

The Game of Hidden Interests A Golden Era of U.S.-Pakistan Relations during 1947-52

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ABSTRACT

Every country developed its relations with other states for their interests and purposes. Hence, soon after the independence in 1947, Pakistan enhanced its relations with the United States as response U.S. also responses positive, however, this connotation was totally on the hidden interests. This research shed light on the relationship between the Islamabad and Washington from 1947 to 1952 and its aftermath. A variety of interests have been found with Pakistan such as Pashtunistan issue from Afghanistan, financial aid, and Kashmir issue, whereas, United States utilized Pakistan to punish the communist cause. At beginning, the U.S. was found timid in the emergence of Pakistan considering the communist control over it; however, later seen the goodwill between the two countries. Under the umbrella of friendship, Washington and Islamabad ensured the both countries interests and developed the number of associations such as Middle East Defence Organization (MEDO) beginning in 1952, settlement of Pashtunistan issue, and a positive try of Kashmir issue. These associations provided the opportunities for both the countries where Islamabad received military assistance, billions of dollars, and other fruits, while the Washington used the Islamabad to fight the communist narrative. It is apparent that despite the number of mistrusts, Pakistan and United States relations were tremendous during the investigation era.

Key Words: Pakistan, United States, Relations, Kashmir & MEDO

Background History

The Pakistan Movement and the United States Attitude

Before 1947, Pakistan was not recognized as a nation of its own, as it was considered part of India. India was primarily made of a population of Hindus and Muslims (Mansergh et al 1970, 905-28). The two communities, though thought to live under one centralized administrative authority had a considerably strained relationship due to their inherent differences, as evidently implied by the British. The tensions between the two communities was a result of the discontent both communities had due to the state of the economy and the consequent lack of a leader who could unite and steer the two communities in one direction. The impact of the Great Depression had hit India just before World War II (Bates 2011). The country faced a period of mass unemployment, inflation and food shortages, a situation that was exasperated during World War II. Food rationing was introduced in all Indian cities; however, come 1942, a major famine hit Bengal. The

discontent from these two communities was a result of the Indian Muslims holding their loyalties in one of their own, and the Indian Hindu's doing the same (Ibid). The Hindu's proposed a leader while the Indian Muslims claimed that only Muslims could represent Muslims. These differences sparked widespread violence that accompanied the Congress party's 'Quit India' campaign of 1942. 55 Army battalions were deployed and successfully managed to ensure the cessation of the hostilities. The Congress party was dismantled with the entire leadership imprisoned (Unterberger 1981).

The All Indian Muslim League (AIML), who was in cooperation with the British, rapidly increased their membership during this time; however, they had minimal organization and influence across the nation. It was during this time that the British suggested the Two-Nation Theory (Hindustan for Hindu's and Pakistan for Muslim Indians); this theory gained a lot of fame in the 1930s (Ibid). During the annual AIML on 23rd March 1940, at Lahore Pakistan, the resolution to separate countries for Muslim and Hindu Indians was approved. On 16th of August, the leader of the All-Indian Muslim League, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, called for a Direct Action Day, which supported the demand for Pakistan. The day dissolved into random violence and civil disruption across North India. The United States, during this time, was not aware of the developing concerns and political issues that Indian Muslims had. The Americans were solely focused on the Congress key party leaders, Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, as the foreseen primary leaders of free India (Ibid). Few media houses knew and wrote about the conflict between the two communities. The New York Times, for instance, published numerous reports on the emerging popularity of the AIML and its leader Jinnah. They termed him the founding father of Pakistan and the Muslim League (Kux 2001, 5).

The conflict and the proposed Two Nations theory finally reached the ears of Washington and Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was the president of the U.S. at the time. During a meeting with the British Charged Affairs minister Sir Ronald Campbell, President Roosevelt claimed that the proposed theory 'sounded terrible' as the U.S. was well aware of what a civil war resembled (Mansergh et al 1970, 911-3). According to Haqqani, Washington's perspective concentrated on the fact that perennial conflict was inherent, was a minority community sought to separate rather than develop safeguards for itself. Washington's perspective sighted that other countries, after being freed from colonialism have faced the same fate where similar separatist demands resulted (Haqqani 2013, 13). During the elections of 1945-46, the British-India voice of partition spread throughout India, London, and the U.S. In the polls, most of the constituent assembly seats had been won by Muslims in the Muslim League. The election was not favourable to the Hindu's, and hence, the British government composed a three-person cabinet team that would oversee the development of a suitable plan that would be acceptable to both parties in the Indian Congress and the Muslim League to ensure unity of India as a country. The cabinet mission was composed of A.V. Alexander, Lord Pethick-

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Lawrence, and Sir Stafford Cripps. It was dispatched in 1946 (Kux 2001, 8). Washington urged the team from London to ensure that it maintained the Indian federation. The Americans were against the decision to separate the nation. They sent an American official who met with Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, a leading member of the AIML. The official warned that the AIML's stance with the British Cabinet Mission Plan would award the sympathy of the U.S (Sharma 1999, 25-8).

The U.S. continued to encourage the British to continue with their efforts and ensure that the Indian leaders took up the British Cabinet Mission plan ensuring that India remained as one state. A meeting between the Indian Congress Party and the AIML by the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, saw much attention by Washington as they insisted that the British plan should be massively impressed upon the leaders, a move that did not yield success. Efforts by the British continued to fail; however, the U.S. pressed on with the need to ensure both Jinnah and Nehru agreed. Joseph S. Sparks, The Vice Consul of the U.S. at the time, was asked to meet Jinnah and continue to stress the concerns Washington had over the AIML's attitude towards the British Cabinet Mission Plan and other issues that were brought up by Congress. Washington profoundly believed that failure to address and resolve these issues would spread chaos all over (Sfikas 2019). Jinnah listened to Sparks but failed to take the advice given. Instead, he sent a message back, claiming that he was not willing to allow their rights and views to be 'chloroformed' by Congress purely for propaganda effect (Ibid).

On the other hand, Nehru continued to move towards a state of partition, as many people observed. According to London's last Viceroy of India, Lord Mountbatten, the continued delay of the partition could further lead to increased losses and bloodshed, as India's unity was no longer possible. After a lengthy push and pull over the importance and need for the partition, Attlee confirmed India's partition on February 20, 1947. Mountbatten accepted the AIML's demands for an independent country. The U.S., though it had been against this decision, did not reject the decision but was unwilling to move along those steps (Kux 2001, 13). On 14th August 1947, Pakistan was declared an independent Muslim state. Before this declaration, London obtained the agreement between Nehru and Jinnah to partition India into two nations. Washington, as well, welcomed the independence of Pakistan from India on 10th June 1947, claiming that this agreement would end the civil disorder between the two communities (Ibid). However, Pakistan was declared an independent nation's with many problems still left to resolve.

Pakistan's Decision to Partner with the U.S.

The British- India partition declared that Muslim majority states would be Pakistani and Hindu majority states would be with India. The agreement also saw princely states were given the option to join either India or Pakistan. This agreement was crucial to ensure the smooth transition of Muslims and Hindus to

their respective nations. Additionally, the division of resources was also critical between the two countries. It is at this point that Pakistan developed mistrusts in India due to a variety of issues developing after partition (Cohen 2019).

After Pakistan's declaration of independence, the Delhi government forcefully moved and occupied Kashmir. Additionally, the two nations had agreed that Colonial Indian resources would be divided between India and Pakistan on a ratio of 66:34, respectively. However, after independence, India refused to handover to Pakistan one-third share of military resources, training institutes, ordinance factories, and heavy machinery and equipment from the Delhi government (Chatterji and Chaudhry 2014, 25-48). The division of resources was thus unequal and forced Pakistan to stare at insecurity and economic imbalance after it gained independence (Nawaz and Borchgrave 2009, 15). There had also been an influx of refugees into Pakistan, and with an unstable economy, the government was not able to provide for all who rushed into the country.

Moreover, the British government, having declared the divide between Pakistan and India without proper demarcation and knowledge of the land, ultimately fostered the development of regional conflicts such as those existing between Afghanistan and Pakistan over Pashtunistan. Pakistan, therefore, had many problems it faced with no clear solution on the horizon (Schofield 2003, 27-48). However, Jinnah, the new leader of Pakistan, had aligned himself with the views of the United Kingdom and the United States. Knowing the power the nations held over India and Afghanistan, the immediate threats to the newly developed country, as well as their capacity to assist in development of the economy, Pakistan had only two options, to team up either with the Communist Soviet Union or other democratic unions such as the United States or the United Kingdom. With the power of the two western Kingdoms, Pakistan sent Mr. Laik Ali to Washington, with the primary mission being to enhance the relations between themselves and the United States (Ibid, 32). Mr. Ali was also supposed to secure 2 billion dollars in loans to lift the economic crisis back home.

By this time, Europe was going through the revolutionary era. There were many conflicts between Moscow and Washington as they tried to ensure they won the support of Europe (Sharma 1999, 57-63). The U.S. prioritized this and hence did not consider South Asia regions at the time. Mr. Robert Lovett, the Acting Secretary of State at the time, politely rejected the offer made by Pakistan utilizing citing that the U.S. was not in a position to approve a loan for a new state. However, even with that exception, the U.S. gave Pakistan \$10 million for refugee assistance. Later that year, Karachi approached Washington once again, seeking a \$300 million to be used for military aid. This request was received by the U.S. and translated to be a situation where the U.S. was to be responsible for the military in Pakistan. In a report posted by the U.S., the country stated that it did not wish to extend any assistance to a country and alienate the friendship of another at the same time, this would be defeating the whole purpose of its presence in South

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Asia. With this, the U.S. denied the responsibility offered by the Pakistani's, as it did not want to alienate any other Southern powers (Ibid).

The U.S.'S Decision to Partner with Pakistan

The United States has been fighting communism for many years. The nation that is at the forefront of communism in the USSR and hence, for many centuries, the U.S. and the USSR have been against each other. After Pakistan gained its independence, the U.S. Commander in Chief in the Pacific, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, visited Pakistan and noted that the country was well positioned to fight against communism. This report was taken back to Washington (Ibid). William Campbell, a U.S. analyst, also visited Pakistan and noted the same views as Radford. For U.S. Pakistan's geo-strategic and geographical value was one that could allow a communist core to ring in Asia (Chaudhary 1989, 27). It was thus, essential for Pakistan and South Asia to fight against the USSR, ensuring communism does not penetrate the region.

Moreover, it was due to the closeness of Pakistan and Afghanistan to the USSR that ensured the two nations, out of all other South Asian countries, were seen as suitable assets in the fight against communism. According to a report posted by the SANACC Subcommittee, the people of South Asia and soviet Central Asia were very close to one another and could easily influence each other (FRUS 1949; Hedges 1986). For this reason, the Soviet Union may try to influence countries in South Asia. Moreover, the acquisition of Pakistan would ensure that it was the central base where all air operations against the USSR could be launched. Also, to ensure the Middle-East oil-rich route was properly defended (Hedges 1986). However, even with the report and the advice from the two statesmen, the United States had not yet made a firm decision on the need to assist in South Asia. It was not until the Chinese Revolution in 1949 that the options in South Asia were considered.

China became a republic in 1949 and became a communist republic. Mao Zedong, the Chinese Communist Party, had waged civil war on the Nationalist Party after World War II. During this period, the United States had made several ties with people in the Nationalist Party as they were continually short of supplies due to corruption. The popularity of the communist party continued to rise as more people noticed the efforts the party made to ensure Japanese invaders were kicked out of the country. Eventually, a full civil war began between 1947 and 1949, with the communist party becoming victorious in 1949. The U.S. lost all its ties to the People's Republic of China and was unable to keep the nation free from communism. The Chinese revolution gave the USSR ground to ensure its hidden objective towards communism continued. China and Russia signed an agreement that was mutual to them. The agreement stipulated that for thirty-years both nations would agree to assist each other enhancing their alliance (Mitcam 2005,

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8-17). Due to this event, Washington had to evaluate any alternatives present to control the spread of communist ideals and values. Strategic analysts and other policymakers reviewed South Asia, the Middle East, and the location of Pakistan. This review led to Washington settling on Pakistan as a comfortable, valued asset that could be crucial in the fight against communism. The U.S. thus took up a partnership with Pakistan without openly announcing its strategy to Pakistan (Sharma 1999, 25-8).

Pakistani Leadership Visits the U.S.

The value of Pakistan had now been realized; however, the U.S. was still slow to accept the partnership with Pakistan. In mid-1949, President Truman invited Nehru, the then Indian Prime Minister, to Washington. Pakistan gave a strong response to Nehru's invitation to the U.S. Nehru was ideally neutral on the communist agenda, yet Pakistan had continued to be vocal about the same. However, after lengthy discussions, President Truman accepted an official visit from Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, in late 1949 (McGhee 1983, 174-88). The invitation was hand-delivered to Karachi by George C. McGhee, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near East, African Affairs, and South Asia. In a press conference held in Karachi, McGhee alluded that Washington was aware of Pakistan's importance; this gave Karachi hope of their being a partnership with the U.S. (Haqqani 2013, 43).

The next year, Ali Khan visited Washington and openly declared Pakistan's interest in a partnership with the U.S. Pakistan was mainly interested in ensuring economic stability while being provided for territorial defences, military equipment and consequently, allowing the U.S. to reap its strategic positioning in South Asia (Kux 2001, 35). Ali Khan, during a press conference at the National Press Club, alluded to the fact that the country was willing and ready to stop all military activities and allow the United States to be its sole protector, should the state agree to a partnership with Pakistan (Malik 2016, 7-31). If the U.S. were to accept the terms set by Ali Khan, then it would have had a task to ensure that not only was Pakistan's borders safe from threats resulting from Afghanistan but also that U.S. troops would take up the Kashmir Issue as it was largely disputed during the time (Ibid, 9-11). Karachi claimed that should America stand with it, then American interested in South Asia will be protected by Pakistan. However, the U.S. was not ready to make agreements with Pakistan that would see the creation of misunderstandings with other countries. George F. Kennan, a U.S. diplomat, stated that there was a need to ensure the careful and tactical approach to the matter regarding Pakistan. It was not fruitful to conduct issues in a rushed manner and end up hurting other relationships with other nations; instead, careful steps had to be taken to ensure the country remains within its limits and maintains relations with other partner countries and friends elsewhere. The U.S. was not ready to take

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up unexpected hopes that they would later not be able to accomplish or see-through (Ibid).

Impact of the Korean War on U.S. Anti-Communist Strategy

After World War II, Japan surrendered, Korea was divided into two sections with the divide located at the 38th parallel north of the equator. The Soviet Union occupied the north while the United States occupied the south. In 1948, two new states that held different ideologies were formed, The Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). North Korea, being the region that had been occupied by the Soviet Union, was mainly a communist nation. North Korea, however, sought to reunify the country under communist rule. On June 25th, 1950, North Korea, led by Kim Il Sung, launched a surprise attack on South Korea. Being a nation that is supported by Soviets, the United States assumed that the attack had been backed by the Soviet Union (Kux 2001, 37-8). It commenced the containment program meant to ensure the spread of communism was stopped. Washington invoked the United Nations (UN) against the North Koreans. Pakistan also openly endorsed the move by the US during the UN Security Council voting. After this, the U.S. sent an American-led UN coalition to South Korea to ensure the North Koreans remained unsuccessful in their mission (Ibid).

By August, however, the North Koreans had swept almost all of South Korea and pushed the American forces into a small defensive perimeter in the Southeast part of the country near Busan. When Washington sought the tangible aid of Pakistan in the war against the North Koreans, Pakistan hesitated to offer any support claiming that if the U.S. wanted any help, then they had to be open to assist in the Kashmir and Afghanistan Issue. It was a standstill for Washington as it was forced to make the hard decision it had been avoiding overtime. For Pakistan, the agreement to support Washington's agenda in South Asia was not limited to that alone, but also in the Middle East and other regions that the U.S. had an interest (Haqqani 2013, 52). However, the U.S. had ignored Karachi's plea to make a commitment and support them where it came to the security issues the country faced. A condition which the U.S. declined. Because of this uncommitment by the U.S., there was very little the state could accomplish with Pakistan as long as these two security issues remained unmet (FRUS 1951).

Development of the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO)

At the beginning of 1952, Britain was struggling to maintain its position of power in the Middle East. As a way of ensuring the Middle East oil-route was maintained, the U.S. foreign policy was established with a plan to consider the replacement of Britain as the preeminent power in the Middle East. In reviewing

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the foreign Policy, Pakistan was once again a significant power that would prevent Moscow's hostility from reaching Near East States. As the U.S. fought against the North Koreans who were invading South Korea, London came up with the idea to develop a unity of Policymakers known as the Middle East Defence Organization (MEDO) that was to be led by the Britain Military and was collaboration between Arab states and Pakistan as a member (FRUS 1950). The idea was presented to Ali Khan as the U.S. Ambassador for the South Asian States, McGhee, endorsed the idea of Pakistan joining MEDO. However, Pakistan declined this proposal citing that it could only participate once the Kashmir issue was resolved (Kux 2001, 45-6). For both London and the U.S., a significant problem was ensuring that the interests of India were not undermined while meeting those of Karachi. McGhee reviewed the problem stated by Karachi and motivated the U.S.'s counterparts "to progressively approach the issue from an independent perspective" (Ibid). The Truman Administration was the first to act on Karachi's requests; this was the first official movement recorded by the U.S. against communism. In February 1952, the United States and Pakistan signed a Mutual Security Program Agreement that saw Pakistan joining MEDO as a member and attaining the much-needed funding and military support the nation required (FRUS 1952-54, November 28). MEDO, on the other hand, was short-lived. President Truman and Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State, were serious about the program; however, Arab states did not give the response that was expected.

Additionally, Britain was struggling to maintain power not only in the Middle East but also in Egypt. There were reported riots in Egypt during this time. Due to Egypt's resistance, it was challenging to get MEDO off the ground. As soon as President Truman left office in 1953, MEDO became defunct. A few of MEDO's founding principles were, however, kept alive and made it to the Baghdad Pact, an agreement signed to ensure continuous protection of the Middle East in 1955 (MEDO 1952).

Impact of the Kashmir Issue on Relations between Pakistan and the U.S.

The Kashmir Issue is one of the main factors that prevented proper Pakistan and U.S. relations as well as India-Pakistan relations. For an extended period, conflicts and clashes between Pakistan and India over Kashmir existed. Due to the inability of the two nations to come up with a solution to the problem, the Delhi leadership intervened and brought the matter in front of the UN Security Council.

Kashmir is a region located in the northernmost part of India. Before the partition, Kashmir was a princely state primarily occupied by Muslims. At the time of the partition, Kashmir was governed by Maharaja Hari Singh, a Hindu. Since sovereign states were given the freedom to choose to join either India or Pakistan, Singh desired that Kashmir remain an independent state and hence signed a standstill agreement with Pakistan. India, on the other hand, refused to do the

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same. When partition-related violence erupted across the two new nations, the Pakistani government pressured Kashmir to join in the fight. The reluctance of Kashmir led Pakistan to invade it using rebels, ultimately taking over much of the western region (Schofield 2003, 33-8). When Singh saw that pro-Pakistani rebels were invading and would soon take over the area, he sought assistance from India. However, India required that Singh sign an Instrument of Accession showing that Kashmir was aligned to India and had a special status in the Indian constitution. The situation dictated that the region would continue to have independence over all matters aside for those related to communication, foreign affairs, and defence. However, after Kashmir agreed to sign the document, and the Indian government offered military support, conflict was quickly ushered in with two wars and a longstanding insurgency reigning in the region (Ibid). It is due to this that the Delhi leadership saw it fit to intervene.

When the problem of whether Kashmir should remain independent reached the U.S. and Britain, they were both opposed to the idea as they feared the same results as those seen in Delhi and Karachi would be evident. The powers were worried that the weak economy, lacking political settlement and strategic location of Kashmir, would ultimately attract communists leading to regional instability. However, once the issue was taken to the UN Security Council, the UN sought to develop a team that would solve the problem; this is how the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) came to life (FRUS. 1950, July 15 & 19).

Washington, at the onset, declined to join the commission and preferred to sit and await the council resolution; however, with time, the U.S. became one of the most active members in the commission. After considerable deliberations and discussion, the UN Security Council came up with the UN Security Council 'Resolution 47' regarding the Kashmir conflict. In the resolution, the UNSC proposed that Pakistan, seeing that it had invaded Kashmir, withdraw all its tribesmen and other Pakistan Nationals who had entered the state for war. The resolution also urged Pakistan to prevent future intrusions to the nation and also to cease furnishing any material to the people in the country that could be used to aid in the fight against the state of Kashmir. This resolution also forced Pakistan to acknowledge that people within Kashmir were free and had the right and freedom to vote on issues of the accession of the state. For India, the resolution detailed a bit more on what they were required to do. These orders are listed below:

- a. After the Pakistani army and tribesmen leave Kashmir, effectively stopping all fighting in the state, India is to provide a plan to UNCIP detailing their consequent withdrawal of forces from both Jammu and Kashmir. The program would see the Nation reducing the number of troops to the required amount for maintaining civil law and order.

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- b. India was also ordered to consult with the commission, ensuring that the desired number of troops and military presence is favourable to the commission and Kashmir.
- c. India was to agree that at the time, an administration was voted into Kashmir; they were to hold state forces and police in specific sites and recruit local personnel for law and order ensuring proper safeguards of the rights of minorities (UNSCR 1948).

These were among the few conditions stipulated by 'UNSC Resolution 47'. Both India and Pakistan refused this resolution. Pakistan stated that the freedom in the decision would prevent people from freely voting for any other leader, as they positively fear Muhammad Abdullah Sheikh, the leader of Kashmir (FRUS 1948).

With the refusal of both nations, UNCIP had to come up with another resolution. To ensure the decision was 'more inclusive,' the commission asked both countries to submit their differences, and from this, they would come up with a resolution that allowed a permanent cease-fire in Kashmir. They came up with a decision and forwarded to the two nations once more to either accept or reject the proposal. This time around, President Truman got involved in the process and appealed to both Karachi and Delhi to take severe steps that ensured the issue was resolved. He reached out to Ali Khan and asked him to accept the terms of the truce. Ali Khan was willing to do so; however, Nehru turned down Truman's request to agree as they found it 'inadequately precise and defined.' President Truman's term ended in 1953 while the resolution had not been approved and hence, it remains unsolved (FRUS 1949, August 25 & September 8).

Impact of the Afghanistan Issue on the U.S.

Aside from the Kashmir issue, there was also an issue surrounding Afghanistan. After Pakistan attained independence, Afghanistan voted against Karachi's admission into the UN; this was because of the outstanding problems the nation had with Pakistan. Afghanistan, for a while now had been at loggerheads with Pakistan regarding several ethnic groups at the north-eastern frontier of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan (Schons 2011; Yeşilbursa 2001). This regional conflict is traced back to the British Colonial Indian Government in the nineteenth century and the demarcation of boundaries.

Between 1839 and 1880, the British Colonial Indian Government had been in two wars with Afghanistan. The first began in 1839 and ended in 1842 the second commenced in 1878 and ended in 1880. These wars were a result of the regional conflict regarding the Durand Line. The Line demarcates the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is an expression of about 2640 kilometres (Yeşilbursa 2001). The region around the Durand Line is ruled by two major ethnic groups, the Punjabis on the Pakistan side, and the Pashtuns on the Afghanistan side. Before the British Colonial Government involvement, the Punjabis and the Pashtuns were at war. The Pashtuns, on the north-western hand of Pakistan, were trying to fight

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off the Punjabis from expanding the territory under their control; this was before defeat by the British Colonial government in 1847. To ensure the completion of peace in the region, the British Colonial government came up with the Durand Line (Ibid).

In 1847, Pakistan was still not a nation and hence, was still joined to India. India was under the British Colonial rule (Omrani 2009). At the time, the Pashtuns were one of the largest ethnic communities living in both Afghanistan and part of the north-eastern region of Pakistan. They ruled over 103,600 square kilometres of territory. However, the Punjabis continued to fight the Pashtuns, pushing them back into the Afghanistan regions. The Pashtuns fought back, seeking to ensure that the Punjabis did not manage to expand their territories into the mountains on the south-eastern side of Afghanistan (Ibid). When the British Colonial Government acquired India (now Pakistan), they made the foothills of the mountains where the Pashtuns dwelt, as the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This border effectively cut the Pashtun tribes into two, with some of the Afghanistan sides, and others on the Pakistan side. However, this was not a formal borderline, and as the Russian empire advanced into Afghanistan, closing in on the British Empire in India, there was a need to properly demarcate where the British Empire began and prevent the Russian advance from taking hold of the same (Ibid).

In 1893, Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, an Indian Foreign Secretary of the British Empire, was sent to Afghanistan to negotiate a formal demarcation of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. He met with Abdur Rahman Khan, the *emir* (Ruler of Afghanistan), and together, they came up with the boundary named the Durand Line (Schons 2011). The negotiations ultimately split the Pashtuns into two sections, with some being governed by the British and others under the Afghanistan ruler (Omrani 2009). All was well until 1947 when the British rule in India ended, and Pakistan was declared an independent state. The Pashtuns refused to be put under the jurisdiction of the Pakistani government; instead, they should be placed under Afghanistan or made into an autonomous state. Afghanistan supported the Pashtunists as the area they occupied could easily allow for the quick influence of the newly formed Pakistan (Ibid). Afghanistan began a war with Pakistan over the issue, hoping to gain a bit more control in the land. Pakistan refused to let go of these regions in the nation as it had rightfully inherited them from the British Colonial Government after it gained independence (Radio Free Europe 2006). For Pakistan, the Afghanistan Issue signified the continued warfare and insecurity that Karachi was facing.

In Washington, the continued war between Pakistan and Afghanistan could ultimately lead to Afghanistan relying on the USSR, its northern neighbour, for assistance in the matter (Malik 2016, 11). Such an alliance would lead to communist leadership spreading in South Asia and slowly gaining control over Pakistan, ultimately claiming ruler-ship over the Middle East Oil-rich route. In

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1951, the U.S. came up with several diplomatic initiatives, meant to ensure both Pakistan and Afghanistan solved the regional dispute with the Durand Line (FRUS 1950, November 2). The capital of Afghanistan, Kabul, accepted Washington's proposal, but Karachi refused the proposal. After the continued talks with Karachi and Kabul governments, Washington gave up, stating that there was no logical conclusion to the issue (FRUS 1951, September 27). However, the U.S. continued to worry over the vulnerability of the region and the ease with which Moscow could influence Afghanistan's and gain control of the area.

Conclusion

The Islamabad and the Washington made number of mistakes in their relationships. Every country developed its relations with other states for their interests and purposes. Hence, soon after the independence in 1947, Pakistan enhanced its relations with the United States as response U.S. also responses positive, however, this connotation was totally on the hidden interests. This research shed light on the relationship between the Islamabad and Washington from 1947 to 1952 and its aftermath. A variety of interests have been found with Pakistan such as Pashtunistan issue from Afghanistan, financial aid, and Kashmir issue, whereas, United States utilized Pakistan to punish the communist cause. At beginning, the U.S. was found timid in the emergence of Pakistan considering the communist control over it; however, later seen the goodwill between the two countries. Under the umbrella of friendship, Washington and Islamabad ensured the both countries interests and developed the number of associations such as Middle East Defence Organization (MEDO) beginning in 1952, settlement of Pashtunistan issue, and a positive try of Kashmir issue. These associations provided the opportunities for both the countries where Islamabad received military assistance, billions of dollars, and other fruits, while the Washington used the Islamabad to fight the communist narrative. It is apparent that despite the number of mistrusts, Pakistan and United States relations were tremendous during the investigations era.

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