism, religious fundamentalism, extremism, weapons of mass destruction, and most of regional and global issues made them an enduring friends, close partners, and allies. Moreover, their common interest for promoting World peace and order, their joint commitment for supporting democracy, and their desire to develop close cooperation in nuclear, military, economic, and political fields for the fulfillment of these objectives led these two countries to end their long-decade misunderstanding, mistrust, and differences and to work together for lasting and brilliant future relationship. And above, India's rising economy, its

huge business and market potential with advanced nuclear and missile technology has provided a new outlook for the India-U.S. relationship in new era. The formation of the Indo-US strategic partnership served as a milestone for the conclusion of Indo-US nuclear deal in July 2005.

Under the new civil nuclear agreement, India has agreed to separate its civilian and military programs and to put two-thirds of its existing reactors, and 65% of its generating power under international safeguards for verification. In return, United States will supply nuclear fuel and technology to India. This deal is very vital for India, because one of the great challenges of its fast-growing economy is the shortage of electricity. India has, therefore, perceived the agreement as a means of achieving its basic energy needs. By acquiring high technology from US will end India's feeling of isolation, and reduce its dependence Persian Gulf's oil and other oil-rich regions of the World. The main objective of USA is to support India's quest for Great Power Status in regional and global politics. More important, the deal signifies US desire and ambitions to get a reliable and trustworthy ally in order to accomplish its geo-political and strategic interests in Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, and to counterweight the growing influence of China (US' principal economic adversary) in the region.

The new cooperative framework aimed at making India a global power, at least the regional power to play a vital role in international politics. Collaboration between New Delhi and Washington, particularly, in the nuclear and space fields would disturb the conventional and non-conventional balance of power between India and Pakistan. The nuclear deal will further enhance Indian capability to have pre-emptive attack against Pakistan. The Indo-US nuclear deal gave a green signal to India's nuclear programme, raising its status from "unlawful and illegal" to the legitimized nuclear power.

Pakistan expressed its desire time and again to US to sign the similar nuclear deal, but the latter did not pay any response. As a result, Pakistan was compelled to explore a number of options that would best serve its security interests in the face of emerging Indo-US strategic partnership in the region. The prime concern for Pakistan was the acquisition of counter-force capability by India, which put the former military assets at stake in the case of major conflict. There are apprehensions that India may covert its civilian nuclear program into nuclear arms, which will have serious security implications for Pakistan. Moreover, the deal will compel Pakistan to pursue a qualitative approach to increase its deterrence stability. This includes technological improvements in its offensive and defensive capabilities. Pakistan follows a strategy of minimum deterrence in both conventional and nuclear fields in accordance with the threat it perceives, whenever strategic balance is disturbed in the region, Pakistan tries to balance it in accordance with its strategy of minimum deterrence. In addition, Pakistan also attempts to robust second strike capability through the quantitative increase in delivery systems and war-heads, or through a sea-based capability.

Against this background, the paper attempts to discuss the Indo-US partnership in an effort to understand that how both the states are collaborating strategically, keeping in view the current strategic environment in South Asia. An attempt is made to discuss its grave implications on Pakistan, especially on its security and regional stability. Moreover, the author throws light on different policy options for Pakistan in the wake of this development.

US-India Strategic Partnership: An Overview

During the cold war, the US followed the policy of containment against the growing threat Soviet communist expansion through the formation of military alliances, NATO, SEATO, and CENTO etc. While, India maintained its non-aligned status and keep itself away from joining SEATO, CENTO, and other military alliance with USA through the notion of “peaceful coexistence,” the Panch-Sheel Doctrine India was making its best efforts to project itself as a leader of the Non- Aligned Movement. In its quest for global supremacy USA not only acknowledged the geo-political and strategic significance of India but, also found it as an ally and regional power, notwithstanding, India’s close linkages with Soviet Union, the US’ principal Cold War adversary.(Mazari,2005).After the disintegration of Soviet Union in 90’s, the remarkable changes took place in the regional and global politics which enabled USA to establish such an international system, in which the lesser units are answerable to higher units (Hagerty,2005).Also, the changes in the international security system, trade,and investment continued to manipulate the international affairs. (Jaspal, 2007).

The new US security policy in South Asia in post Cold War period and its strategic partnership with India is not a surprise development, but, the result of convergence of interests between New Delhi and Washington on most of the regional and global issues. The US-India strategic partnership and military cooperation was further strengthened and intensified after the formation of Indo-US Steering Committee of their Navies, which conducted joint naval exercises in 1992 in 1993. In addition, the US Congress established the new strategies and policies for providing military and economic assistance to India in the wake of changing global realities. In January 1995, the US and India signed the “Agreed Minute on Defence Relations” (Ahmed, 2005) which provided for joint military exercises between the two countries. As a result of this agreement, India received huge military and economic aid from USA. In March 2000, the US President Clinton visited New Delhi and bonding between Vajpayee and Clinton reflected the coming together of the two states. The Vision Document signed between the two countries following the visit of US President Clinton to New Dehli in March 2000. Under this treaty the two leaders resolved to create a closer and new relationship between the two countries on the basis of common interest for ensuring complete regional and international peace and security”.

The relations between the two countries became more strengthened and intensified since 9/11, when the US President, George W Bush changed its policy towards China and called China a “strategic competitor” rather than a “strategic partner”. The Bush administration decided to help India to become a “major regional power of South-Asia” to contain China. Thus, China’s factor has played an important role in the development of Indo-US strategic partnership. On April 17, 2002, the US and India signed the first major weapon deal for more than 10 years by which US agreed to provide (News International, October 10, 2006) Raytheon Co. long –range weapon locating radars to India. The radar system worth \$ 146 million is designed to pinpoint enemy’s long-range mortars, artillery and rocket launches. (*Dawn*, April 18, 2002). On May 22, 2003, the US approved the sale of Israel’s Phalcon airborne early warning system worth \$ 1.2 billion to India. (*The Hindustan Times*, May 23, 2003).

During President Bush’s visit to India in February 2006, the two countries finally signed Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Pact. The deal is the first of its kind to give India’s defiance to become the member of Non Proliferation Treaty NPT². On July 27, 2007, US and India reached an agreement on the terms and condition of civil nuclear cooperation deal, known as 123 agreement.³ The Americans have termed it “ as the symbolic centerpiece of growing global partnership between the two countries”. (Sheikh, 2007). The full agreement was reached on the basis of the joint statement on July 18 2008. Both the countries expressed their desires of strengthening strategic partnership between them through this agreement. (Usman, 2008).

India: As the Gainer

India came out the major beneficiary of this deal. This is a remarkable achievement for India to expand its nuclear program. The Indo-US ‘deal would greatly enhance the Indian capability of developing more nuclear warheads, as it provides assurance on uninterrupted nuclear fuel supply. As the result of the deal, India became the only country of the World with the de-facto nuclear status despite of the fact that India is the non signatory of Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). While commenting the significance of the deal Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said, “The agreement would not hinder or otherwise interfere with India’s nuclear activities, including our military facilities.” (*Daily Times*, August 14, 2007). A former senior Indian intelligence official reaffirmed when he said, “the assurance of nuclear fuel supply from the US and the NSG would free India’s existing capacity to produce highly enriched uranium and plutonium for its nuclear weapons program. Under the deal, India will get the capability to produce 50 warheads a year.” (Sultan, 2006). The Indo-US agreement will improve India’s nuclear arsenal qualitatively as well as quantitatively. Furthermore, the deal does not have any provision which can allow India to give up its right for nuclear

testing. Similarly, India has not agreed to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

In the long run, the deal provides India with an opportunity to strengthen its nuclear weapons program by building higher capacity reactors and enhancing the targeting efficiency of its nuclear arsenals. Furthermore, the de-facto legitimacy also allows India to proceed with its controversial nuclear program under the cover of legitimacy. As a non-signatory to the NPT, India cannot have an access to nuclear plants and nuclear fuel and technology. Thus, India has succeeded to convince US to give more or less the same privileges that are enjoyed by signatories of the NPT. The deal further provided India with an opportunity to continue its nuclear testing moratorium, strengthen its nuclear arsenal's security, and continue its exceptional track record in non-proliferation. Thus, India will get the advantage of dual-use of nuclear technology, both know-how and equipments, which can provide India with enriched uranium to be used in its nuclear weapons program. (Pan, 2006).

The deal turns out to be unfair and discriminatory in the sense that it has bestowed India with all the benefits of a nuclear weapons state without any international obligations. It is evident from the Indian nuclear record that it got nuclear technology under the guise of civilian use and then transformed it for military purposes. This would lead to intangible proliferation of nuclear technology. The deal provides Indian scientists an easy access to advanced technologies, thereby, making the qualitative improvement in nuclear warheads and their delivery systems. In the past, India has received nuclear and space technology for peaceful purposes, but misused it for making nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. (Mihollin, 2006).

The above scenario alarms the bells of insecurity for other regional countries, especially, for Pakistan. Thus, the qualitative improvement of India's nuclear arsenal would affect the fragile deterrence stability in South Asia. The nuclear deal will further enhance Indian capability to have pre-emptive attack⁴ against Pakistan. In the South Asian strategic environment, both India and Pakistan perceive threat from each other in one way or the other. In the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons.

Although, in the current South Asian strategic environment, the chances of pre-emptive or decapitating strike are very low. However, in the event of crisis, which may escalate into a major conventional war, the prospect of preemption will definitely increase. Large-scale conventional warfare between India and Pakistan would certainly include air and ballistic missile attacks. These attacks have the potential to destroy or neutralize the adversary's nuclear capability. Moreover, Pakistan has a less nuclear delivering capability as compared to India. On the other hand, India is making a concerted effort to destroy high-value targets by precision guided munitions, through intelligence gathering, and by the aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons. This gives India the capability to destroy some of

Pakistan's strategic assets. Pakistan lacks strategic depth⁵ vis-a vis India as many of its airfields and strategic assets are very close to India. This allows India to disperse strategic forces widely among numerous sites, installations and airfields. Consequently, India would certainly go for developing more and technologically advanced nuclear warheads with a sophisticated delivery systems.

Both India and Pakistan are extensively involved in strategic arms race. They are vigorously perusing a policy to develop such a defence system, which can neutralize the deterrence capability of the adversary. For this purpose, they are engaged in developing Ballistic Missile Defences (BMDs). The ultimate objective of the BMDs is to protect a state from incoming ballistic missiles by intercepting them before they reach their target. India has been trying to develop and procure BMDs for the last many years. Indo-US new strategic partnership is the example of such development.(Jaspal,2006).

One of the adverse implications of the nuclear deal is the American acceptance of India's nuclear and ballistic missile programs and its right to retain these programs outside the international non-proliferation regimes. The Joint Statement of 18 July, 2005 that declares India as "a state with advanced nuclear technology", the March 2, 2006 Nuclear Separation Plan, the Hyde Act that brought necessary changes in the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954 in order to make nuclear cooperation with India. The deal provides for a non-hindrance clause in favor of India's nuclear weapon's programme, the India specific IAEA Safeguards Agreement that makes India different from other nuclear weapon states(Ramachandran,2008), the Nuclear Suppliers group NSG exemption, and the final ratification of the nuclear agreement by the US Congress that will give India a de-facto recognition of its nuclear and missile programmes for which India was anxiously waiting for the last 30 year.

According to C Raja Mohan & Parag Khanna, "There is not a single area in which India can threaten America's interests" (Mohan & Khanna, 2006). America has acknowledged the geopolitical importance of India by strengthening its power capability. It is worth-mentioned that India's desire for an ICBM capability is motivated by its desire to be recognized as a great power and symbolic nuclear parity with China.(Choudhury,2010).

India's missile programme together with its nuclear programme and its drive for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council is part of its ongoing efforts to establish itself as a world power. The USA has also declared that its ultimate goal is to help India to become a major world power in the 21st century. (Subrahmanyam, 2005). Under the new deal India and the US will also cooperate with India in the field of civilian space technology and other transfers of high-technology like civilian advanced reactors. In June 2004 India and the US started cooperating in space technology since the US softened sanctions imposed on India to help it build a communication satellite. (Sultan, 2006).

Pakistan: As the Loser

Pakistan has a grave concern over the Indo-US nuclear deal. There are apprehensions that India may covert its civilian nuclear program into nuclear arms, which will have serious security implications for Pakistan. Since 9/11, Washington has pursued unilateral and unjust approach in relations with regard two regional powers of South-Asia, India and Pakistan which clearly shows Washington's clear tilt in the favor of India. Pakistan expressed its desire to USA to sign a similar treaty in the fields of nuclear and space technology, but the latter refused. Bespite this, Washington is exerting more pressure on Islamabad than New Dehli to comply with the US Policies. The main objective of USA is to support India's quest for Great Power Status in regional and global politics. It means that the ultimate desire of USA is to make India stronger militarily and nuclearly . This is strongly protested by Pakistan as military competition with India remains a centerpiece of Pakistan's foreign policy. (Lavoy, 2005).In fact, US' current approach to relations with India and Pakistan is more favorable towards India.

First, Indo-US Nuclear Deal hinders Washington's ability to resolve Indo-Pakistan dispute on Kasmir that may lead to nuclear war. Pakistan wants an active US participation in the resolution of Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. Despite of the logistic and intelligence support of Pakistan to US in its war against global terrorism, USA frequently accuses Pakistan to stop terrorist organizations operating from within its borders. On 11 September 2003, Ms Christina Rocca, senior US officer for South Asia, said on the occasion on her visit to India, 'I can assure you that the issue of cross-border infiltration remains a very important issue on our agenda with Pakistan. (Naqvi, 2003).

Second, in the present strategic environment, nuclear capable ballistic missiles occupy a place of special importance in the strategic doctrines of India and Pakistan. India's development of ABM system with US assistance, would have serious strategic repercussions for Pakistan. The prime objective of India's missiles systems is to neutralize retaliatory nuclear strikes by its adversaries (China and Pakistan).Thus, an introduction of missiles defenses in Indian arsenals would definitely compel Pakistan to revise its defence policy and to opt for more counter-measures. This will, in turn, intensify an arm race between India and Pakistan which will be detrimental to the growing economies of these two countries.

The Indo-US deal will considerably improve operational ability of the Indian armed forces. For example, in September 2003, the Indian and American Special forces conducted two weeks exercises close to Chinese and Pakistani borders in Karakoram ranges. (News International, September 7, 2003). Earlier in May, 2002, Para-Commandos from Indian army along with some 200 soldiers from the US Special Group and Supporting Units from the US-Pacific Command, held 19-day joint exercises named 'Balance Iroquois', in India.(Pioneer, May 17, 2002).Furthermore, the deal transcends the US- Pakistan alliance relationship in

terms of its parameters and scope of making India as a major regional power. This, in turn, will have a serious implications for Pakistan, especially, for its Armed forces which has been getting more close to USA in the post 9/11 period. (Kapila, 2005).

Third, the Indo-US Nuclear deal disturbed the balance of power between India and Pakistan, leaving the latter with no option but to increase its defence capabilities. In other words, the massive built-up of India's conventional and unconventional military capabilities, including advance offensive aircrafts, ballistic and cruise missiles, nuclear submarines, and an aircraft carrier, and Pakistan's indigenous armament manufacturing capabilities aggravate the security puzzle. Furthermore, any increase in defence expenditure will adversely affected the socio-economic development of Pakistan (Waltz, 1979).

Forth, the nuclear deal would enable India to make quantitative and qualitative improvement in its nuclear arsenal. A former senior Indian intelligence official reaffirmed this once he said; "The assurance of nuclear fuel supply from the US and the Nuclear Supplier Group(NSG) will free India's existing capacity to produce highly enriched uranium and plutonium for its nuclear weapons program.Under the deal, India will have the capability to produce 50 warheads a year."(The Hindu, June 19, 2006).

As one of the supporters of the nuclear deal said that, "Access to new reactor technology from abroad promises to provide India's nuclear engineers exposure to new and advanced strategies that will greatly enhance its efficiency, output, safety and the future plans developed by India's own indigenous nuclear industry."(Tellis,2006). This would lead to intangible proliferation of nuclear technology. Pakistan always had an Indo-specific linear threat perception. This simplistic linearity which identifies security and national interest mainly as response to an external threat, which in turn is viewed mostly as Indo-specific, influences the strategic thinking within Pakistan.(Agha,2004). Mohammad Sadiq, a spokesman for the Pakistani Foreign Ministry, confirmed the contents of the letter, which he said was distributed to IAEA members. He said: "There should be a model agreement that can be signed with any country that fulfills the required criteria. It should not be country-specific."(Jeremy,2008).

Fifth, the deal would facilitate New Delhi to buy conventional weapons worth of five billion \$ from Washington. The Indo- US Deal is a clear sign that the US will no longer deal with both India and Pakistan on of equal basis as it recognized India the leading power in the region. Although, Pakistan is a close partner of USA in the war against terrorism and enjoys major non-NATO ally status, but, Washington has a deep and more significant strategic association with New Delhi. The deal is a major progress in the framework of overall India-US linkages. The main concern for Pakistan is that the US has ignored Pakistani apprehensions after the delivery of the more advanced and sophisticated missile technology to India e.g. Patriot Advanced Capability-3(PAC-3) system⁸ that further upset the strategic equilibrium of power in South Asia.(BBC Fact File, March 23,2003).

Sixth, the deal practically justifies America's recognition of India as a nuclear power. Beside this, the deal foresees the sending of Indian troops in US-led 'multinational operations' around the world in spite of whether these are approved by the UNO or not. (Mahmood,2005).The importance of the pact was remarked by Dr Singh when he said that it should be observed against the background of India's 1974 nuclear test and the international community's decision to refuse nuclear technology to India"(Mufti, 2005). The agreement is not at all astonishing. One of the world renowned defence experts while responding to US pronouncement of F-16s deal to Pakistan had very properly envisaged that it means the US is going to offer India something amazingly big.(The Frontier Post, August 12,2005).

Initially Pakistan adopted a cautious approach towards the Indo-US nuclear deal. However, subsequent events revealed that US determined to expand India's status at regional and global level. On March 20, 2006, Pakistan's Foreign Office Spokesperson said: "We believe that this deal is not helpful to the stability in South Asia and to the international non-proliferation efforts. As to Spokesperson, "Pakistan's position on the US-India nuclear agreement is well-known. First, we share the concerns of security analysts that the agreement would help bolster India's nuclear weapons capability. We will continue to watch the situation closely."(Spokemanperson of foreign Office)

The National Command Authority (NCA), the apex decision-making body of Pakistan has similarly argued that the Indo-US nuclear deal will allow India to "produce significant quantities of fissile material and nuclear weapons from unsafe guarded nuclear reactors which would adversely impact on strategic stability in the region". (Richard and Fisher, 2004). While reacting to the nuclear Indo-US deal, Pakistan's National Command Authority (NCA), expressed satisfaction at the current state of Pakistan's strategic deterrence, noting that the strategic capability was sufficient to meet current and future challenges. However, it watched with concern the implications of India-US nuclear deal on strategic stability in South Asia and expressed firm resolve to follow the policy of credible minimum deterrence . (Dawn, April 13, 2006).

The security environment of South Asia has always been characterized by the traditional rivalry between Pakistan and India. The rise of one of them as a regional power is meant to be the destabilization of the region. The Indo-US strategic partnership has reduced Pakistan's nuclear deterrence because of the introduction of advanced weapon system in the Indian nuclear arsenal, along with sophisticated missiles and missile-defence systems. In this context, the India-US cooperation in high-tech defence equipments has raised concerns in Pakistan. The induction of new weapons system such as missile-defence would destabilize the strategic balance in the region and may trigger an arms competition in the region involving Pakistan, India and China, thus destabilizing the entire region: one of the alarming implications is that it is likely to initiate a new, more dangerous arms race between Pakistan and India.(The News , August 12,2011). While expressing

serious concerns about the possible ramifications of the deal, Pakistan Foreign Spokesperson said on August 20, 2007 that “Pakistan does not want a nuclear arms race in the region but at the same time it is committed to maintaining a credible minimum deterrence in the interests of strategic balance, which is vital for the regional peace.” Pakistan continued to maintain unilateral moratorium on testing and had proposed to India a bilateral nuclear test ban treaty but the resumption of nuclear tests by India would create a serious situation and Pakistan would have to review its position and take action consistent with its supreme national interest.(Dawn, August 21,2007). Zafar Iqbal Cheema rightly comments that “India’s draft nuclear doctrine...is perceived in Pakistan as an aggressive and provocative strategy, which would not only fuel a nuclear arms race but also enhance strategic instability between India and Pakistan.”(Cheema, 2002).

Policy Response for Pakistan

Pakistan has adopted a cautious approach following the conclusion of Indo-US civilian nuclear deal. Pakistan will likely to follow the policy of ‘wait and see’ before making any change in its minimum deterrent posture. Washington has pursued a policy of de-hyphenation¹⁰ in case of her relations with India and Pakistan. A de-hyphenation phenomenon is also flawed in Indo-Pak relations for another reason. This makes the existing problems between the two countries more complicated .(Burns,2005).

While commenting on Pakistan’s nuclear policy, President Musharaff said that “Pakistan pursues the strategy of credible deterrence in both conventional and unconventional fields in accordance with the threat it perceives. Pakistan, he said, has quantified the strategy of minimum defensive deterrence and is refining its deterrence policy ...whenever an imbalance is created in the region; Pakistan tries to balance it in accordance with its strategy of minimum deterrence.¹¹”(News Summary, Associated Press Pakistan, April 21, 2005.) A more effective option for Pakistan would be a qualitative and quantitative improvement in its nuclear and missile forces and its strategy. The more convenient solution for Pakistan would be to go for a greater number of nuclear warheads and their delivery system. Pakistan will also increase its fissile material production in order to have more warheads.(Banuri,2004).But the manufacture of huge number of nuclear weapons will into only destabilize Pakistan, but the whole region. The policy of minimum credible nuclear deterrence would intensify race between India and Pakistan, which will not only hinder their economic growth, but, it has adverse impacts on poor section of people.

The second option for Pakistan would be deployment of missiles tipped with the nuclear warheads. But, this approach is disastrous for both countries. In reaction, India may also go for deployment of nuclear tipped missile , which could increase the risk of nuclear war (Jaspal, 2006). This approach is, therefore,

counter-productive and should only be adopted in the last resort. This approach is more costly and harmful for the cause of these two countries. Moreover, the deal will compel Pakistan to pursue a qualitative approach to increase deterrence stability. This include technological improvements in its offensive and defensive capabilities. Some of these technologies can be the improvement in the electronic warfare capacity to shatter Indian radar ability on incoming targets, create problems to its interceptors and delivery system.(Sultan, 2002). Pakistan's linear approach towards India stems from the outstanding territorial disputes due to which both the countries Pakistan have fought number of wars.

The third option for Pakistan is to sign a similar deal with China in order to counterweight the growing influence of Indo-US Civilian nuclear deal. In this regard, Pakistan turned towards China, the only country which can provide support to Pakistan in the time of trouble. The relationship between the two countries is termed as "higher than Himalayas and deeper than Oceans". (Dambaugh, 2010).

Although, Pakistan was close US ally in its combat against the former USSR, and now the war against global terrorism, but, US has always ignored Pakistan's interest whenever Pakistan faced crisis, while China is the sole supporter of Pakistan in the time of crisis. China is the only country which has not only provided Pakistan with high-tech equipments, but also transfer nuclear technology, and helped Pakistan in creating its own indigenous defence industries. China also helped Pakistan in developing nuclear technology by construction nuclear power plants in Pakistan to overcome its energy needs. Thanks to the "all weather friendship" China declared to continue its cooperation with Pakistan and announced in 2010 to build two more nuclear reactors Chasma 3 and Chashma 4.(Bukhari, 2011).

At present, the two countries(China & Pakistan) are planning a strategy how to minimize the impact of Indo-US relationship. In this regard, Gwadar port represents the new great game in the region. Pakistan has offered China naval and commercial rights at Gwadar port, which greatly undermine the Indo-US goal of supremacy and domination in Arabian sea and Persian Gulf region. In this regard, Beijing and Islamabad have decided to form a strategic alliance to check the Indo-US predominance in the region (Yusuf, 2007)

Pakistan, in the last few years has been trying to alter its country centric approach and has adopted a more pragmatic foreign policy, involving re-orientation of its relations with its regional neighbors, including Russia, China and Central Asia the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 12, a grouping of Russia, China and Central Asian countries. Pakistan is looking forward to get full membership of SCO. While it may be premature to assume that SCO or some other security arrangement to counter-balance to the Indo-US strategic partnership in the near future. As the core objective of Pakistan's foreign policy is to safeguard its security vis-à-vis India, Pakistan's close relations with SCO members will make more stronger and powerful to follow a foreign policy independent of US. The policies and programmes of the SCO are in consonance with Pakistan's long-

term objectives. Pakistan can not only contribute toward peace and stability but also to the development of transport and energy corridor, which would facilitate promotion of economic stability and peace of the region. More significantly under the banner of SCO, Pakistan can improve its relations with Russia, China, and Central Asia, Iran, and Afghanistan.

Conclusion

The Indo-US civilian nuclear deal is a remarkable development for India to make it more powerful and stronger to play a vital role in regional politics. The deal fulfilled India's long-standing geo-strategic objectives, the emergence of India as an Asian power to counterweight China, its nuclear and missile predominance, and its aggressive and evil designs against Pakistan in the region. The deal would legitimize India's nuclear weapon status and ballistic missile capability both qualitatively and quantitatively and enhance its capability of developing more nuclear warheads. It would lead to arms competition between India and Pakistan, thus destabilizing the entire region. US objective of making India global or at least a regional military power to achieve its own perceived interests would also impinge upon security interests of other countries, especially Pakistan.

Thus, Pakistan will force to explore options that would best serve its security interests independent of the United States. The deal will further enhance Indian capability to have pre-emptive attack against Pakistan. The deal will not only create misunderstanding, doubts, jealousy, and competition between India and Pakistan but, will also place India in a better bargaining position vis-à-vis Pakistan. The deal turns out to be unfair and discriminatory in the sense that it has bestowed India with all the benefits of a nuclear weapons state without any international restrictions or obligations.

The above scenario would alarm the bells of insecurity for other regional countries especially for Pakistan. Thus, the qualitative improvement of India's nuclear arsenal would affect the fragile deterrence stability in South Asia. India-US nuclear deal will have a grave implications for Pakistan. It will not only upset the balance of power between India and Pakistan, but also badly affect Pakistan's interests in terms of defence, political, economic and foreign relations. More important, the deal will enable India to get a permanent seat in UN Security Council which, in turn, designate India the power of veto against Pakistan on a number of issues, especially, on the core issue of Kashmir.

In the regional context, South Asia is likely to become a victim of global power politics. The formation of alliances will place regional countries against one another in the support of their allies. In near future, the overall regional scenario will see states involved in counter-alliances, virtually shattering the South Asian dream of regional integration. Thus, the next decade will be marked by considerable strengthening of Indian military and economic might due to the

blessing of US assistance, and a growing Sino-Pakistan relationship to act as a counter balance.

Notes

1. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, known in India as the Panchsheel (from Sanskrit, panch: five, sheel: virtues), are a set of principles to govern relations between states. This agreement stated the five principles as: mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence.
2. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as NPT, is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament . A total of 190 parties have joined the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon states: the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China (also the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council). Three nuclear states India, Pakistan and North Korea have openly tested and declared that they possess nuclear weapons did not join the treaty, while Israel has a policy of opacity regarding its own nuclear weapons program. The treaty is, nevertheless, sometimes interpreted as a three-pillar system, non-proliferation, disarmament, and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology.
3. The 123 Agreement is the terms of engagement which operationalizes the treaty agreement between India and US for transfer of civil nuclear technology. The next step is to enter into agreement with the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) for safeguards of the civil nuclear reactors to be set up under the 123 agreement and to enter into an agreement with the NSG (nuclear suppliers group) for supply of nuclear fuel i.e. uranium for the civil nuclear reactors.
4. A preemptive attack is an attack that is commenced in an attempt to repel or defeat a perceived offensive or invasion, or to gain a strategic advantage in an impending (allegedly unavoidable) war before that threat materializes. It is a attack which preemptively 'breaks the peace'.
5. Strategic depth is a term in military literature that broadly refers to the distances between the front lines or battle sectors and the combatants' industrial core areas, capital cities, heartlands, and other key centers of population or military production. The key precepts any military commander must consider when dealing with strategic depth are how vulnerable these assets are to a quick, preemptive attack or to a

methodical offensive and whether a country can withdraw into its own territory, absorb an initial thrust, and allow the subsequent offensive to culminate short of its goal and far from its source of power.

6. It conceptually means the action of one to stop another from doing something otherwise he would have done it. The concept assumes an importance in international relations by decision makers who seek to prevent certain actions of political adversaries by threatening them with military and economic retaliation. Deterrence is considered as one of the means by which nations attempt to influence others. In foreign affairs, deterrence refers to the use of the threat of military action to compel an adversary to do something, or to prevent them from doing something, that another state desires.
7. Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a multinational body concerned with reducing nuclear proliferation by controlling the export and the transfer of materials that may be applicable to nuclear weapon development and by improving safeguards and protection on existing materials. Initially the NSG had seven members: Canada, West Germany, France, Japan, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In 1976-77, membership was expanded to fifteen with the admittance of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland. Germany was reunited in 1990 while Czechoslovakia broke up into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993. Twelve more nations joined up to 1990. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union a number of former republics have been given observer status as a stage towards future membership. China became a member in 2004. The European Commission participates as an observer. The 2009/2010 NSG Chair is Hungary.
8. Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) is a surface to-air-guided missile system that provides advanced capability against the cruise missiles, short and medium-range ballistic missiles. PAC-3 battery included four main components: a radar set, a command center, a mobile launcher, and the PAC-3 interceptor missiles. The system is capable of targeting and destroying multiple targets while evading countermeasures and decays. PAC-3 unlike previous models relies on 'hit-to-kill' technology to eliminate short and medium range ballistic missile. There is a genuine threat that the transfer of PAC-3 to India will show the way to an anti-missile race in the region of South Asia and forcing Pakistan to either look for the similar or parallel anti- missile system for itself. This will essentially indicate an offensive raise in defence spending.
9. Credible Minimum Deterrence is the principle on which India's nuclear doctrine is based. It underlines Nuclear No First use Policy(NFU) with a second strike capability, and falls under minimal deterrence as opposed to mutually assured destruction. In nuclear strategy, a second-strike

capability is a country's assured ability to respond to a nuclear attack with powerful nuclear retaliation against the attacker. Mutual assured destruction, or mutually assured destruction (MAD), is a doctrine of military strategy and national security policy in which a full-scale use of high-yield weapons of mass destruction by two opposing sides would effectively result in the complete, utter and irrevocable annihilation of both the attacker and the defender, becoming thus a war that has no victory nor any armistice but only effective reciprocal destruction.

10. "De-hyphenation" means Any gains made by either side, from political to military technology have a direct bearing on other side.
11. In nuclear strategy, minimal deterrence (also called minimum deterrence) is an application of deterrence theory in which a state possesses no more nuclear weapons than is necessary to deter an adversary from attacking. Pure minimal deterrence is a doctrine of no first use, holding that the only mission of nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear adversary by making the cost of a first strike unacceptably high. To present a credible deterrent, there must be the assurance that any attack would trigger a retaliatory strike. In other words, minimal deterrence requires rejecting a counterforce strategy in favor of pursuing survivable force that can be used in a counter value second strike. Minimal deterrence represents one way of solving the security dilemma and avoiding an arms race. Decision-makers often feel pressured to expand their arsenals when they perceive them to be vulnerable to an adversary's first strike, especially when both sides seek to achieve the advantage. A minimal deterrence strategy must also account for the nuclear firepower that would be "lost" or "neutralized" during an adversary's counterforce strike.
12. It is an intergovernmental mutual-security organization which was founded in 2001 in Shanghai by the leaders of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Except for Uzbekistan, the other countries had been members of the Shanghai Five, founded in 1996; after the inclusion of Uzbekistan in 2001, the members renamed the organization.

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