

Historical Perspective of Pakistan USA Relations; Lessons for Pakistan

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Abstract

The United States and Pakistan established diplomatic relations in 1947 the US agreement to provide economic and military assistance to Pakistan and the latter's partnership in the CENTO and SETO strengthened relations between the two nations. However, that US suspension of military assistance during the 1965, 1971, 1975, generated a white spread feeling in Pakistan that the United States was not a reliable ally. The soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 highlighted the common interest of Pakistan and the United States in peace and stability in South Asia. The purpose of this paper is to analyze Pakistan US relationship in historical perspective, highlighting lesson that Pakistan should learn from its past's experiences with the US and recommended a viable strategy for the future.

Key Words Cento, Seto, Taliban, War on Terror

Introduction

The United States' and Pakistan established diplomatic relations in 1947 The U.S. agreement to provide economic and military assistance to Pakistan and the latter's partnership in the Baghdad Pact/CENTO and SEATO strengthened relations between the two nations. However, the U.S. suspension of military assistance during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war generated a widespread feeling in Pakistan that the United States was not a reliable ally. Even though the United States suspended military assistance to both countries involved in the conflict, the suspension of aid affected Pakistan much more severely. Amongst the masses, the U.S. lost all credibility in the wake of 1971 war and the, ers1 Wag_ tragic bifurcation of Pakistan.

“On October 1, 1990, however, the United States suspended all military assistance and new economic aid to Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment which required that the President certify annually that Pakistan 'does not possess a nuclear explosive device.'”

The decision by India to conduct nuclear tests in May 1998 and Pakistan's matching response set back U.S. relations in the region, which had seen renewed U.S. Government interest during the second Clinton Administration. A presidential visit scheduled for the

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first quarter of 1998 was postponed and under the Glenn Amendment, sanctions restricted the provision of credits, military sales, economic assistance, and loans to the government” (books.google.com.pk/books?isbn=0739711946).

The United States has stepped up its economic assistance to Pakistan, providing debt relief and support for a major effort at education reform. However, the mistrust seems to persist on both sides and this marriage of convenience is not professed by many to outlast our previous courtships.

PART — I

Pak-US. Relationship in historical Perspective

The Initial Years (1947-1952)

After the creation of the two dominions of the British raj in 1947, “Pakistan needed financial support for its infrastructure development and modernization of its armed forces it is not known as to when the government of Pakistan decided to ask for military aid from the United States; *Field Marshal Ayub Khan* was definitely their living along these lives in August 1951” (Muqem, 1963). As a US ally in the region, Pakistan could provide a foothold for the US in the region against any Soviet expansionist efforts in South Asia.

“From the US perspective, the United States was more occupied in the post war reconstruction in Western Europe and Japan, its containment efforts in South East Asia and the Middle East. The United States in the initial years of Pakistan was less interested in getting involved in the emerging conflicts of South Asia” (Mahmud, 1991)

TABLE-1

**Changing Strategic Environment and Pakistan:
A Comparative Assessment**

Period	State of Cold War Tensions	Importance of Pakistan to the US (and the West) .	Remarks
1950s	High –	- High - Military alliance - Massive military aid	Developments in Middle East and Iran
1960s	Détente ,	- Reduces - Low after 1965 sanctions	- China moves closer to Pakistan to reduce US influence - China-Pakistan strategic relationship starts
1970s	Mild till 1978 (when Second Cold War starts)	- Low, in spite of "tilt" in 1971 - Increased pressure on non-proliferation	- China's support for nuclear programme - Strong US non-proliferation pressures

			- US embassy burned
1980s	Intense	- Very high - "Frontline state" to fight the soviet union in Afghanistan - Massive military and economic assistance - Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme ignored	- China supplies ballistic missiles
1990s	- By 1990 soviet Union starts to disintegrate - End of Cold War - Afghanistan - experiments (Mujahideen and later Taliban) backfire)	- Very low - Sanctions and arms embargo	.
2000s	- 9/11 and the war against terrorism - Increasing importance of access to energy resources of Central Asia - Iraq War	- "Frontline state" again, this time against "global terrorism" - Taliban and Al Qaeda escape into Pakistan - Concerns about radical Islam and Al Qaeda in and from Pakistan	Pakistan's role in creation of Taliban and Al Qaeda ignored, and US engagement with, and support for, Pakistan increasing

Source: Mathew Joseph, *Pakistan in a Changing Strategic Context* (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2004), p.78.

The Evolving Period & Ayub's Era (1952-1969)

Regional Defence Organizations

"The United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity on the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation or group of nations requesting assistance against armed aggression

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from any country controlled by International Communism" (White House Press Release, 5 January 1957, Text also in United States Department of State Bulletin, 1957) .

"In case of aggression against Pakistan, the Government of the USA in accordance with the con situation of the USA will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon and as is envisaged in the Joint Resolution to promote peace and stability in the Middle East, in order to assist the Government of Pakistan at its request" (United States Treaties and other International Governments., 1959). As Pakistan's president Ayub Khan "Pakistan had become America's most allied ally in Asia" (Khan, 1967) . During the second Eisenhower term, the relations between the two countries grew and Field Marshal Ayub Khan was able to develop strong relations with the Americans. "The US surveillance flights over the Soviet Union from Peshawar (Bada Ber) Airport are a case in point" (Marchchi, 1975).

The China Factor

After initial pleasantries, the relations between Pakistan and China grew to be strained by the day; the rather naive role played by Pakistan on the issue of China's entry to the United Nations triggered the mistrust" (Ispahani, 1964). Then the events in Tibet and Taiwan, to which Pakistan reacted in a totally pro-United States manner, further aggravated Sino-Pak relations. China went to the extent of warning Pakistan that such policies were "diametrically opposed to the interest of peace in Asia, and were also opposed to the national interests of Pakistan" (Bhutto, 1968).

- a. The later years saw Pakistan leaning towards China and playing a pivotal role in breaking the Sino-US deadlock. The US, although being appreciative of the gesture, was irked at Pakistan's growing relationship with communist China. This turned out to be a policy paradox for the US.
- b. The China factor still lingers on and casts a deep shadow over Pak-US relations. The growing military assistance of all types from China to Pakistan; the economic linkages manifest in the Gwadar Port project, are all indicators that Pakistan has found a substitute to total dependence on the US. Thus, the emergence of strategic ties between US and India. It is a balancing game that the US wants to play in the region; while being wary of the renaissance in Russia." (Dasgupta, 2004)
- c. The growing economic power of China and the huge market it boasts, are additional factors that impinge upon US policy makers. On the other hand, Pakistan views China as an emerging super power.

The initial Sobering Experience 1965

The 1965 Pakistan-India War was a hurried and an ill fated affair on the strategic plain by Pakistan. However what it did do is to bring to reality the even-handedness of U.S. while dealing with Indo-Pak disputes. The longed status of an ally of U.S. was put to rest for Pakistan;" Those (nations) who do not pass (the) test of friendship must forever be regarded by the present and future generations of Pakistanis as hypocrites and time-servers for whom a ...nation like Pakistan can have no use. We also must warn the perfidious in our midst

because we know there are some who are trying to keep us under the spell of various delusions" (Dawn (editorial), 1965). Unfortunately, this reality was still not vivid to most policy makers in Pakistan

Sobering Experience — The Sequel 1969 — 1972

In 1970's election General Agha Muhammad Yahya leader of Pakistani Party Awami League were come into power over Ayub Khan, the active President but the government did not transfer their powers to the newly elected government and as a result the state of Bangladesh was established.

"The opening to China was an essential element in Nixon's strategy of creating a new global balance of power. His aim was to bring China into the family of nations — reversing two decades of US efforts to isolate Beijing — and to use an improved US-Chinese relationship as a lever with Moscow to press for US-Soviet detente." (Mahmud, 1991)

The rulers of the Pakistan focusing on their own benefits and wanted a close relationship with the US government and for this purpose they did not give attention to the domestic problems. However, this proved to be a fatal false nation.

Birth of the Nuclear Factor — (1974 - 1977)

"Prime Minister Bhutto initially focused his attention with normalizing the domestic situation in the country. The major challenge for the new government came in May, 1974 when India executed an underground nuclear test. This forced Pakistan to seek a nuclear weapons program to match India's capabilities. This became a major cause for concern for the US administration" (Dasgupta, 2004).

During "Ford and later Jimmy Carter's administration, sanctions were placed on Pakistan. Prime Minister Bhutto called elections in, March 1977 from which he gained a landslide victory" (Dasgupta, 2004).

Graduating is a Front Line State — 1979 - 1988

"On December 29, 1979, Jimmy Carter approved a broader covert action program that instructed the CIA to provide military weapons and ammunition for the Afghan anticommunist fighters, who soon became widely known as **mujahideen**" (Kissinger, 1979).

Pakistan was given a \$3.2 billion aid package for the next six years. In this period Pakistan was a reliable ally for US and they help Pakistan for increasing their nuclear powers.

Unstable Democratic Governments, The Taliban and the Nuclear Explosion (1988 — 1998)

The US government give \$600 million aid to Pakistan after 1988 elections when Benazir Bhutto winning the election very effectively.

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After the 1988 elections, Benazir Bhutto came into power. "Since the US and Pakistani interests had diverted with the Soviets retreating from Afghanistan and the US getting actively involved in the Middle East" (Mazari, 2004) the sanctions were revived and the Pakistanis yet again felt isolated and betrayed by their "old friend" and "ally".

"The Clinton Administration had a tilt towards the more democratic Indian government during this time. The Pakistanis contented that the Pressler Amendment was specific to Pakistan and the sanctions were unjustified " (Kroastodt, 2004). By 1996 Pakistan's Afghan efforts were bringing some success and the **Taliban** government was established in Afghanistan. "The US administration initially welcomed the prospects of peace in the country but later opposed the Taliban regime based on their extreme fundamentalist views and gross violations of human rights" (Ahmad, 2004).

"Although a new nuclear deterrent had been established between India and Pakistan, another wave of international sanctions followed from the international community. This put further pressure on the already weak politic economy of Pakistan and fragile Pak-U.S. relations" (Kroastodt, 2004).

"The US had a new interest in **Afghanistan** by mid 1998 after the terrorist attacks on US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania by an organization belonging to **Osama Bin Ladin**" (Dasgupta, 2004) . The US officials and high authorities wanted Pakistan to use their influence and powers on Taliban to surrender but Taliban refused and new animosity started in the region.

President Musharraf — 9/11 and Partners in the Fight against Terror

In the period of President General Pervaiz Musharraf "Pakistan was moving closer to a "failed state" case and it's nuclear and missile programs were a constant concern for policy makers in Washington" (Zehra, 2004).

"9/11 changed the nature of US — Pakistan relations once again The US President George Bush asked the world to make a clear choice to side with the US with the slogan you are either with us or against us" (Zehra, 2004).

"In the last few years, Pakistan has captured several hundred operatives of the Al-Qiada organization" (Kroastodt, 2004). There has also been macro economic revival of the Pakistani economy. "On the Kashmir front, however, not much progress has been made since India has projected Pakistan as a supporter of terrorism in Kashmir itself, an accusation vehemently denied by the Pakistanis: and has used this time for a host of activities such as a massive crack down on the freedom movement in IHK, erection of an electrified fence along the Line of Control and pursuing disputed water projects, all to the peril of Pakistan"(Zehra, 2004). Hence the lack of enhancing or at least safeguarding of Pakistani interests in spite of renewed relationship with the U.S is again a cause of major concern to the Pakistanis.

TABLE –II
“US ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN, FY 2001- FY 2005
(in millions of dollars)

Programme or Account	FY 2001 Actual	FY 2002 Actual	FY 2003 Actual	FY 2004 Estimate	FY 2005 Request
CSH	--**	5.0	15.6	25.6	21.1
DA	-*-	10.0	*34.5	42.4	29.0
ERMA	--*-	25.0	*-	*-
ESF	624.5	188.0a	200.0a	300.0
FMF	-*-	75.0	224.5	74.6	300.0
IMET	0.9	1.0	1.3	2.0
INCLE	3.5	90.5b	31.0	36.5	40.0
NADR	--*	10.1	*-	5.0	8.0
PKO	220.0	--*-	--*	--*-
Subtotal	\$3.5	\$1,061.0	\$494.6	\$385.4	\$700.1
P.L. 480 Title Ic	0.5	10.0	9.0	5.8	.-
P.L. 480 Title Iic	1.9	5.1	9.7	(d)	(d)
Section 416 (b)c	85.1	75.7
Total	\$91.0	\$1,151.8	\$513.3	\$391.2	\$700.1

Source: U.S. departments of State and Agriculture; U.S. Agency for International Development”.

PART II

Key Contemporary issues bedeviling Pak-U.S. Relations

General

U.S. policy interests in Pakistan encompass a wide range of issues, including counterterrorism, religious extremism, nuclear weapons and missile proliferation. South Asian regional stability, democratization and human rights, economic reform and efforts to counter narcotics trafficking. "These concerns have been affected by several key developments in recent years, including proliferation and democracy-related sanctions; a Pakistan-India conflict over Kashmir and a continuing bilateral nuclear standoff; and, the September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States" (Aamir, 2004). "Revelations that Pakistan has been a source of onward nuclear proliferation to North Korea, Iran, and Libya has further complicated the future of Pakistan-U.S. relations. (Hasan, 2004) "

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Security and Terrorism.

After 9/11 terrorists attack on US Pakistan become a reliable ally for US in the War on Terror. Pakistan started banned so many groups in their premises like Lashkar-e-taiba and Lashkar-e-jhangwi and stopped them with using power.

"Pivotal Al Qaeda-related arrests in Pakistan have included Abu Zubaydah (March 2002), Ramzi bin al -Shibh (September 2002), and Khalid Mohammed (March 2003)" (Joseph, 2004) . The United States also identified Indian crime figure Dawood Ibrahim as a "global terrorist" with links to both Al Qaeda and Lashkar-e- Taiba.

Infiltration into Kashmir

"Islamabad has been under continuous pressure from the United States and numerous other governments to terminate the alleged infiltration of insurgents across the Kashmiri Line of Control" (Joseph, 2004). A vivid example of a vital national interest of Pakistan being rendered hostile treatment by our ally.

Infiltration into Afghanistan.

A more recent development is the alleged increased infiltration of terrorists and .their supporters across the Afghanistan - Pakistan border. "I want to establish parameters of the relationship between the two countries. One, we want friendship. Two, we want trade and business. Three, I want a civilized relationship with Pakistan which avoids acts of aggression against Afghanistan and support for extremism ... as much as we want good relations with Pakistan and other neighbours, we also oppose extremism, terrorism and fundamentalism coming into Afghanistan from outside. But there is the other page of the consequences if intervention continues, crosses - border terrorism continues: violence and extremism. Afghans will have no choice but to stand up and stop it. I would like to see Pakistan stop living in the dreams of attaining strategic depth. Let us all be friends and attain strategic depth that way" (<http://www.India.emb.org.eg/archives/Aug1,%2003/Karzai,%20India.htm>).

Domestic Terrorism

Pakistan continues to suffer from this cancer at home. "In the U.S. these attacks, often victimizing foreigners and religious minorities, are viewed as expressions of militants' anger with President Musharraf's regime for its cooperation with the United States" (Kroastodt, 2004).

Religious Extremism and Anti-American Sentiment

The US has always been weary of the Islamic identity of Pakistan. The issue boiled within Pakistan during General Zia's era, but it served the American interest at that time. Thereafter, religious extremism in Pakistan has been viewed by the US as the cause of spread of terrorism around the world. "These western provinces border Afghanistan which led to the fear - of their Talibanization of Pakistan in the American circles" (Zehra, 2004).

A survey in March 2004 results showing that on 6% of the whole nation of Pakistan think that the US is sincere to rid off the terrorism but 55% peoples think that US just try to dominate the world. Most analysts contend that "Pakistan is probably the most anti-American country in the world right now, ranging from the radical Islamists on one side to the liberals and Westernized elites on the other side." (Joseph, 2004).

Nuclear Weapons and Missile Proliferation

U.S. policy analysts consider the apparent arms race between India and Pakistan as posing perhaps the most likely prospect for the future use of nuclear weapons. "The International Atomic Energy Agency has implicated Pakistani companies in providing critical technology and parts to Iran's uranium enrichment program" (Kroastodt, 2004).

The history of U.S non-proliferation efforts in Pakistan is long and well known. The sanctions regimes have only isolated the two further apart from each other. More significantly, it has shown Pakistan the path to self-reliance; and has given an unprecedented rise to the anti-American sentiment. However there are persisting concerns on the issue, both in Pakistan and the U.S; concerns that can cast deep shadows on the future relationship of the two countries when the global war on terror takes a back seat in U.S. foreign policy formulation.

Democratization and Human Rights

Although the demand for western democratization of Pakistan is always on the agenda and is voiced as a source for concern; "it is being played in the background with visible U.S. support to the present Pakistani setup for all to see" (Joseph, 2004). It serves the purpose of both presently; yet again, when there is a divergence of interests, the westernized version of human rights and democracy can easily turn an old ally into a UN -acceptable autocracy.

Narcotics

Pakistan is a major transit country for opiates that are grown and processed in Afghanistan. "The region has in the past supplied up to 40% of heroin consumed in the United States and has been second only to Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle as a top source of the world's heroin" (Anjum, 2004). However, opium production has spiked in post-Taliban

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Afghanistan and, in September 2003, "President Bush again identified Pakistan as being among the world's major illicit drug producing or drug-transit countries" (Anjum, 2004). The US House International Relations Committee Panel told Pakistan that "the role of the ISI in the heroin trade over the past six years had been "substantial" (Dasgupta, 2004).

US — Indian Strategic Relations

Pakistan has seen its external Security environment become increasingly aggravated as a result of the Indo-US strategic relationship that began to gain momentum after the collapse of the Soviet Union and which has progressed steadily, despite India's nuclear tests in 1998 especially in the aftermath of 9/11. Pakistan's security parameters are being impacted upon by the Indo-US strategic partnership. In this context, the new US Security Strategy Paper of September 2002, and which marks a strategic shift in US security and foreign policy. From the Pakistani perspective, post — 9/11, the parameters dividing South Asia from the neighbouring Asian regions have further weakened especially with both Pakistan and India becoming part of the international coalition's war on terrorism and the presence of external military forces not only in Central Asia but also in the Indian Ocean. "The Indo-US agreement to jointly patrol the Indian Ocean from the Red Sea to the Malacca Straits reflects the redefinition of India's strategic milieu to effectively include the whole of Asia. Drawing the Central and West Asian regions more directly into the South Asian strategic milieu have been the various schemes/proposals for oil and gas pipelines. And now there is India's direct military presence in Central Asia with the setting up of an air base in Tajikistan at Farkhor" (Maitra, 2002).

- "Defence Policy Group (GDP), for tackling issues of defence cooperation. The group also tackles sensitive issues like CTBT and Kashmir.
- Joint Technical Group (JTG), for discussing issues related to defence research.
- Joint Steering Committee (JSC), for discussing personnel and information exchange, as well as joint exercises" (Grillot, 1999) .

PART – III

Pak- Us Relations : The Way Forward

General

While the expectations of both countries from each other remain very high and therefore a ripe case for mistrust; there is all the likelihood of continued closeness of relations at least in the foreseeable future. After all, with George Bush having been re-elected, the White House policy remains unchanged.

US Foreign Policy Compulsions vis-à-vis Pakistan

Realization of the Fragility of Pre-emption

In the post 9/11 period al-Qaeda killings and Guantanamo Bay-like human rights abuses; that social economic development of societies is also a necessary component of anti -terrorism. To a lesser extent, Washington also realizes that resolution of conflicts also contributes to condition of peace and security. Moving forward on these various fronts, Pakistan have become Washington's key ally.

The Geo-Strategic Compulsion

Also Pakistan's geographical location links it to four different regions -- South Asia, South West Asia, China and Central Asia — making it the swivel around which matters of trade, security, politics and economy revolve. By virtue of its location Pakistan has the inherent strength to influence security, trade and commerce, ideology and social state of all the four regions that surround it. As the hub of an open -ended United States proxy war, politico-economic instability and insecurity trickled to its surrounding areas. This reality is also vivid to the US.

Compulsions / Determinants for Pakistan

The New World Order.

Any viable policy on future strategy for Pakistan vis a vis its relations with the USA must be cognizant of, and address the new world order; broad contours of which are enumerated below: -

- a. The Bush doctrine of pre-emption, allowing US overseas intervention, with or without world/UN support.
- b. Is characterized by US Hegemony in a unipolar world, streaming out of her military and economic muscle.
- c. The emergence of regional centers of power and that of quasi and aspiring global players.
- d. Geo-economics is fast overtaking OEO -strategy; and the latter is now looked at as a function of the former.

Other Determinants of Future Relationship

How the contours of Pak-US relationship will shape in the days to come is a moot point. These will contingent upon domestic, regional and global factors.

- a. Domestically, how do the internal dynamics in Pakistan unfold in the coming days? In other words, how strong and stable is the present regime; and how effectively is it able

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- to handle the restive, resurgent and radical elements in the country. How astute is it in handling the economy; that exports terrorism.
- b. Regionally, as to how the ongoing peace process between India and Pakistan unfolds? The US, as a facilitator, would like to see progress in the regard. It would also monitor the course of our strategic relationship with China; and our role in Afghanistan.
 - c. Globally, how do the US forces ultimately fare in Afghanistan and Iraq? This would bear enormous domestic compulsions on the US; and world directly affect its commitment to the War on Terror, and thus Pakistan.

A Realistic Appraisal

What Pakistan must realize is that the present set up is a marriage of convenience and based neither on ideology, nor on an a notion of friendship; but as is the case in international relationships, it is based on convergence of interests. And the U.S. interests are the overriding factor. There is no logic in fighting reality and no cause for biased anti - Americanism; the relationship suits our interests too; and we would miss yet another opportunity if we were to let this one slip by. Pakistan has to endeavor for a meaningful and constructive engagement with the U.S. and look for the long term, diversify the nature of contact and broaden its base so as to remain an important player in the region as well as the Muslim Ummah. What Pakistan h as to be careful about is not to put all the eggs in one basket and be caught unawares. This is the time for internal action and consolidation to gain strength, and we must avail of this opportunity. While pursuing this path, Pakistan should not be complacent and must work out strategies if the scourge of the war on terror and the doctrine of pre-emption are pointed in its direction; after all, a misunderstanding or another horrible incident with linkages to Pakistan is not out of the realm of probability.

Pakistan's reform and reconstruction and its relations with Washington are significantly inter-linked. However, the extent to which Pakistan can benefit from this relationship will depend on Pakistan's internal political stability and on the reform of its state institutions. Pakistan's future course/strategy must aim at mitigating own vulnerabilities while accruing maximum advantage from those of the US. At the same time, it needs to be realistic and implement able.

Paradigms of Strategy

- a. **Self Reliance.** This must become a stated and vigorously pursued policy objective. We cannot enjoy dignified sovereignty without standing on our own two feet. What must be understood is that it is not necessary to antagonize others in realization of this aim.
- b. **Restoration of National and Religious Pride.** The dealing with the US MUST NOT be viewed as a compromise on our sovereignty. National dignity must be guarded and a positive perception to this effect be created both internally and in the international community. Own Islamic identity and character be portrayed as a source of strength and an understanding sought from the US to this effect.
- c. **Inner Front.** We must present a cohesive inner front to the US. If anything the foreign elements, including the America ns, should be dissuaded from interfering with and

- aggravating our internal problems. The "religious extremism" card can be played to own advantage in this regard.
- d. **Relationship with China.** The prowesses of Pakistani diplomacy faces its acid test with regards to thwarting American suspicion of own growing partnership with China. Pakistan must pursue this strategic relationship; while accruing benefits from contending Sino-US interests without alienating the US; lest the Indians are afforded an open field to foster relations with the USA. The Strategic relationship with China has to be nurtured and guarded at all costs; it will pay Pakistan in the long run.
 - e. **The Indian Factor.** The present US stance of bi-lateral relationships with both Pakistan and India, independent of each other, is fraught with danger for us. We can already witness the manifestation of this in the growing US -India strategic relationship. Leverage afforded by the present environment be put to effective use to disrupt / delay this growing nexus; and to address the conventional imbalance; as well as 'coerce' the US to facilitate the Kashmir resolution.
 - f. **War on Terror.** Pakistan must continue its support to the global war on terror. But the US be made to appreciate own 'bottom line' in this regard. This congruence of interests has to be carefully manipulated to own advantage. The strategy must redress internal fallouts; infact, pre-empt those if possible.
 - g. **Religious Extremism.** There is no such category in Pakistan, infact, this term is a misnomer; and the US be asked to not only appreciate own point of view but also to consent. On our part, we must ruthlessly root out extremists who perpetrate acts of extremism. The social utility of Madrassas and the effort to bring them into the mainstream be realized to the Americans and to the world.
 - h. **Nuclear proliferation / WMD.** Pakistan needs to work with the US on confidence building measures in this regard. Without compromising own national security or interests, we need to be viewed as a responsible nuclear power. We must be cognizant that the US perception in this aspect, like in most others, will mould world opinion.
 - i. **Media Blitz.** Pakistan must be vocal against the "unholy media blitz" leashed against it by the American and western electronic media. This is one issue where our stand should be un-ambiguous. All our efforts are rendered in vain as the perception about Pakistan being built by the media is what people perceive to be true. We must link this directly to the extent of own support to the US. In this aspect, we must have a defined watershed.
 - j. **Economy and Trade.** In the War on Terror Pakistan's destroyed their economy and trade as well as their defense. US should give Pakistan to access the International Financial Institutions and free Trade with Pakistan give a boost to their relationship.

Conclusion

In the War on Terror Pakistan destroyed their economy, trade and the defense capabilities. Pakistan wants a good relationship and become a reliable ally for the US government in War against Terrorism. Pakistan plays a vital role in the stability of Afghanistan. From vendetta oriented political leaderships and dictatorial regimes Pakistan is moving slowly

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and surely towards sustainable democracy and political stability. From a military centric concept of security Pakistan has realized the importance of a broader concept of security with the emphasis on economic and internal stability. These are paradigm shifts and the nation needs both time and space, internally and externally, to absorb these and steer the course to progress and prosperity.

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