Strategizing the role of Islam for Pakistan: An analysis of the shifting perspectives of Pakistan

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ABSTRACT

The ideological debate between conservatives and modernists remains a central issue in Pakistan since its inception. This study arguing that the military rulers tend to keep strategic interest of the country in mind while taking position in the ideological debate between conservatives and modernists. This study traces the history of military regimes in Pakistan and their role in shaping ideology of Pakistan. This current longitudinal study aims to analyze the role and position of military rulers of Pakistan on the debate of Islam and modernity. This study is descriptive, historical and follows the longitudinal analysis to examine the data.

Keywords: *Conservatives, Enlightenment, Islam, modernity, military rulers,*

Introduction

"Take Islam out of Pakistan, and make it a secular state; it will collapse." Zia ul Haq as cited in (Abbas, 2006)

The end of the European colonial empires after the Second World War transformed the Muslim world into independent nation-states. The people of these independent states continued to have link with Islam, but their ruling elites came up with different perspectives to incorporate Islam into modern state system. Most leaders in South-East Asia, Turkey, Arab world and Iran initially did not believe in the role of Islam in public sphere. Only few Muslim countries acknowledged the role of Islam as a part of their identity. Pakistan was also established in the name of Islam and the role of Islam in the modern state remained a central concern for Pakistan (Allawi, 2009).

Chughtai (2015) explains the four phases of Pakistan from 1947 to 2012 in the religious context. In the first phase, (1947-1958) Islam was used for social welfare. In the second phase that was from 1959 to 1976, in which Islam employed to promote national unity, because of the separation of East Pakistan, there was the intense need of national unity rather than religious divisions. This phase also emphasized on Islamic research and made it compatible with contemporary thoughts. Islam seemed across the political boundaries of Pakistan for transnational Muslim unity and the phrase of "Muslim Ummah" commonly used for Islamic nation in the third phase from 1977 to 1998. The final phase that was from 1999 to 2010, Islam was used for tolerant and comprehensive society. In this

last phase president Musharraf used the term "Enlightened Moderation" to eliminate extremism and de-radicalizing the country.

The link of Islam with Pakistan is everlasting (Faruqi, 1991). The role of Islam in the modern state of Pakistan has a subject of intense debate since the inception of the country (Belokrenitsky & Moskalenko, 2013; Shaikh, 2009). Before the independence of Pakistan, the influential group of religious scholars and ulema was opposed to westernization and the British rule on the sub-continent while the Westernize group of Muslims, leading the Pakistan movement and the Muslims of India supported the Westernized leadership. But after the inception of Pakistan in 1947, Ulema started a struggle to make Pakistan an Islamic state. The Westernized group considers Islam only perform the religious duty. Islam remains the essential component in the formation of Pakistan. Islam has become a controversy in Pakistan from the initial days. Ulema are dogmatic in their interpretation of Islam but they are not unified rather they are divided into sects (Faruqi, 1991).

There has been an ongoing struggle between various groups identified in the literature on the role of Islam in Pakistan: conservatives and modernists. The conservatives wanted to restore the 'classical Islam' and opposed any innovations and, reformation. They also hindered the propagation of modern education and did not allow women to work outside their houses and receive the same education as men. They were not in favour of the rights of non-Muslims equal to Muslims. But modernists stood for the struggle to establish a better society, harmony, and ideology with a better requirement. They did not see Pakistan with a lower status. At that time, the political elites were interested to promote one nation for all Pakistanis and equal rights according to Islam (Belokrenitsky & Moskalenko, 2013).

In Pakistan, there has been a constant conflict between the Islamist parties who want to establish religious laws, and the Muslims who want to see Pakistan as a modern democratic country (Ayaz, 2013). The trouble of Pakistan started on the theocratic strand of politics and the confused position taken by its leaders regarding the future of the country. The compromises with the ulema were a natural outcome of the promises made during the Pakistan movement that the new country would be governed by Islamic principles (Ayaz, 2013). Before and during the constitution making process of 1956, the debate on the role of Islam was dominated in Pakistan. The most common desire was to enforce the Islamic constitution. The hostility between conservatives and modernists were on the issue of Objective Resolution 1949, Anti-Ahmadi riot 1953 and before the 1956 constitution in the first decade after the independence of Pakistan (Ansari, 2011).

This debate was not unique because the majority of the country population was Muslim. Only Islam was the source of national unity in the case of the regional separatists' challenges in NWFP, Bengal, Sindh and Balochistan (Shaikkh, 2009). According to Ayaz (2013) Ulema were right into demanding the Islamic constitution because to get the support of the Indian Muslims, All India Muslim League made a deal with them and gained their support. The use of Islam by the leaders created space for the Islamists and the leadership had to live up to its propaganda. The clash between the modern value system and pull by the ulema to sectarianism continued. It was said before the partition of 1947, that Muslims of sub-continent needed Pakistan to spend their lives according to the Islamic values,

it was the religious exploitation for political gains. When Pakistan became independent country, then religious parties and clergy exploited religion to get maximum benefit. Muslims, who were living in the glorious past, rejected and resisted modernization, which they called westernization.

After discussing the conservatives and modernists' stance of both groups in Pakistan now this study focus on the military regimes in Pakistan because military considered to a tool of modernization in many countries all over the world. Pakistan's army also considers the modern institution and it entered into political arena many times. Ayub Khan and Pervez Musharraf governments were on the way of modernization, but Zia ul Haq government adopted the policy of Islamization. Before the military coup of 1958, there was an interaction between the role of Islam and the political modernism, but their debate was focused on the political parameters. (Ansari, 2011)

This research argues that military regimes did not adopt the same clear line of stance on the modernist and conservative approach towards Pakistan. This study shows the different line of stances of the four military regimes in Pakistan. This study is descriptive and historical. It relies on secondary sources to trace the role of military rules in Pakistan on the debate between Islam and modernity. The purpose to select the descriptive research design is to find and describe the reality about the research topic (Monette, Sullivan, Dejong, 2011). Descriptive study described the situations, activities, perspectives and focused on behavior and attitudes (Adler & Clark, 2006).

This research uses the longitudinal analysis that allows to examining the same phenomenon and using records to study changes over a long period of time. It is the best way to study changes over time (Babbie, 2010).

Longitudinal analysis of four Military regimes

Ayub Khan's era: (1958-1969)

Ayub Khan's regime was the first military regime in Pakistan (Ansari, 2011). He promoted himself as a visionary and enlightened dictator (Haqqani, 2005). During the Ayub era Pakistan was on the path of modernization. He believed on the modernist version of Islam and brought social reforms to make country modernize (Ansari, 2011). He temporarily saved the cause of Pakistan's secular intellectuals. By moving Pakistan away from an Islamic ideological stance to more developmental concerns, he was successful into shifting the debate in favour of secular elite of the country. It cannot be said that his pro-secular regime had no vision on the role of Islam in public life. But it was an immensely simplistic formula that reflects Ayub's style of governing individual politics and was clearly designed to fit what he fondly referred to as the "intellectual" of the Pakistani nation. Ayub used Islam as a force for political unity, and projected Islam as a mechanism of socio-economic development, he assumed that the benefit of the socio-economic development would trickle down and create a strong nation capable of standing without the support of Islamists (Shaikh, 2009). Ayub Khan believed the modernist interpretation of Islam relevant to the contemporary time (Ansari, 2011).

Ayub admired the Kemalist model of Turkey. Like, Kemal Ataturk, Ayub was hopeful that extensive social and economic reforms would help to cut off his country's links with its immediate past and, by extension its ideological attachment to Islam (Shaikh, 2009). He did not favour the contradictory version of religion presented by theologians and opposed their role in governance. He wanted the Islamic ideology to help in defense, security, development, and unify Pakistanis. He visualized Islam as a nation building tool, controlled by enlightened military leader rather than clerics. His lack of outward religious observance, his distance from ulema, and his careful choice of words, created his image as a latter day Ataturk abroad (Haqqani, 2005). Ayub reformulated Islam in the way that would by-pass the religious establishment. He adopted the bureaucratic approach, advisory councils and research institutes to manage Islamic discourse, but Ayub failed to gain the support of religious parties, which were determined to challenge Ayub's power to interpret Islam. Ayub partly succeeded in his early years of the regime into rolling back Islam as a guide to public policy. He believed that the modernist implementation of Islam is faithfully reflected in the original vision of Pakistan (Shaikh, 2009).

Ayub turned to the traditionalist Islam of the Sufi shrines. He was supported by Pir Dewal Sharif and many of the prominent *Sajjada neshins* (Talbot, 2012). He judged that *pirs* had an important source of influence (Jaffrelot, 2015). Ayub had hoped that the rural based folk Islam will provide the support against the urban clerical opposition, but his agenda to legitimize his modernization efforts through rural Islam was unclear. Ayub continued to rely on rural spiritual leaders and *sajjida nashin* to restrict the enmity of urban-based ulema, uncertain their Islamic achievements. Ayub's attempt to appropriate the ulema's right to interpret the role of Islam in the public sphere was also hostile them and their Islamist allies (Shaikh, 2009).

Inspite of certain attempt to modernize Islam, it did not dare to think of limiting Islam's role and influence. Moreover, the regime made adequate use of religion in order to strengthen its own position and integrate the unity of the West and the East Pakistan. The military regime took measures to strengthen the role of Islam and promoted religious education at all levels for students. Academy of Islam was established to trained theologians and specialists in Islamic studies. The central institution of Islamic research was established to the reconstruction of Pakistani society on the Islamic basis (Belokrenitsky & Moskalenko, 2013).

In the initial days of his regime, he kept religious parties out of the power, because Ayub sought to cultivate the image of enlightened Muslim leader in the West (Haqqani, 2005). But after the declaration of 1962 constitution, he allowed to reemerge the political parties (Faruqi, 1991). When political parties legalized, Jamaat e Islami (JI) criticized the anti-Islamic features of the Ayub regime. Even before the ban on political activities had been lifted, he organized a meeting of fifty ulema from the East and the West part of the country to condemn the Muslim Family Laws ordinance. The central council of JI met at Lahore in August 1962 and passed resolutions to condemn the Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology, the Muslim Family Laws, Construction of Cinemas, Pakistan Arts Council, the Girls Guides and the Blue Birds and the importation of Books critical to Islam (Talbot, 2012). In his enlightened Islam era, Ayub setting up the committee to moon

sighting for the Eid festival in 1967, to eradicate the disagreement among the believers. On this matter, ulema protested against the Ayub government (Jalal, 2014).

In the 1962 constitution, the name of the country contained "Republic of Pakistan" and the word "Islamic" was dropped. The term "Islamic" was inserted on the demand of the ulema and this was the victory of ulema and defeat for the seculars (Hayes, 1986). Ayub Khan reformed the Muslim family laws to restrict polygamy and promulgated family laws ordinance in 1961. This was intended to show to the world that Pakistan was a modern secular state with the concept of liberation of women. Ulema considered these laws un-Islamic and protested against it. The government strictly suppressed the ulema's agitation. However, Ayub realized that for the sake of political legitimacy it was necessary to compromise and keep up Islamic appearance (Faruqi, 1991).

Ayub's regime criticized fundamentalists and they turned Islam into an escape from life which became a 'lifeless object incapable of progress and restricted only to the mosque and Muslims, religion has remained static while mankind has made great advancement in science and philosophy. He pointed out that such a situation was filled up with great danger for Islam itself. The aim of Ayub regime was to revive the spirit of Islam in the light of modern progress and scientific achievements. He said that we need Islam that is understandable for all the people in the country. We did not need mullah's Islam. Religious activity should be in the hands of a new generation of trained theologians, who were capable of harmonizing Islam with modern consciousness. For this purpose, they established higher religious educational and research institute designed for training the ulema, who mastered the teaching of Islam in the light of modern scientific and technical achievements and were capable of holding discussions with anyone and on any issue. However, when it came to practical action with religious groups and organizations, the government tended to lose its spirit and acted carefully and reluctantly. They have a concern that modernizing Islam could eridicate the religion which was the basis of Pakistani society (Belokrenitsky & Moskalenki, 2013).

Ayub khan described the need of ideology in his autobiography and stated that we got Pakistan on the basis of Islamic ideology but after getting it, we failed to define the ideology in an understandable way (Lodhi, 2011). Conservative ulema were against the modernization agenda of Ayub. He turned down his modernization agenda under the pressure of religious leaders who was the threat to his legitimacy and he also needed the support of ulema in the 1965 election (Ansari, 2011). Ayub used Islamic card for election as a tactic. Ayub contested with Fatima Jinnah who was the candidate of Combine Opposition Parties. He sought the help of religious groups to issue the fatwa that female cannot become a head of an Islamic state (Haqqani, 2005; Kukreja, 2003). Maudadi said that woman can become head of state but it was not desirable. The general controversy was that government bribed the clerics. This happening undermined the Ayub's original plan of keeping distance with clerics (Haqqani, 2005).

Ayub did not play with Islam to gain legitimacy as some politicians had done earlier. He justified his regime through modernization. Ayub's modernist Islam

was practical and based on common sense rather than any theological interpretation, soon he faced the resistance from Islamist groups. By the end of his regime, the role of Islam in Pakistan's public life was as unresolved as it had ever been. The ulema were unhappy with the composition of the Islamic advisory committee which Ayub had established to assist the National Assembly in framing laws based on Islamic concepts (Talbot, 2012).

Ayub khan set out to modernize Islam in Pakistan. He considered that religion was the only foundation for national unity, but publicly he rose up against the ulema's obscurantism and sought to separate the spiritual from the materialistic spheres. He pressurized Imam in mosques to open up to western science and tried to get Maududi to quit politics by offering him the presidency of Bahawalpur University. Ayub khan sought the support of Maududi during the 1965 war with India. He had arrested him twice in 1964 and 1967. His regime stood apart from the JI's fundamentalist agenda (Jaffrelot, 2015).

Yahya era: (1969-1971)

The second military regime under Gerenal Yahya Khan was for the short period of time (Haqqani, 2005). After Ayub's resignation in 1969, Yahya Khan took over the country. Yahya Khan used Islam to legitimize his rule and tactically form alliance with Islamists. He became allied with the JI and it was the first coalition of the military with the Islamist. JI called Yahya "champion of Islam" (Jafferlot, 2015). During the election campaign of 1970 the army leadership under Yahya opted for an informal alliance with Islamic parties against the perceived populist challenges of Bhutto and Sheikh Mujib ur Rahman in West and East Pakistan respectively. (Talbot, 2007)

Yahya Khan tried to develop an Islamic identity for the unity and defense of Pakistan remained most important. To retain the power, Yahya khan used the intelligence agencies to systemize attacks by Islamic parties against mainstream political parties; Awami league and PPP. Both were accused of being un-Islamic for their secular and socialist beliefs. The 1971 war under the Yahya regime was framed as a struggle for Pakistan's Islamic identity. Yahya khan said that Pakistan's enemy was doing their level best to undo the country. The 1971 war ended in disaster for Pakistan, and military leader used Islam to promote Pakistan's ideology and integrity but failed (Lodhi, 2011).

It was considered by ulema that Mujib ur Rehman is a secular leader as a result ulema supported Yahya Khan in the 1971 civil war. Then political leadership gained the support of these ulema groups and orthodox Islamist groups made themselves politically strong and established (Kukreja, 2003). When military operation started in East Pakistan, the army decided to prepare the *razakaar* force of non-Bengalis who belonged to East Pakistan and Islamist groups that was in favour of Pakistan. The IJT which was the student wing of JI, recruited number of volunteers and name of these Islamist brigades have significant value from Islamic point of view: *Al-Badr* and *Al-Shams* (Haqqani, 2005).

Hamood ur Rehman commission report charged to investigate the events of 1971 civil war noted that, 'the belief appears to be universally entertained by all sections of our people that one of the major causes of our disgrace was the moral

degeneration which had set in among senior army commander' that involve in 'lust for wine and women'. The most serious allegation centered on General Yahya, whose addiction to heavy drinking and a questionable friendship with a number of ladies of indifferent repute was held up as indisputable evidence that secularism had damaged the moral fabric of the leadership and hastened the disintegration of the nation. This weakening of Pakistan's founding ideology 'the two nation theory which now came to be seen as too closely tied to the secular vision associated with Jinnah and the country's first generation of politicians (Shaikh, 2009).

Zia-ul-Haq era: (1977-1988)

According to Jaffrelot (2015), Ayub and Yahya were the two modernist military men, but Zia ul Haq had desired to link the country back to the times of Holy Prophet (PBUH). He used Islam as a political strategy and to legitimize his rule. Yahya laid the foundation of military and Islamist association and later Zia institutionalized it. Pakistan sought to sponsor Islamization for ideological and legitimization purpose. Islamization was the corner stone of Zia's regime (Talbot, 2012). JI celebrated the takeover of Zia-ul-Haq. In his first speech after take over the power, Zia expressed himself as a "soldier of Islam". He was responsible to make Pakistan global center of political Islam (Haqqani, 2005). Zia said in his July 1977 address that Pakistan can only survive if it associates with Islam and Islamic system is an important prerequisite for the country. From that day onward all of his actions justify to established Islamic system. The overhauling of the social institutions were required to set matters right. It was the fact that the political and economic institutions of Pakistan had the western influence as a result of British rule in Sub-continent. First step under the policy of Islamization was to examine all laws, if they are un-Islamic then make correction (Hayes, 1986).

Under his policy of Islamization he encouraged the national dress *Shalwar Kameez* and prayers were introduced in offices. He discouraged the drinking officers for promotion and gave priority to pious military men. JI found the soul mate in the face of Zia. Zia presented that Islamization is the demand of the people but he misinterpret the people's will. People wanted equity and social justice. He introduced Hudood ordinance in 1979 to specifically targeting women. Islamization aimed to manipulate the Islamic sentiments of the masses and appease the religious parties (Jalal, 2014). Zia regularly met with ulema and *mashaikh* in his residential office and in conferences that arranged by his government (Haqqani, 2005).

Zia ul Haq changed the motto of army from unity, faith, discipline to faith, piety, and holy war. Religious practice and piety became the part of the assessment in the promotion of army officers. He was the first leader to attend the annual meeting of Tablighi Jamaat at Raiwind in Lahore. He encouraged the soldiers for *Tabligh*, and many of them became committed to its activities. Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology announced that presidential form of government nearest to Islam and political parties are un-Islamic. Zia saw Islamization to search the stability and national unity of Pakistan (Talbot, 2012). The liberal in reacting to these Islamic laws would assert that the Islam has dynamic potential for reformation and modernization that is being ignored (Sayeed, 2015).

Zia believed that after the loss of East Pakistan, only Islam prevented Pakistan's complete disintegration and absorption by India. Zia insisted on the establishment of Sharia law and the strict observance of Islamic practices. He declared that political parties had no place in Islam, he brought into being Majlis-i-Shura, and argued forcefully for the need to create a state that not only found guidance in scripture but also avoided divisiveness and competition. Zia action were challenged by those who saw his seizure of the government as a personal grab for power, and many did not believe his truly intended to construct an Islamic state (Kukreja & Singh, 2005). In 1985 Islamic political parties were disappointed by the half-hearted to enforce Islamic principles and started the campaign to enforce Shariah, other parties also joined them for lifting up martial law and restored the democratic institutions in the country (Faruqi, 1991).

Federal Shariat Court was established in 1980 to reviewing the Ayub's Muslim Family laws ordinance which was still being denounced by the ulema. This court had the authority to judge whether the existing laws are according to the Islamic principles or not. In Zia's reform agenda, Shariat courts had high priority and justified that Pakistan had been created for the purpose of Islamic justice (Ziring, 1997).

Ulema demanded greater autonomy over madrassas. Zia strengthened the nexus between the JI and ulema and then launched comprehensive program of Islamic reforms that covered legalistic approach to Pakistan's Muslim identity. The process of shariatizaion needs to be carefully distinguished from better-known phenomenon of Islamization that has been most closely associated in Pakistan with the military regime of Zia-ul-Haq. Shariatization and Islamization both do not compromise on the emphasis on the enforcement of Islamic law, commitment to the ethical foundations of Islam that held away in the early discourse about the nation-state in Pakistan (Shaikh, 2009). Zia most effectively consolidated Islamization through education (Ziring, 1997). He brought significant change in education system. Text books were written Islamist ideological agenda (Haqqani, 2005).

The army provided support to anti-Bhutto camp as under Zia ul Haq and in the post-Zia ruling periods. At the other end, Islamic parties provided the ideological platform to anti-Bhutto forces in both electoral and non-electoral terms. This so-called *Khaki-mullah* nexus was further consolidated in the backdrop of the decade-long Afghanistan war in the 1980s. (Talbot, 2007) It is important to note that JI members celebrated the Bhutto's execution. During Zia era, some ministries such as Information & broadcasting, ministries of population, water, power and natural resources were under the control of JI members. The ideologue, Professor Khurshid Ahmad was appointed the head of planning commission and he prepared the plan to Islamize the economy (Haqqani, 2005).

Jinnah was portrayed as upholding Islam, while the ulama whose influence had been marginal to the creation of Pakistan were elevated to a vanguard role. On the occasion of Jinnah's birthday in 1981, newspaper articles omitted his speech to the Constituent Assembly in which he called for religious freedom and the relegation of faith to the private sphere. Film industry made films that presented the Jinnah as a proponent of an Islamic state. He setting up the consultative assembly of nominated members and gave a title of Majlis-i-Shura. But ulema criticized the

role of Majlis-i-Shura which Shura as prescribed in the Quran would have made decisions already taken by the government. In August 1983, the advisory council of Islamic Ideology pronounced that a presidential form of government is nearest to Islam and political parties are un-Islamic. Zia's Islamization increased tension between different expressions of faith. Zia attempt to place Islam at the forefront of Pakistan's public life widened sectarian opening. Contemporary Pakistan continues to suffer from the fruits of these divisions (Talbot, 2012).

After 1947, Pakistan is passing through an intense process in different periods, but after the period of 9/11, Islamic social movements, increasingly conflict with the state, have replaced its efforts to follow pubic life with interpretations of Islamic principles. The state of Pakistan manipulated and projected religion and established alliance with militant groups for regional strategic interests. The debate intense in 1990s and this was the result of Zia's education policy and it links with current intolerance and impose orthodoxy (Talbot, 2012). It was the result of Zia's policies that a vast section of our society has become intolerant and backward rather than tolerated and liberal and went toward Islamic militancy (Kukreja, 2003).

The long standing debate about Islam's role in public life took on a new dimension in the Zia era. The state for the first time sponsored Islamization through judicial, economic and educational reforms and amendments to the Pakistan Penal code. Islamization thrived within the regional context of the Afghan conflict and domestically drew strength from the rapid socioeconomic changes of the later 1970s and the truncation of the state following the emergence of Bangladesh. Its legacy was to bring the ulema closer to the power than ever before, although initially it was the lay activists of the Islamist JI who were closest to the Zia regime. Zia Islamization coincided with the Afghan war which initiated important process continuing to impact on Pakistan, was, 'the war encouraged the links between Islamic radicals and the army and its intelligence wing, the ISI which resulted in ambiguities in the approach to the post 9/11 'war on terror'. (Long, Samad, Singh & Talbot, 2016).

Musharraf era: (1999-2008)

Musharraf was like Ayub Khan because of his liberal family background. Musharraf spent many year of his childhood in Turkey because his father posting was in Pakistani Embassy in Ankara. Musharraf was committed the Jinnah's vision of moderate and progressive society. Islamic moderation remained a motto throughout his era (Talbot, 2012). Pervez Musharraf was inspired by the Father of Modern Turkish leader Kamal Ataturk and followed his policies. He desired a modern and liberal Pakistan like Turkey, where religion is considered a personal matter of an individual. Under the vision of enlightened moderation, he tried to promote liberal values, presented soft image of Pakistan at the international level, redefined the role and status of women that is based on the western ideology, tried to alter the Blasphemy Law, liberalize the electronic media, introduced educational reforms and produced new "Wave of Modernization" in Pakistan (Khalid & Ali, 2015).

Musharraf presented the vision of Enlightened Moderation (EM) that was clearly contradicted his domestic, regional and international policies. He had duality in his policy of EM because his Islamist opposition MMA in parliament justified his intervention in politics. Two leading mainstream party leaders were exiled and their parties suffered in the 2002 election. Muttahida-i-Majlis-i-Amal's candidates (coalition of six religious parties) were benefited by the Anti-American sentiments from the bordering areas of Afghanistan and gained the electoral success. Pervez Musharraf marginally reversed Zia ul Haq's course of Islamization. He encouraged women's participation in public affairs, conducted cultural events, liberal media with unrestricted entertainment, but Hadood and controversial Islamic Blasphemy laws remained in place (Haqqani, 2005). After Musharraf's took over, Jamaat e Islami (JI) issued a statement in which he' urged on military ruler to accountability of corrupt leaders, criticized Musharraf decision of state emergency and expressed that JI could not support martial law and suspension of fundamental rights. It was also pointed out in the statement that whatever is happening in the country because we did not adopt the Islamic system (Kukreja, 2003). Despite this statement JI supported the military regime of Musharraf and became his ally.

Post September 11, 2001, Musharraf assured the world that Pakistan has ended its links with *tabligis*, fundamentalists and jihadis to become a country Islamic moderate state (Kukreja & Singh, 2005). In Musharraf's government Federal Minister of Religious Affairs, suggested to build model madrassas in all provinces of Pakistan including Islamabad. At first, model madrassas were established in Karachi, Sukkar and Islamabad, developed their curriculum, but development of these madaris were very slow. Musharraf issued the Madrassas ordinance without the consultation with ulema but ulema participation was mandatory. Ulema argued that these reforms will fail because government did not consult them to design the reforms (Kennedy & Botteron, 2006). Musharraf accommodated the Zia's associates Sharif ud Din Pirzada and Atiya Inayat Ullah in his government, it suggested that Musharraf is looking Zia as a role model rather than Ataturk (Kukreja, 2003).

During his tenure, Musharraf claimed that he was only the savior of Pakistan, dismantled the Jihadi network and extremism, but in practice his performance did not meet his claims. All the leaders of Jihadi Organizations openly implemented their agenda. Musharraf tried to perform the balancing act, on one side he cooperated with the West but on the other he was soft with certain groups of militants. By 2006, the Americans got to know his dual policy and unfolded the layers of Enlightened Moderation (Mir, 2009).

Some noticeable changes were also brought in institutional practices through the strategy of EM, like; afternoon prayer in organizations were no longer required, T V announcers appeared unveiled, no duppata on heads, thickly bearded flight attendant vanished from PIA flights, women pilots are allowed in Air Force, brought an amendment in Hudood Ordinance. Musharraf thought that theocratic Pakistan cannot work, and he called for Enlightened Moderation (Hoodbhoy, 2006).

In the spirit of EM, he banned militant organizations, started the process of registering *Madaris* and reforms their curriculum, but militant groups reappeared with other names. He banned the heads of the two main political parties and this

vacuum was filled by religious parties. Musharraf failed to stabilize the theory of EM in Pakistan due to his policies to empower the religious parties and tolerate the militant organizations (Haider, 2010). Islamic parties raised the voice against the deletion of column of religion for a new Pakistani passport. According to them, the new religious order restricted religion only in personal affairs and entire matters of state was run through the Western ideology and try to marginalize the Muslim Ummah. It was the American and the Jewish agenda to de-Islamize the school curriculum and excluded the topics of 'Jihad' and 'Shahadat' from the curriculum (Kalia, 2011).

The idea of EM was presented in response to the world's perception that Islam breeds extremism and fundamentalism. Musharraf appealed to the Muslims that they should adopt the modern way and conciliatory approach to prove that Islam is not a religion of militancy; rather it is in favor of democracy and secularism (Ahmad & Afridi, 2014). Many Pakistani welcome this approach because they realized that religious extremism is an obstruction (Kronstadt, 2005). A combination of Musharraf's liberal attitudes, mounting sectarian conflict, and the need to secure a favourable international image for his regime, led him to portray Pakistan as a moderate Islamic state which would act as a source of stability in the West Asia region (Long, Samad, Singh & Talbot, 2016).

Pervez Musharraf's political strategy had inherent contradictions. On the one hand, he reserved the authority to behave as a dictator, and pushed his opponents with the backing of the army and the courts. On the other side, he claimed to be placing Pakistan on the path of "Enlightened Moderation" and sustain democracy by holding elections (Markey, 2013). He did not completely renounce terrorism as a tool of national policy of Pakistan and continued to support terrorist groups for his perceived geopolitical interests. The focus of Musharraf reforms was only to strengthen his hold on power. Despite his pleas for "Enlightened Moderation", he did a little to develop the institutions that could provide the democratic and moderate political forces. As a result of his political mechanism, first time in Pakistan's history, Islamic parties got prominence in the parliament (Tellis, 2005). Musharraf required the legitimacy that's why he led to accommodate Islamic parties. Musharraf make alliance with PML Q and National alliance but both parties faced the legitimacy challenged from the masses, then army leadership prepare space for Islamic parties in the 2002 election (Talbot, 2007).

To meet his political ends Zia adopted the policy of Islamization and Musharraf had enlightened moderation. Musharraf had succeeded to read his time well, the US domination and the Western Values. He had no alternative, but to show himself as a modern and enlightened general (Zaidi, 2007). Musharraf claimed that Pakistan has rejected the militant and violent Islam that was imposed by ex-President Zia ul Haq, to be replaced by "Modern" and "Moderate Islam". But his own allies were opposed to this philosophy (Hoodbhoy, 2006). With his idea of EM he wanted to create a balance between Islamic traditions and the western modernity. Military and religious leaders were collaborated each other in Musharraf regime. They used EM as trick to gain opportunities, to suppress the women opposition. This regime is considered a hoax. Musharraf wanted to change

the adultery laws, but the reaction of the coalition parties was so negative, that he threw it away (Gazdar, 2006).

After 9/11 Musharraf decided to change the internal and external policies, joined US in its war against terrorism, gave up the previous Afghan Policy, condemned terrorism and visualized Pakistan, as a modern Muslim state (Anand, 2010). These changes were on the demand of the USA. Due to the lack of consensus on the role of Islam and ideology, Musharraf's program of EM was ineffective and under critical observation because of his liberal opinion (Shaikh, 2009). Musharraf did not modernize the system due to internal weaknesses of Pakistan (Talbot, 2012).

To adopt EM as a foreign policy tool he addressed to the American Jewish Congress and said that Pakistan had no conflict with Israel and both countries should improve their relations. American and Israelis press highlighted this event and appreciated by Tom Latos, who was a vocal critic of Pakistan in congress (Kennedy, 2006). Musharraf supported the enemies of Islam, followed the neo-con agenda under the title of "Enlightened Moderation" and argued that the world was an extremely dangerous place because of plastic explosions and suicide bombers. US wanted to impose the Zionist ideology on Pakistan (Jan, 2006).

Musharraf emphasized Sufi teachings as a counter to extremism. He launched National Sufi council in Nov, 2006. Sufism was project as an alternative 'moderate' version of Islam. Every government in Pakistan tried to redefine Sufism and the *pirs*, and instrumentalize them for his own political benefit. Ayub define the role of Sufi's as social reformer, but Musharraf redefine their role as promoters of peace and tolerance. Sufism gradually became the symbols of the fight undertaken by the government against creeping 'Talbanization', deemed to threaten the very fabric of the nation (Long, Samad, Singh & Talbot, 2016).

Conclusion:

Based on the historical analysis of the struggle between Islam and modernity during the military regimes in Pakistan, this study concludes that slogan of Islam has continued to be an important force in Pakistan. Islamism gained ground in Pakistan due to the power struggle between military and democratic forces. This longitudinal research finds that throughout the history military adapted the slogan of Islam according to the strategic requirement of the country. The lines between Islam and modernity have not been clearly drawn and the battle between modernists and conservatives continue in the political arena of Pakistan. The military choose religion of Islam to promote a social welfare, to unite Pakistan, to fight in Afghan jihad, transnational Muslim unity, and to portray Pakistan as an enlightened moderation state. Islam was empowered over the modernist ideals and used it to safeguard their political power. In the different phases of military rule in Pakistan, military rulers adopted different strategy to use the slogan of Islam. It was in fact not religious but strategic interests that shaped the ideological position of the military rulers in Pakistan.

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