

## **Compulsions of Sino-Pakistani Strategic Engagement in lieu of Security Constraints Engendered by the Anarchistic International Political System**

**Syed Shahbaz Hussain**

*University of Punjab, Lahore.*

**Umbreen Javaid**

*University of Punjab, Lahore.*

**Pirzada Sami Ullah Sabri**

*The Superior College, Lahore.*

**Muhammad Ilyas**

*The Superior College, Lahore.*

**Iffat Batool**

*Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, P.R. China.*

### **Abstract**

In this article, an analysis is made that how and why Pakistan China relations have emerged in strategic partnership with altogether difference in history, culture and ideology. Pakistan China relations have been extraordinarily long lasting engagement. Many constraints have been taking place in the anarchic international power politics in the region of South Asia which drove Pakistan and China to have strategic convergence for the regional balance of power. This partnership found its ground from the Realist School of International Relations which postulates that the states' internal character shaped by various factors, i.e. their history, culture and ideology, play a nominal role in their foreign policy choices; instead, the security constraints generated by the anarchic international political system leads states' preferences. Pakistan and China had not anything incommensurate their history, culture, religion or political system when they initiated formal diplomatic relations. Both the states originated from ideologies that were entirely different and later linked themselves to the blocs which were opposite during the Cold War period. In spite of the fact that both states did not share past and were in entirely contrasting blocs, they effectively continued close relationships in order to counter the regional and international challenges.

**Key words:** Boundary Agreement, Diplomatic relations, Indian hegemony, Security constraints, Territorial integrity, Regional reciprocal rivalry.

### **Introduction**

The security structure and compulsions of states contemporarily have transformed to a greater degree. According to Barry Buzan (year) state security in contemporary global political system is essentially inter-reliant. On this collective engagement, the states attempt to conglomerate the philosophies instead being involved to unproductive hostility and opposition. Pakistan was the first Muslim,

## **South Asian Studies 29 (2)**

non-Communist, and a member of Common Wealth that recognized China on January 5, 1950 and laid the foundation of diplomatic relations on May 21, 1951. Both the countries encountered issues provoking actions for their survival since the very early times of their independence. China was pushed in to war with Korea in 1951, while Pakistan was resisting India over Kashmir. China was supported and strengthened by its close alliance with the USSR during the Cold War. Pakistan joined the camp of the US in its struggles to enclose the spread of Communist forces in 1954 and joined SEATO. Consequently, Pakistan rewarded in terms of military and economic support that strengthened the newborn state of Pakistan.

This transformed security of the major events that brought both the states near to each other. This was the platform provided by the Non-Alignment Movement in the assembly of states of Afro-Asian held in Bandung during April 1955. The seven day meeting provided the two countries with a chance to clear up the reciprocal misperceptions and misconceptions. These were grown from their divergent political associations as they belonged to the two opposing blocs of the Cold War era. The next year, the Pakistani and Chinese Premiers swapped visits and their Joint Statement issued on 23<sup>rd</sup> October. They stressed that there is greater need to focus on the cultural exchanges and both the countries should have profitable relations (Hilali, 2005).

The following years paved the way for closer cooperation. China and Pakistan found themselves in an altered regional atmosphere that encouraged collaboration. The China-India relations became strained over the Tibet issue and ultimately escalated to war in 1962. The China Soviet split also widened and became visible when the Soviet Union assisted India against China in their war over Tibet. On the other hand, Pakistan felt left in dismay by the US in her war of 1965 against India as the latter did not advance any aid and assistance to Pakistan in an hour of trial. The disenchantment of both China and Pakistan by their allies became a ground for them to come closer in a further durable coalition to protect their endurance and territorial integrity. Thus, the altering conditions of Cold War alliances drove both the countries to make an entente.

### **International political scenario and its impact on regional security engagements in South Asia**

China, India and the Soviet Union were intimately knitted in to a bond initially. This form of relations continued to late 1950s but due to Tibet conflict it turned in to antagonistic engagement and a role leadership for the Third World (Singh, 1987). Pakistan was disenchanted when its Western allies initiated weaponizing India during its war against China in 1962. Pakistan found China, a possible ally with its new anti-Indian feelings. Thus due to the China India border skirmishes, relationship of Pakistan and China ameliorated unusually.

United States kept closed eyes on the swiftly worsening China India relationship. Instantaneously during the border clashes of November 1959 in

Ladakh, President Eisenhower commenced his visit to Asia and deliberated the issues with Indian prime Minister. Until 30 June 1959, the United States fully assisted India economically. It is valued over \$ 1,705 million included \$ 931 million in agrarian merchandises. India got \$ 4 billion from the United States from 1959 to 1963. This was far bigger amount it had received in 11-year period (Bhutto, 1969). This turned the regional power balance definitively in support of India. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto stiffed a strong complaint counter to the precipitous Western act to support India. He quantified, "In their own global interests, these countries have taken a stand and offered arms assistance to India despite our protest and these provisions increased Indian armed forces by no less than 40 per cent" (Bhutto, 1964, p.22).

United States had not recognized the People's Republic of China until 30 years after it achieved independence. Most scholars approve that US magnanimity towards India in the China India War in 1962 originated mainly from its deep-rooted hostility towards China along with an attention in charming India over to the Western bloc since the US was doubtful of the Soviet assistance to India. The US arms provisions to India also disheartened Pakistan. These progresses moulded the atmosphere in which China, India, and Pakistan fashioned their foreign policies. The China-India and China-Soviet's rifts in the 1960s profited to the founding of India-Soviet Union and also escorted pleasant Pakistan China relations. China alleged India of attaching itself to the USSR "strategy of encircling and containing China" (Ahmad, 1993, P.41). To poker chip this connexion, China gave importance to upholding relationships with Pakistan. "Consequently, China and Pakistan signed a Boundary Agreement in March 1963, followed by an Air Service agreement, which had the effect of ending China's isolation through the extension of the services of Pakistan International Airlines to its territory. China also became a reliable source of military hardware during a period that saw growing Western restrictions and embargoes on Pakistan" (Bhatty, 2000, p.50).

The US did not help Pakistan in war against India in 1965 and rather in its place enforced an arms embargo on both India and Pakistan, which deteriorated Pakistani weak defensive position additionally and provided added explanation for Pakistan's intimate relations with China. China was the country that provided substantial material assistance to counter Indian hegemonic behaviour (Ahmad, 1968). In this environment Pakistan China relations developed gradually and entered into a fresh period of military and economic collaboration. This supply of arms support to an already relatively fragile Pakistan caused her to become more dependent on China.

During the War of 1971 that brought about in the making of Bangladesh, Pakistan relished China's support however; the United States merely unwillingly drew-out its help to Pakistan as compared to the spoken support that India and Bangladesh got from the Soviet Union. India was determined to exercise regional domination after the disintegration of Pakistan. However, China disapproved the India's hegemonic purposes. She stated Bangladesh to be a conceived conception

## **South Asian Studies 29 (2)**

of the Soviet Union and India. The US was constrained to support Pakistan because of the initiative that Pakistan took in enabling the US-China entente in the 1970s. In the 60's, US nodded its aspiration to stabilise relations with China. In fact, Pakistan's role in this rapprochement was very vital. India supposed it as a Pakistan China and United States alliance and congruently reinforced its associations with the USSR. In August 1971, the India and USSR signed a mutual defence agreement that successfully barred China to support Pakistan in 1971 war (Ahmed, 1993). China always needed required affirmative role of powers in South Asia to guarantee regional peace and stability; however the Cold War competitiveness constrained the superpowers to support their corresponding benefits. That's the motive regional peace kept on being always more defenseless toward instability.

### **Reciprocal Indo-Pakistani Rivalry in South Asian Region**

The security environment of South Asia is formed by the reciprocal rivalry of India and Pakistan which they both inherited with their partition. This enmity gave rise to three wars between the two countries and the disintegration of Pakistan in 1971. Pakistan's military capability was lesser as compared to that of India. Owing to this inferiority, she was being supported by both the superpowers in an effort to acquire her loyalties and course of actions over to their corresponding coalitions. The purpose was to secure strategic benefits in South Asia. Moreover, a feeble Pakistan would turn the balance of power in India's benefit with which China was in a border disagreement.

However, the United States and USSR backed India during the 1962 Sino Indian war on boundary issue. Any exterior influence in the region, whether direct or indirect, postured a national security threat to China, hence she did not intend for US and USSR to have a durable base in the South Asian region. The positions of both the superpowers concerning India were contrary to Pakistan and China. China nullified the Indian claims on Kashmir and acted a composed and balanced role on this issue. According to a Chinese periodical; "The internal and external policies in both countries gave an upward push to their mutual friendly relations. The scope of mutual interest was so wide in nature that even leadership and regime changes in both countries did not affect this entente" (Peking Review, 1965). China's relations affected with many countries other than Pakistan after the Cultural Revolution and in Deng Xiaoping's era but coming into power China's relations with many countries affected other than Pakistan.

China powerfully sustained Pakistan in 1965 war. She did not involve in the war physically but diplomatically played its role to bring it to end. The Chinese support to Pakistan at such crucial time and ultimatum to India were driven by a mind set in China (Beijing Review, 1965). The Chinese press starkly condemned Indian war crimes, in a harsh and bitter discourse, against Pakistan. Rinmin Ribao held "India guilty for crossing the international border into territory of other side and launched massive attack, so India in every sense was an aggressor and Pakistan

its victim” (Survey of China Mainland Press, 1956). The note of August 27, 1965 sent by China to India said: “The Chinese Government must warn India that if it does not immediately stop such act of aggression and provocation, it must bear full responsibility for the consequences that may arise there from” (Sherwani, 1967, p.11). During the 1971, India-Pakistan war, China reinforced Pakistani support against Indian hostility.

## **Sino-Pakistani Strategic Convergence**

Pakistan and China have a partnership over decades. The close proximity emerged in 1950s when China extended its relations to developing nations. It had the design to have regional and international dominance. This dream came true through its huge trade infrastructure. Pakistan as a regional actor could not be ignored. Indian hegemonic designs in the region and its close ties with United States were a deep source of concern for China. China needed Pakistan to on set this power balance in the regional power politics. The economic and military ties of both states hold significant importance in the bilateral relations.

### **a- Military Partnership**

China paid special importance to Pakistan’s military development. China remained Pakistan’s largest defense supplier. During 1980s and 1990s it paid special attention to Pakistan’s defense requirements. China delivered nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan throughout these two decades. China provided Pakistan the following military weapons:

- i. M-11 ballistic missiles (short range)
- ii. JF-17 production facility
- iii. F-22P frigates
- iv. K-8 jet trainers
- v. T-85 tanks
- vi. F-7 aircraft
- vii. Ballistic missile facility near Rawalpindi
- viii. Shaheen-I missile
- ix. Two nuclear facilities near Chashma.

<http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/chinas-military-and-security-relationship-with-pakistan>

The overview of Pakistan-China military relationship gives a varied pattern of warmth of relationship. Very warm and heartfelt relationship reduced to low ebb in 1970s. Pakistan felt alone in 1970s but China did not give overt support to Pakistan. The overall pattern of Chinese policy to intervene between Pakistan and India does not show a clear pattern. Stephen Cohen is of the opinion that China supports Pakistan to gain strategic gain against India and to maintain classic balance of power in the region. It is a view that Pakistan overestimated China’s

support for it throughout the period of relationship. China remained neutral in so many strategic issues of Pakistan. Especially during the crisis of 1971, China did not meet Pakistan's expectations

(URL:<http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/2011/09/28/pakistans-china-syndrome/>).

### **b- Trends in Pakistan China Trade**

Pakistan and China share so many economic ties. Pakistan serves China as its one of profitable markets. In 2006, Pakistan and China signed Free Trade Agreement. China reduced its tariff on knitwear and woven garments. Pakistan got market access on zero duty on industrial alcohol, cotton fabrics, bed linens, home textiles and other goods (Memon, 2012, p. 40). This shows that China has given Pakistan special status of trading partner. Pakistani markets have shown positive trends in accepting Chinese goods. Pakistani markets can also be helpful in trading with Central Asia and Afghanistan.

The trade is a hot topic in Pakistan-China trade currently. Economic ties can further strengthen the political relations. Pakistan is strategically always important for China. But the current trend in economic disparity will benefit Pakistan less. Pakistan's focus must be upon the enhancement of its ties with China with a target to gain maximum benefit. Pakistan paid its maximum attention to gain militarily from China ignoring the strategic aspect of export ties. The nuclear and conventional arms gain overshadowed this wide spectrum of strategic interest.

**Pakistan China trade (value: US \$ million)**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Exports</b>	<b>Imports</b>	<b>Trade Balance</b>
2005-06	437	1843	-1,406
2006-07	548	2321	-1,773
2007-08	685	3029	-2,344
2008-09	661	2708	-2,344
2009-10-	1121	3284	-2,073
2010-11	1645	4145	-2,500

**Source: State Bank of Pakistan**

This table shows the trend of Pakistan China trade in the recent years amid swiftly transforming global, political and economic drift. Pakistani exports to China are increasing but not with the same pattern as Chinese exports are capturing here our local markets. Pakistan's export and import bill from China shows negative balance to this trend. This negative trend implies that Pakistan is more dependent on Chinese imports. But the industry of Pakistan is not capable enough to deal the Chinese product range. China has become one of top five import sources of Pakistan (Memon, 2012, p. 41). Pakistan's exports to China are only 0.65% while the Chinese imports constitute 13% of the market. Currently the bilateral trade is about \$12 billion but the assertion is to increase this volume to \$15 billion. The potential Pakistani exports to China can go up by \$ 6.7 billion (Council, 2013, p. 36). Pakistan China trade is now a topic of open debate. One of the constraints in its limitedness is that level of relationship only confined to government level. It is not delegated to private sector.

### **c- China's Nuclear Assistance to Pakistan**

This nuclear relationship initiated in 1971 with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's policy to pursue the foreign policy in a diversified way. He laid the foundation of nuclear program and seeks Chinese help (Rammana, 2011). This started the era of strategic partnership in a new dimension. This was the time when Pakistan brokered resumption of China-US diplomatic ties. Pakistan gained benefits and got nuclear help. Serious nuclear cooperation started in 1982 and in 1986 a treaty was signed for the transfer of nuclear material (Mishra, 2001).

### **Regional Order in South Asia**

In the Regional Security Complex of South Asia, India is the overpoweringly leading and hegemonic actor in rappings of material competences. The dissemination of abilities win this Regional Security Complex is unipolar. India has nevertheless remained unable to manage to alter its physical frontrunner into the dogmatic realism of hegemonic character. Actually, The politics in South Asia appears to have been motivated by a bipolar assemblage, with India incapable to decide its clash with Pakistan. The regional mandate in South Asia has persisted to be a power- restraining-power model. This climaxes the fact that no tactic for distribution of power can elucidate South Asian politics since India has not been able to lead regional matters according to its substantial dominance, nor has it efficiently nurtured regional amalgamation by the establishment of public beneficial mechanism. No plausible propensity of mutual balancing amongst the smaller South Asian states has been witnessed so far. In short, South Asian Regional Security Complex is distant from displaying an unwavering hegemonic order in spite of a unipolar dissemination of proficiencies.

This can be partially elucidated by the fact that, notwithstanding India's ostensible dominance, Pakistan is still disproportionately capable I contrast to the residual South Asian states (Bajpai, 2003). The states in the east (Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Sikkim, and the Maldives) were too feeble to struggle against Indian hegemonic attitude. These developments were combined by the limitation of outsiders who recognized India's leading part in this region. Thus, the United States tolerated India's interferences in Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Nepal (Bajpai, 2003). In the west, however, the condition is dissimilar for India. During the Cold War, the bipolar rationality within this suborder was continued through superpower participation "Given this backdrop of a bipolar international system interacting with a quasi-bipolar regional system, it is not surprising that attempts at conflict management in western South Asia have been sparse and ineffective" (David Lake, 1997).

## **Kashmir Issue**

Kashmir has inordinate implication for Pakistan and India, and they have been contending over this territory ever since they attained independence. Kashmir's strategic location marks it as an imperative part of Pakistan's foreign policy. Its unsettled position and continuous control by India is one of the main conflicting issues in South Asia. In the early stage of the conflict, China took a rational stand and pushed both sides to go for a two-sided resolution for the peace of region (Rizvi, 1994). Even during Cold war era when Pakistan decided to be an ally of Western powers, China kept stick to its policy and after Pakistan and China became closer, China changed its policy in favor of Pakistan. The only serious apprehension arose from Chinese side was on the issue of China-Pakistan border conflict but Pakistan resolved that issue amicably and China appreciated this policy of Pakistan. After becoming the member of UN and Security Council China has showed its full support for self-determination right of Kashmiri people.

The policy of China did change after the death of Mao as China and India got close economically. After that development China has the stance in the favor of negotiation and peaceful resolution of the issue but still many analysts believe that the Chinese tilt is more towards Pakistan in this issue. Their view is founded on the fact that Kashmir still finds its place on the schedule of maximum mutual dialogues between Pakistan and India. On May 2001, the Chinese Prime Minister stated, "Kashmir is a problem left over by history. China appreciates and agrees with the position taken by Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir. We will try our utmost and spare no efforts for peaceful resolution of this issue" (Pakistan's Foreign Policy ...2003).

## **Hegemony in the Indian Ocean**

Indian Ocean is very important for the regional politics and because of its richness in natural resources and strategic location and being a trade route makes India to make a strong foot hole in the ocean (Jaspal, 2003). The Indian motivations of authority in the Indian Ocean are imitated by the statement of an Indian naval officer, who openly specified the control of Malacca Straits (Jaspal, 2001). The self-assumed supremacy disorder in the Indian mind-set has prospect to ground fight with China and Pakistan, since both have lasting benefits in the Indian Ocean too. According to Zhengjia, Beijing's key goal is to preserve steadiness in the Indian Ocean (Zhengjia, 1999). "To attain these objectives, China emphasizes regional co-operation and considers it one of the ways to reach the goal of economic advancement in South Asia. This is why Beijing lauded the inauguration of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) in Mauritius on 5 March 1997, while India opposed Pakistan's membership tooth and nail"(Zhengjia, 1999.p41).



## **The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan**

The Soviet assault on Afghanistan in 1979, unlocked a new period of partnership among Pakistan China. Both the countries were in complete settlement in context of the USSR presence in the Afghanistan and considered it a great risk to the security and stability of the region. According to an analyst, "Support to Pakistan's security was the major feature of China's Afghan policy because the Chinese want to honor their often repeated commitments"(Rehman, 1998, p.122). The Soviet extension southwards was also potential serious hazard to the sovereignty of China and Pakistan. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the security atmosphere of South Asia became even more intricate (Rizvi, 2004). Pakistan's sense of susceptibility improved additionally due to the Durand Line problem; the undecided western border upon which the earlier Afghan governments had frequently elevated qualms. Since the Soviet presence in the Afghan territory posed a great trial to the United States' strategic securities and interests in the region, the US delivered substantial volumes of economic and military aid to Pakistan to contest the interventionist Soviet Union. China provided clandestine military supplies worth US \$ 200 million to the Afghan Mujahidin through Pakistan. In the face of international view, India did not disapprove the Soviet incursion of Afghanistan (Rehman, 1998).

Due to internal political and economic factors, the Soviet Union ultimately crumbled in 1991, paving the way for a unipolar international order. With the withdrawal of Soviet Union, the US attention also stone washed in Pakistan because the US had attained its anticipated purposes in the region. Soon subsequently, the US became far more absorbed in India as a regional balancer against China, inspiring a new wave of unpredictability and fear in Pakistan and greatly pushing Pakistan to depend highly on China.

## **Nuclearization of South Asia**

In May 1998, India conducted its nuclear test and warranted it by asserting that the professed nuclear threats from China in specific. The statements openly imitated India's regional hostility. This growth resulted in a strategic inequality in China's neighbourhood. This test positioned Pakistan's security on high risk and with the change in power equivalence between the two important foes; Pakistan military capability became even more substandard to the Indian military and political strength. At this point, Pakistan took up the conclusion to promote its own nuclear program as a restrictive against the Indian threat. According to Hassan Askari Rizvi, "Pakistan decided in principle to work towards building a nuclear weapon capability in 1972 in the aftermath of military debacle in 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, but it did not acquire any new technology for that purpose before India's first nuclear explosion in May 1974" (Banerjee, 1987, p.23).

After India tested its nuclear capability in 1998, China provided complete

political and diplomatic support to Pakistan after which Pakistan remained able to test its nuclear bomb because after Indian explosion number of world states were in favor of bringing resolution in Security council which states that all countries who test their nuclear arms will sanctioned according to Iraq model but the Chinese veto power stopped it to pass form Security Council. Currently, India disobeyed NPT by terming it “discriminatory” (Haider, 2002).

### Gwadar Port: Sino-Pakistani Strategic Leverage in the Region

The proximity of Gawadar port with Strait of Hormuz makes it more relevant for strategic and economic interest of China. The Strait of Hormuz is the global oil conduit. About 35% of world oil trade takes place through this (Hamdan, 2012, p.23). China’s economy is oil hungry due to its huge volume. The oil from this state is to be sea boarded for about 4000km to the Eastern coast of China. Gawadar shortens this distance to just 2000km. This is a considerable advantage for Chinese economy and with the passage of time it would become integral for Chinese trade route. Pakistan draws considerable benefit from this development. The Growth pole/Growth centre theory describes the pattern of the development of a region. The development of a region is not uniform rather is concentrated more on a pole. The development is of a key industry around which so many other industries revolve. The geographical factor in development and improvement is crucially important (Syjanoska-Wysocka & Kulesza, 2007).

Strategic location of Gwadar Port



Source:<https://www.google.com.pk/search?q=map+of+gwadar+port&tbm=isch&imgil>

The Gawadar ports rests on this strategic notion of concentrated and spatial development. The Gawadar port is of significant importance for Pakistan economically, geographically and militarily. Gawadar holds this capability to further deepen Pakistan’s strategic depth by 460KM. It will also enable Pakistan to monitor Sea Lines of Communication (Malik, 2012, p. 58). This benefit enhances Pakistan’s capability to monitor India and manoeuvre freely in Indian Ocean. The

benefit becomes twofold for China and Pakistan as it checks Indian Blue Navy dream and US 5<sup>th</sup> fleet presence in Persian Gulf. Indian and US influence in Indian Ocean is threat to the security of China and Pakistan both. The convergence of interest drives both states to mutually get gain out of this strategic port. The joint manoeuvre establishes naval nexus between Pakistan and China. It also denies Indian navy freedom to move in Indian Ocean and enhances security of Ocean (Chailand, 1994).

This port provides China with an alternative route for trade. US influence in South East Asia is an irritating factor for China. In case US blocks Strait of Malacca China's trade would not be hindered (Malik, 2012). The trade is the lifeline of every state today. Pakistan also draws its huge benefit from this strategic port in regard to its trade. Globalization has increased trade many folds. The sea trade has increased from 2.37 billion tons of cargo to 5.88 billion tons of cargo (Stapford, 2009, p. 3). Pakistan had considerable problem in maximizing the volume of Karachi and Bin Qasim Ports. Out of eight locations Gawadar was considered as best port location. The distance from India also helps to ensure its security. The deep sea port has a great potential to become a trading hub for landlocked Central Asia giving huge profits to Pakistan and China. Pakistan plans to develop rail roads within its territory to make transportation of cargo to and from Gawadar more feasible. China, by extending its East-West railway network from Kashghar to Peshawar, can make transportation of goods laid-back (Anwar, 2011). China always showed deep concern and commitment for this cause. It has the tendency to cement Pak-China relations more strongly. Earlier the operationalization of Gwadar was handed over to Singapore's PSA International but later it was also given to Chinese state owned company. In 2004, three Chinese engineers were killed in Gawadar. Same year two more Chinese engineers working in South Waziristan on hydroelectric project were abducted and one of them died. China did not find it a huge price as compared to its goals in this strategic port.

### **Sino-Pakistani Engagement: A Natural Conglomerate**

The alliance between China and Pakistan is termed as natural because of various ground realities. Many factors which molded Sino-Pakistani partnership in a natural progression of actions mainly during their early days of independence that overlapped with the early years of the Cold War. Pakistan serves as a connection between East Asia and West Asia on one hand and East-Asia and Central Asia on the other hand (Griffiths,2008). Its position between the energy-rich Persian Gulf and Asia Pacific made it an eye-catching place for the world powers during the course of the Cold War. The United States' policies were directed at constructing this region abase to counter the Communist development. Pakistan, however, did not join the deals to counter China (Hashmi,1973). Rather these defense pacts were destined to guarantee Pakistan's national security in contradiction of external threats.

Pakistan and China geographically located in vicinity of competitors; China shared borders with the Soviet Union, India and Japan while Pakistan shared borders with India and Afghanistan. Pakistan's relations with its neighbors were not pleasant; and China's acknowledge men partially pleased Pakistan's concerns in sustaining her territorial integrity. China wanted to promote sociable relations with her SouthAsianneighbors.ChinafirstmovedtowardsIndiaowingtoitsnon-alignedpolicy. This paved the way for "Panchsheel Agreement" between China and India in April1954. In that era, Pakistan China relationship was at the lower most level for the reason that of Pakistan's affiliation with US and China headed towards India. China-India relations caused to be worsening abruptly after1959duetotheir dissimilar positions over Tibet which ultimately came out in a full-fledge war due various domestic, regional, and international factors. The geographical realities and the related security necessities required China and Pakistan to value their friendship outside every other deliberation.

Pakistan joined SEATO and CENTO in order to augment its defence capacity *vis-à-vis* India and to secure economic benefits. Aalliances offer and ensure increased economic security among the partners (Jain,1974).“The main driving force behind a nations' foreign policy is its urge to maintain its independence and territorial integrity. Pakistan surrounded by host of neighbors, must seek arrangements guaranteeing its territorial integrity and permitting it to preserve its distinct ideological personality” (Bhutto,1964, p.12).Although Pakistan could not afford to have a foreign policy liberated from external compulsions and pressures in its early days owing to the economic and security benefits that she importantly reached through her alliance with the US, this alliance did not stop Pakistan's funding for the China. One of the initial tests of the Pakistan China engagement was the Korean Warin the early 1950s. The West aided South Korea and presented resolution on June 25and2,1950 in the United Nations Security Council that declared North Korea as an aggressor state. Pakistan did not join sixteen nation's force to fight communist forces (jain,1974).

### Conclusions

Pakistan-China relationship is unique in its nature and goals. The two states share so much benefits that they always endeavored to keep this relation warm and intact. Pakistan has always been wary of its conventional military disparity with India which was mitigated by China through nuclear assistance. China's primary concern was to maintain the balance of power in the region. This Chinese doctrine provides the basis of Pakistan-China strategic partnership. This partnership is of bulky significance for both states to attain their respective objectives. The way forward for China to maintain this balance, reduce Indian threat in the region and support Pakistan as a state against Indian was to equip it militarily. The nuclear assistance was based on filling the conventional gap in Pakistan's military capacity.China has taken a strategic policy shift in Indian Ocean. The policy is based on various economic, political geographic and military interests. The

presence in Indian Ocean ensures to check the US policy of concentration in Asia. The Indian hegemonic designs in the region are source of concern for China. This concern is mitigated by Chinese presence on strategic port of Gawadar. It also strengthens the bilateral relationship between Pakistan and China. This deep sea port is integral currently for Pakistani endangered economy.

The bilateral engagement was not free of ups and downs and jerks. There were foreign policy phases of warmth and coldness. But the overall cost of this relationship is not so low. China's real politik approach in its foreign policy compelled it to take a soft stance on Pakistan. It seems China had a full feasibility of its strategic gains from Pakistan. Pakistan also drew considerable gains from this partnership. Pakistan's chief concern was threat from India which could be checked by this engagement. This course of partnership passed through various rocky roads and witnessed bilateral disagreements over so many issues. But the two states resorted to drive out of these through mutual consensus on other strategic issues.

## References

- Ahmad, M. (1968). *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*. Karachi: Space Publishers.
- Ahmad, S. (1993). Sino-Indian Relations in a Changing World. *Regional Studies*, 11(3).
- Anwar, Z. (2011). Gwadar deep sea port's emergence as regional trade and transportation hub: Prospects and Problems. *Journal of Political Studies*.
- Bajpai, K. (Ed.). (2003). *Managing Conflict in South Asia*. New York: Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Banerjee, S. (1987). Explaining the American "Tilt" in the 1971 Bangladesh Crisis: A Late Dependency Approach. *International Studies Quarterly*, 31(2).
- Bhatty, M. A. (2000). Pak-China Relations in the 21st Century *Regional Studies*, 28(1).
- Bhutto, Z. A. (1964). *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs.
- Bhutto, Z. A. (1969). *Myth of Independence*. Karachi: Oxford.
- Chailand, G. F. (1994). *The art of war in world history*. Los Angeles: University of California press.
- Council, T. P. (2013). *Preliminary study on Pakistan China trade partnership post FTA*. Karachi: The Pakistan business Council.
- Fazal-ur-Rehman. (1998). Pakistan's Relations with China. *Strategic Studies*, 21(14).
- Griffiths, M., O'callaghan, T., & Roach, S. C. (2008). *International relations: the key concepts*. Taylor & Francis.
- Haider, Z. (2002). The US Policy towards Nuclear South Asia at the Dawn of 21st Century. *Regional Studies*, 20(2).
- Hamdan, S. (2012, January 11). Pipeline avoids Strait of Hormuz. *New York Times*.
- Hashmi, B. (1973). The Beginning of US-Pakistan Alliance. *Pakistan Forum*, 6(3).
- Hilali, Z. A. (2005). *US-Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*. Burlington: Ash gate Publishing.
- [http://www.ipcs.org/pdf\\_file/issue/SR91.pdf](http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR91.pdf)
- [http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex\\_database](http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database).
- Jain, J. P. (1974). *China, Pakistan and Bangladesh*. New Delhi: Radiant Publishers.
- Jaspal, Z. N. (2001). India's Missile Capabilities: Regional Implications. *Pakistan Horizon*, 54(1).
- Jaspal, Z. n. (2003). India's Look-East Policy: New Challenges for Pakistan. *IPRI Journal*, 3(1).
- Lake, D. A. (1997). Regional security complexes: A systems approach. *Regional orders: Building security in a new world*, 52.
- Malik, H. Y. (2012). Strategic importance of Gawadar. *Journal of Political Studies*.
- Memon, N. A. (2012). *Pak-China trade relations*. Chinese Review.
- Mishra, R. K. (2001). *Nuclear and Missile threat to India: China-Pakistan nexus in South Asia*. South Asia Analysis Group.
- Peking Review*, (1965, September 17)

## South Asian Studies 29 (2)

- Rammana, S. (2011). *China-Pakistan nuclear alliance*. New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.
- Rizvi, H. A. (2004). *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Overview*. Islamabad: PILDAT.
- Rizvi, H. A. (Ed.). (1994). *(China and Kashmir)*. Islamabad: Pakistan Forum.
- Sherwani, L. A. (1967). *India, China and Pakistan*. Karachi: Ferozsons.
- Singh, G. (1987). *Sino-Pakistan Relations: The Ayub Era*. Amritsar: Guru Nanak Dev University Press.
- Stapford, M. (2009). *Maritime Economics*. London: Taylor & Francis.
- Survey of China Mainland Press, 1956, 31 October.
- Syjanoska-Wysocka, A., & Kulesza, M. A. (2007). *Studies of Social and spatial industrial centre*. Lodz.
- URL:<http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/2011/09/28/pakistans-china-syndrome/>
- URL:<http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/chinas-military-and-security-relationship-with-pakistan>
- Zhengjia, Y. (1999). Experience and Lesson in 40 Years in 40 Years of Sino-Indian Relations. *Gouji Wenti Yanjiu*, 23(4).

## Biographical Note

**Syed Shahbaz Hussain** Assistant Professor, Government of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan.

**Prof. Dr. Umbreen Javaid** is Professor & Director, Department of Political Science, Punjab University, Lahore Pakistan.

**Pirzada Sami Ullah Sabri** Assistant Professor of Business and Management Sciences, The Superior College, Lahore. Pakistan.

**Muhammad Ilyas** is Chairman, Faculty of Management Sciences, The Superior College, Lahore. Pakistan.

**Iffat Batool** College of Education, Xixi Campus, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, P.R. China.

---