

## **Structuralism and the Indo-Pak Rivalry: Responsible Politico-Economic Factors and Policy Analysis**

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### **Abstract**

Ever since the partition of Indian subcontinent in 1947, India and Pakistan have marched on the path of mutual animosity. Both the countries are struggling to clear out their relation clouded by the debris of partition. Not only are Indo-Pakistani relations tremendously explosive, intertwined as they are with communal relations and internal power struggles in both countries. With their inherently linked foreign policies, both countries have used the Indo-Pak segregation to muster support of their conjugal hard-liners against each other. The historic rivalry is further heightened by the efforts of the ruling government of both the nations. They play an eminent role to ignite antagonistic feelings against each other to suffice their agendas such as winning public support and to divert the attention of the masses from real issues especially economic turbulences.

Hence, they have been both the victims and the perpetrators of violence and extremism. With the advent of new governments in Pakistan and India headed by Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif and Narinder Moudi, it seems that Indo-Pakistan relations might turn a corner. Measures have been taken to move towards a less antagonistic and more cooperative equilibrium; aiming to extinguish the decades old conflagration of mistrust and animosity. Both nations are interested in strengthening trade ties, exchange of Most Favored Nation (MFN) status, share gas and oil pipelines from Iran and Central Asia, and follow the path of peace and conflict resolution. While this may not end the intractable rivalry between India and Pakistan, it's imperative for the stability and prosperity of both the regions that opportunities for mutual cooperation be pursued further. Simultaneous conflict over territory, national identity and power position in region, makes Indo-Pak rivalry an enduring one. (Paul, 2005). Therefore, it might result in a yawning hiatus between rhetoric and reality.

This paper will encompass four parts. Part one will present an in-depth view of the theory of structuralism. Part two will highlight the history of the genesis of the rivalry between India and Pakistan. Part three will focus on current relations of the two nations. Part four will therein confer a conclusion, based on the relationship of the two countries.

## Structuralism

An approach, which lay emphasis on the structures that motivate human behavior, is structuralism. Fundamental themes of structuralism includes: the core elements of the structure remain considerably analogous, but the relationships between them alter; concepts that appear 'natural' to us, such as masculinity and femininity, are in fact social constructs; and that the individuals, too, are the product of relationships. Thus, individual's actions are dictated by the overall circumstances—structures—in which they operate. These structures are comprised of the rules, conventions, and restraints upon which human behavior is based. For example, within the structure of capitalism, the optimal location for an industry would be at the point of maximum profits.

The theory of structuralism can be elaborated by the twist given to realist international relations theory by Kenneth Waltz. Instability and war were less the result of fraudulent human nature or poorly constituted states than of fluctuating distributions of power across states in an anarchical international system. Earlier realist explanations that had dwelt on the characteristics of individual states and their leaders were dismissed as reductionist.

How does one understand the relationship between two arch-rival neighboring countries such as India and Pakistan? There are two possible ways. Relations can be understood on a case to case basis either through historical processes or thematically. In doing so, it is important to identify the points of convergence and divergence; subsequently explaining them in historical perspective or rationally. A rational approach points to a structural explanation of relations. It is the structure that ascertains the schedule of interests for states. No state can adhere to policies with regard to another state that are incongruent with the logic of the given structure (Rajgopalan & Sani, 2008). Hence the regional balance of power and regional systems must be taken in consideration while formulating relations with other states. The character of such systems influences the strategic policy culture of the pursuing state in a given system. Observing such influences on national policies and their interaction with other state policies develops a structure which determines internal and external factors of foreign policy.

The debate of internal and external factors in foreign policy can be approached a bit more directly by incorporating Kenneth Waltz's views. He contrasts this theory of regional politics from foreign policy theories by arguing that they are different in *raison d'être* (Waltz, 1998). A structural theory of regional policies explains why different states behave similarly; while foreign policy theory reasons out why similar placed states behave differently. The debate gets heated on the question that how convincing is his theory in practice? One cannot refute the fact that every state is primarily concerned about its own physical survival. Survival remains the distinctive leitmotif of all states (Tellis, 2007). However, states differ on the basis strategy selection and the means of survival. Great regional powers maintain its regional structure by ensuring stability whereas weaker nations balance the structure by acquiring friendship of extra-territorial

global nations. Thus a regional structure is intercepted by global actors for the physical security of lesser powers. During the Cold War bipolar system, Pakistan acquired a strategic regional balance in relation to India, a regional power, by drawing the US sponsored anti Communist alliances- South East Asia Treaty organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty organization (CENTO) (Soherwordi, 2010).

### **Indo-Pak History and Structuralism**

The blaze of excitement of partition whimpered to a pervading gloom as structural imbalance between the two parts of the Subcontinent that became India and Pakistan became evident even before the partition. Mountbatten, who was tasked by the British Government to oversee transfer of power to Hindus and Muslims, failed to maintain impartiality. It is important to note that 'in each of his objectives, which he himself had helped to draft, Mountbatten failed' (Roberts, 1994). As per the opinion of Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinlack, 'Mountbatten was already a partisan before he arrived (in India)' (Hamid, 1986). From day one, Mountbatten was dubious about Muslims' competence in running a new state-Pakistan. On April 25, 1947, while speaking with his staff, Mountbatten questioned, 'whether there were likely to be sufficiently intelligent Muslim officials to administer Pakistan' (Roberts, 1994, p. 85). The following day, during an official meeting he said that the last thing which he wanted to see would be that Hindustan left the Empire irretrievably and Pakistan remained within irretrievably (India Office Records, 1947). On a personal level, Mountbatten was on very cordial terms with Nehru but had very unkind words for Jinnah whom he found 'most rigid, haughty and disdainful' (Mansergh, 1970-1983). Such a biased approach to the 'divide' further amplified the hatred between the two nations.

During the independence movement, Jinnah focused on the advance of Muslims 'as a nation'. He insisted that Gandhi should accept the 'basis and fundamental principles' adumbrated in the Lahore Resolution. However, Gandhi, who was very cynical to any of his demands said: 'I find no parallel in history for a body of converts and their descendents claiming to be a nation apart from the parent stock'. He further said, 'If India was one nation before the advent of Islam, it must remain one in spite of the change of faith of a very large body of her children' (Singh, 2009). Gandhi's failure to maintain unified India inflamed the contentions further. Alleged interference in each other's internal affairs forms an irritant in Indo-Pak relations which has raised its head very seriously not only in the past but in recent years too. Both the countries were entangled in such acrimony that their internal reasons of instability were imposed on each other as external factors of interference.

Hence, amalgam of these internal and external factors provided a structural framework, serves as the pillar on which the structure of foreign policies of both

the nations stands. Regardless of the changes in regime, the policy makers of both the countries keep this structural reference stagnant.

### **Internal Factors That Determine Rivalry**

With a thorough consideration of structural theory and its application between India and Pakistan, internal factors that ascertain long standing Indo-Pak rivalry are as follows:

#### **The Divide**

With the partition, Pakistan received 23 percent of the total territory and 19 percent of the population of the Subcontinent (Gankovsky & Gordon, 1970). Though partition was a moment of joy, emotions were running high. In Pakistan, people were celebrating independence from the British and the majority-Hindus alike. But in India, the blaze of excitement whimpered to a pervading gloom with the segregation of the Sub-continent. The countries were birthed out of a bloody partition that encouraged each to define itself in antagonism to the other. 'Indian attitudes have been colored by the fact that Pakistan is seen as a secessionist state; while in Pakistan there has been the abiding fear that India will seek to undo the 1947 Partition' (Talbot, 2012, p. 16)

It was inevitable that future relationship between the two newly born countries will be aggravated by the internal and external factors. Two societies who once shared common culture and ethnicity were now sidelined in the wake of the name 'divide'.

#### **Kashmir Dispute**

The imbroglio of Kashmir which has bedeviled the relations between India and Pakistan right from independence has brought about an unbridgeable divide between the two countries. Unfortunately, the Kashmir question is unlikely to be answered soon. Niccolo Machiavelli has rightly said for a situation like the Indo-Pak rivalry: 'When neither their property nor their honor is touched, the majority of men live content' (Machiavelli, 2009). However, the 'Divide' happened for the separation of territories between the two countries. Discontent with the division of land resulted in the Kashmir dispute. The way the Muslim majority Kashmir acceded to India was not recognized by Pakistan. The unjust Kashmir accession touched on sensitive honor of South Asians'. Now, it's no longer a political issue, rather a purely egoistic issue with more complications from religion and ethnic divisions. Interestingly, India, a heterogeneous country with multitudes of diversities still behaves like an ideological state. Mr. L. K. Advani of Bharatiya Janata party (BJP) claimed in 1991 that 'India may be multilingual, multi-religious and multinational, but her culture is one- Hinduism' (Arif, 2000). While both countries attempt to portray a religious tolerance in their outlook for the world,

they are still chained in their origins of divide- religion. Their internal policies' failure is normally attributed to outside intervention in reciprocity.

A classic way to comprehend Indo-Pak relationship is its comparison with a roller coaster. Peace efforts take long to reach to a point of culmination. However, a slight jolt throws off the entire process of intended détente. During 1997-99, track-two diplomacy was in progress for the resolution of the issue of Kashmir. Niaz A. Naik from Pakistan and Barjesh Mishra from India (both former foreign secretaries) were negotiators on the project. Nuclear tests, first by India and then by Pakistan, elevated fears of a nuclear holocaust in South Asia. This endangered the trust between the two countries. Niaz A Naik's says that the nuclear tests damaged the track-two diplomacy and the issue of Kashmir for which Mr. Naik and Mr. Mishra had reached to a solution- Chenab Formula (Naik, 2000). However, in 1999, the then two Prime Ministers, Atal Bihari Vajpai and Nawaz Sharif tried to mitigate tensions by initiating 'Bus' diplomacy to build trust. According to Ambassador Naik, the peace initiative was in progress but the Kargil episode abandoned the peace initiative to infancy. This led to the Kargil war in 1999 which brought an end the 'Bus' diplomacy (Naik, 2000). China's neutrality and political pressure of the US administration on Pakistan ended the Kargil war. In Pakistan, the military and the civilian government were at odds regarding the Kargil issue. Hence, via a military *coup*, the democratically-elected government of Nawaz Sharif was removed, and General Musharraf came into power (Cohen, 2005).

The man responsible for the Kargil war and 'Bus' diplomacy fiasco, General Pervez Musharraf, was invited by Prime Minister Vajpai for furthering peace efforts between the two countries. However, due to the intransigent attitude of both leaders on what should be the priority for their talks, the Agra summit also turned into a fiasco (Mohan, 2003). The Pakistani side wanted to initiate talks on Kashmir dispute, but the Indian side insisted to begin with cross-border terrorism.

### **Attack on Indian Parliament**

On December 13, 2001, a terrorist attack took place on the Indian Parliament. India blamed Pakistan for the attack and pressurized her by downgrading diplomatic relations, moreover, suspended train and air services (Sattar, 2013). This also resulted to the deployment of the troops' on the border of the two countries. Both armies were standing face-to-face with the possibility of an all-out war. 'For a year the two armies stood 'eyeball to eyeball' and on more than one occasion the two countries came dangerously close to the brink of war' (Sattar, 2013). However, after the occurrence of 9/11 any war or a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan would have sidetracked US attention from its War on Terror. Hence, Washington exerted pressure on both countries to show restraint (Petil & Jha, 2003).

## **Mumbai Attacks 26/11**

The latest wave of trouble in Indo-Pak relations took place in 2008 in the form of the 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attacks. The Indian government once again accused the government of Pakistan for not taking appropriate measures in curbing anti-India terrorist organizations. Pakistan's government declared 26/11 as being a sheer and blatant failure of Indian internal security system.

The turmoil between the two countries does not cease here. Certain insiders give a different version of Indo-Pak relations. To hurt each other's interests, they orchestrate drama of crisis to malign each other. It is alleged that Pakistan continuously breach the 'Line of Control' and that its Inter-Services Intelligence agency sponsor terrorists' attacks in India (Marino, 2014). A former Indian home ministry officer submitted his declaration in the Supreme Court of India which said that he was told by a former member of the CBI-SIT team that both the terror attacks (Parliament and Mumbai) were staged "with the objective of strengthening the counter-terror legislation (sic)." The affidavit also included reference to the attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001 which was followed by the controversial Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), and the 2008 Mumbai attacks which led to amendments in the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) (2013). The blame game and pseudo crisis further disrupt relations as per structuralism.

## **External Factors**

Not only internal factors, certain extrinsic irritants strain Indo-Pak relationship. Pakistan has been referred to as a 'prisoner of its geography' by some scholars. 'The region's geo-politics since the 1980's have brought Pakistan economic benefits, but high costs in terms of internal instability arising from the 'blowback effects' of weaponization, the influx of afghan refugees and the support afforded to militant and sectarian expressions of Islam' (Talbot, 2012, p. 17). The US administration with the assistance of General Zia created 'Islamic Jihadis' and 'techno-guerillas' that later turned against their creators (Ayaz, 2013, p. 269). Since independence, the Pakistani establishment had an Indo-phobia. They thought that India had not accepted Pakistan's existence whole-heartedly. In 1947, with the birth of Pakistan, the Kashmir dispute, water problems, delay in division of financial and military assets and the problems of refugees were some examples of mal-intentions to weaken each other. Thus India came to be regarded as the main security concern of Pakistan and vice versa (Cohen, 2005). In case of US, various administrations have different policies towards India and Pakistan. President Nixon had always favored Pakistan that irked India on every progressive day (Bass, 2013). Afterwards, the sense of insecurity forced Pakistan to the security alliances system drawn by the US against communism. The US was primarily interested in the prevention of the absorption of the region by the communists and not in terms of the states (like Pakistan) (Hilali, 2005). The US paid scant attention

to Indian sensibilities and concerns when it chose to forge a renewed and cordial strategic relationship with Pakistan. Though the US support provided to Pakistan brought a strategic balance in South Asia, however, this threw India into the lap of the Soviet Union and hence a cold war was fought between India and Pakistan in miniature at regional level.

### **China Card**

Since the Indo-China war of 1962, Pakistan emerged as favorite of Chinese leadership. Beijing exploited India's 'soft underbelly' in Kashmir and used Pakistan to keep India in 'low equilibrium (2012). China assisted Pakistan in the development of its missile program, nuclear program and extended support to its cause at international forums. China is also planning to sign a nuclear deal with Pakistan along the same lines as that signed between the US and India. According to Guruswamy, China is supporting Pakistan at the cost of global opprobrium as an irresponsible proliferator and jeopardizing its relations with India (Guruswamy, 2010). For China, Pakistan is a low-cost secondary deterrent to India, and for Pakistan, China is a high value guarantor of security against India (Guruswamy, 2010). China has used Pakistan as a proxy in its relations with India. Therefore, it's an irrefutable fact that U.S and China have remained external factors in influencing Indo-Pak relations at the regional level (Soherwordi, 2010).

### **Nuclearization of South Asia**

During the phase of extreme tension, India and Pakistan have growled at each other while evocatively pointing towards their respective nuclear arsenal. With the introduction of nuclear weapons in South Asia, the rivalry between India and Pakistan has been further fueled. 'The Indian nuclear explosion in 1974 had a catalytic impact in generating a drive for a nuclear weapons capability in Pakistan.' (Cheema, 2010). Attainment of nuclear weapons lured Pakistan to challenge India. The Pakistani establishment believes that nuclear weapons will play a deterrent role against an all out war by India. Thus a nuclear status has provided an advantage of prestige to India at the global level, but a disadvantage in her rivalry with Pakistan. After the nuclear explosions in 1998 Pakistan feels more confident against India. However, certain other factors, which contributed to revamp Pakistan's confidence shouldn't be ignored. Firstly, Pakistan is militarily a weak state as compared to India. Hence a conventional war will be converted to a nuclear catastrophe. That is one of the reasons why Pakistan is hesitant to sign 'no first strike' agreement. However, a conventional war will be a risky nuclear flash for South Asia, which will never be acceptable for the great powers. A nuclear flash will be especially unacceptable to the US, keeping in view her engagements in the region- War on Terror, Iran's nuclear program, the situation in Afghanistan and the Taliban phenomenon. Possession of nukes by both countries will deter full scale Indian retribution. Secondly, a conventional war will immediately draw attention of international actors like the US and the UN so that a nuclear escalation may not take place. This had happened during the Kargil war of 1999 when China

and the US exerted their due pressure on Pakistan to withdraw its forces from Kargil. This means nuclear weapons contribute to stability based on fears of retaliation. Furthermore, it produces benefits for conventional conflicts as long as the warring parties do not cross a line (Ganguly, 1995). No to nuclear war results in yes to conventional war. Kenneth Waltz argues that due to the limited escalation of nuclear weapons, countries may opt for war at a small scale (Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed*, 2003). In his theory of asymmetric conflicts, T.V. Paul also challenges that a small and weak state may go to war against a stronger state to achieve its political and military objectives by a limited and quick attack (Paul, *Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers*, 1994). This all justifies Pakistan's role in the region for small-scale skirmishes against India.

### **Indian as a Major Regional State**

Since the partition of the Subcontinent into India and Pakistan, the bond between these neighbors has often been far from friendly. Both countries felt threatened by each other and persist to emphasize strengthening their armed forces. The major causes of the gravest discord between India and Pakistan include differing ideologies, negative images of each other, mistrust, and wide divergence in their foreign policy goals. Pakistani perceptions have been influenced by distrust of India—what it alleges are India's hegemonic regional and international ambitions, exacerbated by what Pakistan sees as an ambitious and hostile regional foreign policy.

There is extremist view which is followed by a section of Pakistani society that India has its eye out for re-annexation of Pakistan. I do have concerns at India's goals vis-à-vis Pakistan. However, I do not go to such an apocalyptic level. I don't see benign scenario with India. The question is how actively malignant it is. Hence, Pakistan is worried for the growing Indian role in its backyard — Afghanistan — as well as its growing influences in other smaller five south Asian sister countries. In a way, Pakistan has every reason to be concerned about India (Soherwordi S. H., 2013).

The situation is more alarming for Pakistan now as Modi, India's current Prime Minister, has made significant efforts to improve relations with the United States, Japan, China and most recently Australia, where he recently attended the G-20 summit. Given that his stated priority is improving and liberalizing India's economy, Modi may have concluded that spending precious political capital on Pakistan is useless unless Pakistan is fully committed to peace, which it simply cannot be as long as it's military is interfering in politics. Modi perhaps believes that India can afford to ignore Pakistan for the time being while he focuses on trade deals and investment contracts from elsewhere.

Moreover, Indo-US nuclear deal for civilian purposes has completely altered the South Asian strategic balance. She has now a dominant influence in Afghanistan. Its security agencies are vigorously playing their role in Baluchistan insurgency via Afghanistan. Indians are supporting terrorist groups targeting the



unionists in Baluchistan. The Pakistanis periodically pay courtesy calls on Indian foreign ministry officials and the Pakistani prime minister and president often invites the Indian prime minister. Usually they pose smiling and show off warm handshakes. But both understand that the smiles are of crocodiles and elephants. (Soherwordi S. H., 2013).

In worst case scenario, for the national security against any Indian attack, Pakistan look up to China as a possible pillar of support. But this reliance is problematic as China is marching on the path to normalize its relations with its neighbors, especially India, in the post-9/11 era. While the Indians focus their hostile rhetoric almost entirely on China and Pakistan, the truth, as per structuralism, is there is not much reason for China than Pakistan to be fearful of India. Economic power with one of the world's leading military, China, is unlikely to be attacked militarily by India (Soherwordi S. H., 2013).

### **Security as a Factor of Survival for Pakistan**

Since independence, Pakistan's military establishment was concerned about their strategic disadvantage. "Critics of militarism have seen the army as turning to its advantage enmity with India and regional Western strategic concerns, firstly derived from the Cold War and latterly the 'War on Terror' to transform Pakistan into a permanent 'insecurity state'" (Talbot, 2012).

India was much superior, more resourceful and well equipped with defense tools than Pakistan. India's military capabilities on the whole and her quest for a superpower role in the region are strong factors influencing the defense and foreign policy orientations of Pakistan. The geopolitics of the region places India in a commanding position, with a ring of weak and vulnerable states around it. Moreover, India's strong association and security links with the former Soviet Union are motivated by a desire for the most sophisticated weapons from Russia's arms industry. India also seeks indigenous competence to develop and co-produce advanced weapon systems, counting to its capabilities as a fearsome war machine. Its ever-growing defense competence and assertive position on bilateral issues serve to magnify Pakistan's perception of the Indian threat.

Throughout history, it has always been the national armies which are concerned with the country's defense. The British had left numerous institutional structures- a set of laws, administrative and education systems, and trends of democracy to govern the post colonial state. Pakistan failed to sustain them, thereby giving it a Frankenstein effect which is neither pre-colonial resilient system nor post-colonial indigenous system. However, 'the British military system, on the other hand, was able to root itself effectively because it fused with ancient local military traditions rather than sweeping them away' (Lieven, 2011). Thus, the Pakistan Army's technique of formulating policies is incongruent from Pakistan's politics, law and various domestic policies. 'Saner politicians and intellectuals have been opposing the India-Centric policies for many years but

their voices are muzzled by the military co-evolutionist in the media, religious political and militants groups and intelligence agencies' (Ayaz, 2013). Hence, the Pakistan Army established strategic and military relations with the US and China for a unilateral containment of India in mortgage to serving their interests in the region. This is the reason that despite threats emanating from Al Qaeda and the Taliban, Pakistan Army chief Ashfaq Pervaz Kiyani said that "I will be the first to admit, I am India-centric" (Woodward, 2010). This reflects that India is the alpha and omega of the Pakistan Army's animosity. Speaking of the average Pakistani officer of today, quoted in Anatol Lieven's *Pakistan A Hard Country*, General Naqvi said: 'He has no doubt in his mind that the adversary is India, and that the whole raison d'être of the army is to defend against India. His image of Indians is of an anti-Pakistan, anti-Muslim, treacherous people. So he feels that he must always be ready to fight against India' (Lieven, 2011, p. 186)

To confirm this conception of the average military officers in the Pakistan army, I conducted a survey in Peshawar and its outskirts. Most of the officers were reluctant to fill the survey forms. Hence, an oral survey was conducted for them. I, with the help of some of my students, completed this task. The essence of the five questions was to find out who is considered to be the prime enemy of Pakistan. Different options were given, for example: the US (due to drone attacks in Pakistan's tribal areas), Israel (with regards to Palestine), Afghanistan (due to her undue interference in Pakistan's border areas and support to the Baloch separatist movement) and India. Surprisingly, 73% officers answered India to all five questions. To our greater surprise, when the same survey was given to the civilian common men (100) in Peshawar, 67 declared the US as the number one enemy of Pakistan. This shows a sharp contrast between the approach of a common man and a military officer towards India. When I enquired from an army officer who happens to be a very good friend of mine, as to why Pakistan Army is so much against India, he replied, "Pakistan Army is not against India. We respect any common man in India as we respect any other nationality of the world. However, to correct you, we are against Indian hegemonic designs and their army establishment's anti Pakistani posture. We as Pakistan Army are concerned about the security of our country. Hence, we see the immediate threat more seriously than any other reason emanating against Pakistan's survival. India is enemy number one due to its continuous anti-Pakistan assertions, its extremist political parties' stances which they regularly pronounce with the support of their secret agencies, and its secret agencies' clandestine role inside Pakistan especially in Baluchistan". When asked, one of the civilian respondents justified his opinion of considering US as the principal enemy of Pakistan than India, by saying: "India is a defined enemy which has learnt to live with us with our mutual differences as facts and hard realities. However, the US is an enemy in a friend's shape [disguise]. It has violated our air space and territorial sovereignty by its Drone attacks in Pakistan's border areas more than India did".

## **Economics ASAA Factor of Conflict Resolution between India and Pakistan**

Economic cooperation between neighboring countries leads to comparatively speedy economic development. It is time for the people of Pakistan to stop flagellating themselves over India's progress in diverse fields and look instead to the wonderful possibilities for mutually beneficial cooperation. Economic relations without strings are a prerequisite for global opulence and prosperity. Since the end of World War II, the trend has been to dismantle trade barriers and promote interdependence so that the economic welfare of the people gets improved. Thus, fusion of markets in neighboring countries through economic cooperation is certain to bring economic benefits to both as it will begin free trade while simultaneously providing the necessary protection against the onslaught from industries in other Third World countries. Trade should no longer be a tactic of economic imperialism; it has to be pursued on the basis of mutual benefit.

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union carefully avoided triggering a nuclear war because of the assumption of 'mutual assured destruction': each knew that any such conflict would imply the obliteration/annihilation of both countries. Today, despite the heightened contentions between India and Pakistan, an economic version of mutual deterrence is preserving the uneasy *status quo* between the two sides (Katz, 2013).

The sale of Indian products in Pakistan experience ebb and flow with the intensity of contentions between them. The Indian products that had lost the most sales during these latest tensions in the last thirty years have been the highly noticeable, which are vulnerable to social pressure. Pakistani consumers seem not interested in an embargo of Indian products. Many Pakistani religious parties and their workers boycott Indian products. But these fears have not materialized, for one simple reason: Pakistan needs to buy Indian products as much as India needs to sell them.

However, in the last five years, sales of the popular Indian products (cosmetics, skin-care products, cotton, artificial jewelry, bridal dressing and medicines) enlarged, partly because many Pakistani customers demanded such products and partly because such products were smuggled-in from border areas especially in the *Bara*-markets. Geographical proximity and economic complementarities are the palpable advantages and should have already brought India and Pakistan more closely together in commercial relations. Instead, political difficulties created artificial barriers to trade between them, which helps no one but the smugglers.

Some stores, especially in Karachi and Lahore, display Indian products more prominently, and very few stop carrying them altogether. Even on the national level, Pakistan is far more pluralistic than it used to be. Customer's purchasing behavior is inclined upon cost-benefit analysis in comparative terms. They prefer a

fine quality product at a cheap price rather than selecting products on the basis of made-in.

Many of the products assembled in and exported from India, often on behalf of American and European firms, enter in Pakistani border areas. This is costlier and counterproductive for Pakistan. Pakistan must look forward to develop economic ties with India for an economic recovery, promotion of regional integration, and getting boons of regional economic blocs.

As World War I cruelly demonstrated, economic self-interest does not always override nationalist emotions. But it does raise the costs of letting passions dominate foreign policy (Katz, 2013, p. 22). For most of the past three decades, in recognition of those costs, Pakistan has sought a permanent, peaceful, and conflict resolved rise of South Asia. In the past few years, however, Islamabad has shifted to a far closer posture towards the US in the War on Terror. The repercussion of Pakistan's decade old policy to counter terrorism is political dysfunction and the financial crisis, which have led to its grant of MFN to India. With a new government in power, PM Nawaz Sharif is following a civilian foreign policy based on low politics of economy and trade towards New Delhi for the détente. However, the collaborative efforts between the two nations is further engendered by statements from some Indian leaders; they continue to preach the abhorrence for Pakistan —up to the present day, sometimes in threatening language, sometimes in a more benign fashion. For instance, Indian PM Manmohan Singh, in his address to the UN General Assembly session of September 2013 unveiled a pernicious policy towards Pakistan based upon contempt, hatred and militaristic. In the circumstances when two countries are in the process of exchange of MFN, promotion of economic ties and relaxation of tension, Mr. Singh's pronouncement of declaring Pakistan as an 'epicenter of terrorism' was indeed very discouraging. In fact, Pakistan is not the only country which is confronted with the terrorist organizations, rather South Asia as a whole region is engulfed with this phenomenon. The ultimate responsibility, however, lies with the two neighbors themselves. India and Pakistan both face a common foe in the form of terrorism; only a new effort at cooperation will rid the region of this scourge. Mao once observed that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." But in today's South Asia, it is trade and globalization that pay for that gun. Hence, halting verbal and otherwise smoking guns and producing butter is in the interest of the two neighboring nations.

The masses of Indo-Pakistan are suffering from a very grave economic situation. Their intricacy have been further multiplied by spiraling oil prices—leading to their dependency on the Gulf States—and the reluctance of developed countries to offer fair terms of trade to developing countries. It is therefore not in their interest to put exclusive faith in the industrially advanced countries for trade and economic cooperation. Instead, they should try to expand trade among themselves. Experience has shown that reliance on traditional markets and resources alone will fail to sustain their developing economies. India and Pakistan

together form a market of formidable size, large enough for the exploitation of economies of scale without the concomitant ills of monopoly.

Moreover, both Pakistan and India are likely to lose by competing with one another in the world market. Collaboration between the two in non-trade fields may not boost foreign trade substantially, but it can indirectly benefit various economic sectors in each. For example, such cooperation in the non-trade fields could include the mutual development of water and power resources, exchange of technical and academic expertise, etc.

International history says that it is only when two hostile countries develop an economic stake in each other that peace becomes an imperative and war a non-option. The recent examples that are cited are those of the US and China, US and Japan, and the warring Europe by developing today's European Union. Business and economies forced these erstwhile enemies to change their policies altogether towards each other. It paved the way for more people to people interaction and a progressive amicable relationship (Jha & Shukla, 2012).

In case of India and Pakistan, Civil Societies are robust enough to set this process in motion. Increased interaction at the level of the common peoples of the two countries would bridge the trust deficit that has plagued their bilateral relations (Mattoo, 2010). Differences in the political and security perceptions of both countries, coupled with mistrust about each other's intentions, affect the shape and scope of mutual cooperation between Pakistan and India. However, Media can facilitate an environment where new ideas can germinate and bold initiatives can sprout. Classic example is of 'Aman Ki Asha' a project by the *Geo/Jang* group of newspapers from Pakistan and 'Times of India' from India. Such ventures can cleanse polluted mindsets and revive the generosity of spirits, which is a distinctive trait of the Subcontinent (2010).

Furthermore, anti-democratic religious extremism/terrorism in Pakistan has inflicted irreparable dent to its economy and society. Recent, barbaric attack on Army Public School in Peshawar is a gruesome manifestation of the episode. Such incidents have further splintered foreign investment in the country.

Pakistan's national economy has already failed to broaden its horizon. It's over dependence on agricultural exports, external remittances and foreign aid for state revenues forms an obstacle in the path of economic progress. The thin tax base in Pakistan, which is owed entirely to its constructive political economy, has prevented the country from making the kinds of public investments in power production and water management- not to mention public health and education- that would have been essential to sustain growth ( (Tellis A. J., 2013, p. 234). As a result, thus substantial economic stress is expected in foreseeable future especially in the realm of Energy production and flood control which in turn may threaten its agricultural system (Tellis A. J., 2013, p. 235). In the circumstances, a regional economic cooperation rather than an injurious competition with India will be to the advantage of Pakistan. Not only resolve their economic problems but will also

bring them to a negotiating table for the resolution of their long-standing disputes like Kashmir.

## **Conclusion**

In the last 65 years, India and Pakistan have been unable to resolve their differences and develop amiable relationship, which could have increased the welfare of people on both sides of the border. There have been numerous attempts to initiate a sustainable peace process but most were either stillborn or abandoned in infancy. Does it mean that both the countries are condemned to breathe in perpetual hostility? Can they trounce their historic rivalry and emulate the example of France and Germany in the post-World War II era? Are the tribulations besetting their bilateral relations so intractable that no resolution is possible? Can they set aside their differences for a while and construct upon commonalities of interest? Can antagonistic Indo-Pak relation ever reach cooperative brink?

They must begin by breaking the chicken-and-egg cycle that thwart even a starting point for discussions. Pakistan says, "Settle Kashmir and normal cooperative relations will follow. Whereas India retorts, "Start normalizing relations, and options regarding Kashmir, unthinkable today, can become feasible."

Viewed with the lens of structuralism the painting depicting/illustrating role of internal and external dynamics in determining Indo-Pak rivalry, has been considered as an abstract – intricate/complex one.

With stagnant/enduring/everlasting legacy of bloody partition, Pakistan no longer feels secure with Indian secular discourse. The acid rain of border clashes and cross-border terrorism frequently falls on two nations which burns up the already fragile/frail economies of the region.

It is no longer possible to demarcate the reasons of rivalry as the two countries struggle to identify each other enemy or a trading partner (exchange of MFN status). One consistent feature is that they continuously appear hostile to each other without taking pacific impressions of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Immense--- and immensely difficult -- changes for the two countries are admittedly involved: realizing that current policies are not only futile but pernicious; facing down the domestic political forces that would seek to exploit new approaches; and throwing away the stifling baggage of some 65 profoundly divisive years. The power of a nation is vested in its skilled population and strength of its political and democratic institutions. However, its tendency of progress and opulence is insured by its relations with its neighbors. It is rightly said by Chairman Mao Xi Dong of China: 'A fish can swim in a friendly sea'.

It is primarily the domestic turbulences of both the countries, which has strained the relation more, than their limited foreign policy options. It is an irrefutable fact that Pakistan's domestic failures smashed the efficacy of its foreign policy options. Pakistan- a country torn by poverty and war on terrorism; political

instability (caused by incessant military interference), feeble democracy, shabby economy, poor governance, and fractured national integration (exposed in 1971 that resulted in the creation of Bangladesh) reduced its image to rubble across the globe. As a result, Pakistan is limited in its choices.

Moreover, Pakistan's tendency to presume the role of guardianship of Indian Muslims is one of the major irritants between India and Pakistan. Another matter which became source of irritant between two countries was the distribution of river waters. The divergent perception of both the countries on Indian Ocean as a zone of peace was yet another irritant including the Sir Creek issue. Alleged interference in each other's internal affairs is an irritant in Indo-Pak relations which has raised its head very seriously in the recent years. India considers Pakistan responsible for fomenting terrorism in the country and its controlled Kashmir. During the phase of excessive tension, India and Pakistan have growled at each other while meaningfully pointing towards their respective nuclear arsenal. Under the umbrella of external factors, that has marred the Indo-Pak relation, comes: The Cold War of 1950s and 60s and later the Soviet attack on Afghanistan. Similarly, the events of 9/11 took place 7000 thousand miles away and in retaliation, the US invaded Afghanistan. This led to Pakistan becoming the 'ground zero' of terrorism.

Thus, since its independence, Pakistan and India's foreign policy is dictated by external factors influenced by the hostility of other states. They had to sacrifice their own relations with their neighbors for others.

On the other hand, India has a few misunderstandings about itself. 'Shining India', 'rising India' and a booming economy is disparaging its spirit to repair its relations with its neighbors. It is not the time for India to compete against the Chinese economy or to keep a low profile with Pakistan. Now is the time to disentangle the hostile knots of its relationship with neighboring countries; for further economic growth and prosperity.

In due course, it is the people of South Asia who are bearing the brunt of the cost of economic non-cooperation in the region, and this must change in order for the region to grow economically and trim down poverty. India and Pakistan must renounce hostile behavior against one another and turn over a new leaf – establish a cooperative human security model in which its people will benefit more. The exchange of MFN status between the two nations is a constructive/affirmative gesture for a win-win situation in South Asia. The concept of Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India must come to an end to mitigate Religion-based discrimination and animosity. As the time has changed, thoughts and approaches have also somewhat toned down the scornful scream of hostility.

**Iqbal, the national poet of Pakistan very rightly says**

*Zamanay Kay Andaaz Badlay Gaey,*

The ways of the world have been changed,

*Naya Raag Hai Saaz Badlay Gaey!*

The lyrics are new, (and the) melodies have been changed.

*Khirad Ko Ghulami Say Azaad Kar,*

Let all mind be free from slavery,

*Jawanon Ko Peeron Ka Ustad Kar!* (Iqbal, 1958)

And let the young (generation) be the teachers of the old.

The compelling lesson from the past must be learnt “when circumstances do not permit of a solution, do not try to find one -- try instead to change the circumstances.”

There are still glimmers and high pinnacle of hope. It's a time of widening horizons and establishing channels of communications in order to avoid any misunderstanding on both sides. Let there be a relationship of shared Information Technology, economic and commercial ties. Let there be an end to religion-based and colonial-mindset hostility.

Let there be an end to long standing rivalry. Let there be cooperative equilibrium between the two nations which the new generations wish to see. Thus, *It's the time to destroy old notions and create new paradigm!*

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