

Pakistan's Counter Terrorism Strategy (2001-2019) (Evolution, Paradigms, Prospects & Challenges)

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ABSTRACT

With the terrorist's attacks on world trade center and pentagon on 9/11, there usher a new are in the global politics era. The term terrorists emerged on the global horizon as an urgent matter to deal with full zeal and strength. The culprits were aimed and alliances were made to initiate counter terrorism strategies. The strategic position and political enigma again thrust Pakistan into the coalition of war on terror. This time terrorists' organizations, militants and the extremist's groups were the opposition instead of the secular communist threat. The task of war on terror was not only delicate but also an intricate one, with serious ramifications and implications on both domestic and regional political scenario of Pakistan. The counter terrorism activity of Pakistan started in the region with the military and diplomatic cooperation and coalition of the United States. Countering terrorism remained a huge domestic, regional and global challenge for Pakistan due to the existing threats of its eastern and western borders. Thus, Pakistan's counter terrorism strategy has to deal with the rightest bloc in the domestic political scenario, Indian opposition and propaganda and the global pressure to meet the settled targets in the war on terror. Pakistan needed a great state Manship, creative diplomacy and astute military strategy to deal with such a challenging situation. At present, now about two decades have elapsed there is a time to access the ratio of success and failure of war on terror. There are a few subtle things on the surface i.e. loopholes in decision making, the element of distrust between the partners and the domestic stakeholders along with the struggling socio-political and economic environment have created challenges in the Pakistan's counter terrorism strategies. Beside the negative implications and problems, the emerging awareness of national interest, policy making process in terms of fighting with terror has changed the course of things and events in the future prospect. Pakistan yet have to develop diplomatic and strategic maturity in the context of its counter terrorism policy in more viable and workable direction.

Keywords: *Counter terrorism strategy, Military Operations, Non-Frictional Approach, Militant Groups, Global War on Terror.*

Introduction

Pakistan has been facing a persistent wave of anti-state terrorism acts since the incident of 9/11 in the United States. Pakistan has lost more than 40,000 lives of its civilian and military persons along with economic loss amounted to almost \$70 billion. Pakistan faces the menace of terrorism perpetrated by non-state home grown actors and sectarian violence of militant, jihadi and extremist organizations. The Islamabad administration has actively been involved in fighting against the scourge of terrorism since the launching of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in October 2001 as a frontline state of GWOT. Pakistan has to pay a heavy cost of

being an active and frontline state in the war against terror. The endurance of war has contributed in the socio-economic instability and political unrest in Pakistan, especially in the tribal areas and few districts in Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA). The law enforcing agencies have been facing a serious difficulty in the administration of the rule of law in the tribal belt of northern Pakistan i.e. Waziristan agencies bordering to Afghanistan due to the presence of radical, religiously motivated, politically committed international terrorists. These transnational terrorists have been integrated by certain non-state organizations through global networks of terrorist cells located in different regions of the world. The national and international intelligence agencies have reported that different terrorist organizations have developed their sanctuaries in the northern areas of Pakistan beside the Durand Line (Lander & Nichloas, 2007) (Nichloas, 2007, p. 34). The terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda, Taliban and other associates have exploited the prevailed lawless environment in Pakistan and Afghanistan border areas and undermined the writ of the government of Pakistan. Pakistan has been reported as an epicenter of numerous militant and extremist groups involved in ongoing lethal and frightening terrorist activities. These terrorist groups have close operational links with each other and operated for decades in association of Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda (Siddiq, 2009, p. 64).

The major terrorism promoting factions can be described in four categories, the local religious cluster such as the Sunni-Deobandi, Sipah-e-Sihaba Pakistan (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangavi an arch rival of the Shiite community in Pakistan. The second faction consists of Pakistani Taliban organized by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a network of almost 40 militant and extremist groups based in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Baitullah Mehsud laid the foundation of TTP in December 2007 in Southern Waziristan. The TTP was led by Maulvi Fazlullah after killing of Hakimullah Mehsud as the result of the US aerial drone attack in North Waziristan on November 1st, 2013. Implementation of shariah and display of unity for jihad against the US led collating forces in Afghanistan was the prime motive of TTP (Gunaratna & Iqbal, 2011, pp. 39-41). The third section of extremist terrorist group consists of anti-Indian militant jihadi network known as the Kashmiri groups, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Harkat-ul-Mujahedeen; Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Hizb-e-Mujahedeen and al-Badr. The fourth group of terrorists in Pakistan comprises Jalaludin Haqqani's Taliban group as the former member of the Quetta Shura of Mullah Umer based in North Waziristan. Pakistan army graded the groups of Taliban as 'bad Taliban' due to their deliberated designs of terrorist attacks in Pakistan against the civilians and military installations whereas the other two sections of militants are perceived in the better interest of Pakistan and were entitled as 'good Taliban' due to promotion and protection of Pakistan's geostrategic interests in India and Afghanistan. Therefore, Pakistan remained reluctant to initiate any military operation against good Taliban despite immense regional and international pressure. The Tehrik-Nifaz-Shariat-i-Muhammadi (TNSM) is another leading militant group with a reputation of confronting Pakistan army and the state to enforce shariah in the country. There are several foreign militants i.e. Arabs, Chechens, Chinese, Uighurs and Uzbeks actively working as the associate groups of TTP and al-Qaeda in Pakistan. These extremist militants entered in Pakistan from its western border during the 1st Afghan war period and rooted themselves deeply in the society. Currently, these international

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extremist militants have cultivated their close relations with local Taliban and selected the northern areas of Pakistan as their hideouts.

Evolution of Counter Terrorism Strategy

Operation Enduring Freedom was launched by the US led NATO forces to dismantle the strength and regime of Taliban in Afghanistan in October 2001. The military campaign of allied forces in Afghanistan dislodged the network of jihadi groups that enhanced the threat of terrorism in Pakistan, due to infiltration of Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders and recruits from Afghanistan to tribal areas of Pakistan. The migrated extremist cadres initially began to increase their focus on Southern Waziristan and influence into remaining areas of FATA and PATA. The persistent working of Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda gave birth to another alliance of tribal militant groups under the leadership of Nek Muhammad Wazir, who called themselves as the Pakistani Taliban in 2003. This group soon developed its links with other sectarian militant outfits and started guerilla operations against the NATO forces in Afghanistan. It also launched a terrorist campaign against the security forces and civilians in big cities and tribal areas of Pakistan. Therefore, in the post 9/11 landscape, Pakistan required an effective strategy of crushing the evil of terrorism. The concept of counter terrorism seems difficult to define like that of terrorism, since it is very complex. Paul Wilkinson is of the view there is not a globally agreed counter terrorism strategy because every incident of terrorism has its own attributes (Wilkinson, 2006, p. 203). Kelman describes counter terrorism “a set of measures that states apply in response to acts of terrorism”. The Oxford English Dictionary defines counter terrorism as, “political or military actions or measures intended to combat, prevent, or deter terrorism, sometimes (in early use) with the implication that the methods utilized resemble those of the terrorists” (Kelman, 2012, pp. 253-258).

Pakistan has adopted military and non-military methods as prime determinants of its counter terrorism policy to handle the hazards of terrorism. Pakistan launched various security operations against the militants in its northern areas. Pakistan also adopted the policy of intelligence information based ‘search and capture’ actions in its densely populated cities like Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar and Rawalpindi capturing various leaders of terrorist organizations, i.e. al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The Islamabad administration also emphasized on non-military options i.e. negotiations and legislative aspects. The government of Pakistan has signed different peace agreements with the extremists and militants. On the other hand, different governments in Pakistan have chosen legislative aspects and passed different anti-terrorism laws since 9/11 whereas various presidential acts and ordinances remained an additional and effective counter terrorism policy perspective. The government of Pakistan occasionally took strict actions against the terrorist network and banned militant groups in order to combat the aims of the dissidents.

A Factual Consideration to Counterterrorism

The security forces of Pakistan have launched several short-and long-term security operations to uproot the belligerents from the targeted areas as the leading part of its counter terrorism strategy. The new counter terrorism policy of Pakistan stood out on four major accounts in respect of military operations i.e.

1. The commitment and capability of army and the paramilitary troops,
2. Unanimity between the civilian leadership and the top brass of the military,
3. A full fledged support from civil society and
4. Rehabilitation of Pakistan army's image at the popular level (Rizvi, 2009).

The security forces of Pakistan conducted different operations especially in the most populated areas of Pakistan to hunt the leadership and the activist of terrorist organizations especially al-Qaeda and Taliban. Pakistan's security agencies have launched a number of limited and long-term military operations to destroy the hideouts of the terrorist, militants and the extremists within its territorial jurisdiction. The major coercive measures were taken by Pakistan Army during 2001-2019 in the titles of operation Al-Mizan 2002, operation Kalosha 2004, operation Earth Quake 2007, operation Right path 2008, Operation Lion Heart 2008, operation True Path 2009, operation Just Path 2009, operation path of salvation 2009, operation white mountain 2011, operation Zarb e Azab 2014 and ongoing operation Radd ul Faasad 2017. Pakistan has paid a huge cost of \$120 billion and almost 70,000 military and civilian lives. After the incident of 9/11 the northern areas of Pakistan became a hotbed of proxy warfare by a number of external forces. The terrorist organizations tried to foster sectarian and communal divisions. The dissidents also acquired strength, power and got deeply rooted in Afghanistan. The US led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan required Pakistan to stop the infiltration of militants and extremists in its tribal areas. Pakistan deployed a large number of troops along the Durand line in support of OEF and employed a large portion of its logistical reserves to support the collated forces and put its maximum energy, potential and strategic skill to uproot the scourge of terrorism from the entire country. Pakistan's success ratio has been acknowledged by the world particularly country wide military operation Zarb e Azab and Radd ul Faasad launched to crush the terrorists and dissidents throughout the entire Pakistan.

The Non-frictional approach

The key decision makers in Pakistan i.e. the prime minister, president and the parliament also recommended non-military options to eliminate terrorist activities from Pakistan. The government of Pakistan has promulgated several acts and amendments in the existing legal framework dealing with terrorism, such as the Anti-terrorism Act (ATA) of 1997. The new legislative proceedings were introduced and converted into law to make the anti-terrorism efforts more rigorous.

Anti-Terrorism Ordinance: The Anti-Terrorism amendment ordinance was promulgated by the government in January 2002, aimed at targeting the terrorist network with a severe penalty including death sentence to the people involved in aiding and abetting terrorism. The ordinance 2002 included the military personnel from the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, as one of the three anti-terrorist court members of the bench to ensure speedy trials (Dawn, 2002).

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Anti-Terrorism Court: Pakistan made another amendment to the ordinance of Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC) 2002, on 16 November 2002, that granted police to detain an individual under suspect for the period of 12 months, even if no criminal charges have been filed against that individual. According to this amended ordinance, the arrested individual could only be freed on giving guarantees to justify his purity otherwise he was to be sent in front of the court not beyond the time of 24 hours. ATA law of 1997 was also amended during the month of November 2004 that extended the opportunity of appeal to the victims and his legal successors against the judgment of ATC in the high court within a month after the ATC decision. In January 2005, another amendment was brought and implemented with further changes in ATA of 1997 aiming to root out the terrorist activities in a more effective mode. The 'imprisonment for life' replaced the word '14-years' and this was determined to be the maximum imprisonment period for the militancy accused personnel in Pakistan. This law further suggested for establishing 'special benches' of high court consisting two judges. This decree called for enhancing the jurisdiction of ATC for trying offenses of abduction or kidnapping for ransom, firing of arms, explosive device and bomb blasts in any worshipping place or court area (Gazette of Pakistan, 2005).

Anti-terrorism Amendment Ordinance 2009: The manifestation of different security actions in the regions of Swat in the middle part of 2009, the government of Pakistan reviewed and revised its counter terrorism policy and its infrastructure. The operations of the security forces were devastating for the militants, who continued relative strikes on the security forces, law enforcement agencies and civilians. Therefore, a sensitive security environment in Pakistan required stern legislation to bring the terrorists to book. The government of Pakistan issued another amended ordinance for the sake of curbing terrorism. This newly shaped law allowed confessing in front of the investigation in the ATC's. Moreover, the tenure of remand was extended from 30 to 90 days. The government of Pakistan also brought another important ordinance which led to establish new ATC's in the capital of KPK and in the Malakand region (Yusuf, 2014, p. 23).

The Regulation Actions 2011: The government enforced the Regulation Actions in Aid of Civil Powers 2011 for PATA and FATA in June 2011. The regulation act authorized the armed forces of Pakistan to imprison the suspect till the continuation of action in aid of the civil power. This act also gave "a set of offenses, punishable with death penalty or imprisonment for life or up to ten years and a fine along with the forfeiture of property" (The Dawn, 2011).

National Assembly's Fair Trial Law 2012: The national assembly of Pakistan passed the "investigation for fair trial bill 2012" on 20th December 2012. This investigation for fair trial law empowered the official authorities to intervene the personal communication of a man but with the dubious meanings pertaining to be involved in some acts of violence, crime or terror (The Business Recorder, 2012).

Parliament's Anti-Terrorism (Amended) Bill 2013: The parliament of Pakistan approved another significant law to combat the evil of terrorism inside the country. This altered bill 2013 authorized the agencies to capture the moveable and non-moveable property of an individual who is found to engage in financing any kind of terrorist act in the country. This anti-terrorism bill re-determined the concept of

terrorism in the section VI, ATA of 1997. If a person or group is found to create threat, risk, horror and intimidating common public, government officials, security forces or any other public sector authority, it will be a sheer act of terrorism (Kakakhel & Ahmed, 2013). The changed decree permitted the official authorities and agencies to lock up the suspect for the period of 3 months without challenging this in any court. It also disallowed the issuance of passport, credit cards, arms licenses and other facilities from the workers of the banned organizations, groups and its leaders from travelling abroad (The News International, 2013).

National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA): The parliament of Pakistan enacted another law for the installation of an autonomous body namely NACTA in March 2013. The NACTA performs different functions of data collection, information, and intelligence, dissemination, shares with other responsible authorities to chalk out a coherent and competent CT policy while coordinating with other international agencies to crush domestic and international terrorism. The NACTA is chaired by the prime minister of Pakistan including the director general military intelligence, DG FIA, heads of provincial police along with AJK and GB. The chief ministers of all the provinces, CM GB, the federal minister for law, chairman of the upper chamber, a senator, member of NA, interior secretary and DG ISI are the other members of NACTA.

Pakistan Protection Ordinance (PPO) 2013: The president of Pakistan Mr. Mamnoon Hussain enforced Pakistan Protection Ordinance (PPO) on October 20, 2013. The PPO empowered the security agencies to kill any suspect terrorist following the policy of 'shoot on sight' and the law also allowed the security forces to arrest the persons involved in pro-terrorist activities against the civilians or Pakistan army without any warrant on the non-bail able conditions. The PPO will be applicable against the social crimes based on discrimination, hatred, creed and race, use of arson, firebombs, suicide explosion, chemical and biological weapons, attacks on public places, official authorities, historical buildings, financial hubs, killing of innocent citizens, politicians, judges, media anchors, security officials, police, energy supply lines, airports, buses and navigation on sources. The PPO empowered the law enforcement institutions for the 90 days detention of the accused without any court trial. The ordinance authorized Islamabad administration to formulate new courts to conduct the speedy trials of the terrorists. According to the PPO ordinance, a person can be declared an anti-state element, enemy if his identification is not traced or found engaged in launching anti-Pakistan war and making any kind of destruction of its territory. The government of Pakistan is authorized to fix position or place, detention, trial, investigation, query and offence any corner site of Pakistan under the PPO law. The under-arrest person of any offense would be given opportunity to prove himself innocent. The supreme court of Pakistan shall hear an appeal against the final judgment of any special court (Gazette of Pakistan, 2013).

Outlawing of militant organizations

Pakistan has banned almost 45 militant and jihadi groups engaged to promote terrorist activities since 9/11. President Musharraf took bold initiatives to outlaw different militant organizations i.e. JeM, LeT, SSP, Tehreek-e-Ja'faria Pakistan (TJP), TSNM and Tehreek-e-Islami on 14th January 2002 to lessen severe global pressure especially after the attacks on the Indian parliament. President Musharraf

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announced to outlaw some other extremist and militancy sponsoring organizations in November 2003, i.e. Al-Qaeda, Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan (MIP, former SSP), Khuddam-ul-Islam (KuI, former JeM) and Islami Tehreek-e-Pakistan (ITP, former TJP). The government of Pakistan also proscribed the remaining networks of the militants which were supporting jihadi culture, militancy and terrorism. Lashkar-e-Islami (LeI), Ansar-ul-Islam (AuI), Haji Namdar group and TTP in 2008. The Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jama'at (former SSP) was also ceased to act in 2012 (Dawn, 2012).

Challenges to Pakistan's Counterterrorism Policy

Pakistan has adopted monotonous measures to pull out the network of different extremist and fanatic organizations during 2001-2019 for the following reasons:

Ineffective Counter-Terrorism Strategy:

Military and nonmilitary options reflect country's ineffectiveness for a counter terrorism strategy. Pakistan lacks the counter terrorism legislation in its normal legal proceeding history through the parliament (Kennedy, 2002, pp. 387-411) it has proved insignificant for eradication of terrorism from the soil of Pakistan.

Lack of Speedy Trials: On the one hand, Pakistan has failed to conduct speedy trials of the suspected terrorists and could not obtain any reasonable success to halt the activities of the banned militant groups which had started functioning by the substitute names. For example, the Jama'at-ud-Dawah (JuD, former LeT) has established madrassas, schools, health centers, and hospitals and hence depicted itself as a welfare organization.

Linkage with Country's Strategic Interests: There are some important overlapping shortcomings that led to Pakistan toward ineffectiveness of its counter terrorism policy in the context of sweeping out the evil of terrorism. Pakistan's anti-terrorism strategy is linked with its geostrategic and regional environment, especially dealing with its eastern and western neighbors India and Afghanistan. Pakistan's policy interest in the case of India is connected with the Kashmir issue as Pakistan considers the Kashmir conflict as 'unfinished agenda' of the partition plan of United India. Therefore, Pakistan preferred to stick with constant approach about the Kashmir conflict. Pakistan adopted both the war and dialogue policy to keep India engaged in a low intensity conflict by using the jihadi organizations through proxy wars. Although civil and military authorities gave tough time to crush the terrorists and their networks heavily "through the tactics of arrests, targeted assassinations and aggravated intergroup massacres" (Tellis, 2008, pp. 7-31). Pakistan's strategy of 'bad Taliban' and 'good Taliban' raises a question mark on its commitment and credibility to eliminate all kinds of terrorist network and organizations from its territorial jurisdiction. Therefore 'Pakistan friendly' jihadi and militant organizations are actively operating in Kashmir held by India and have been graded as the 'strategic assets' in the military circles of Pakistan. These strategic assets also use training camps and resources under the ideological inspiration of the state. As far as the Durand line issue is concerned, the Islamabad administration concentrates on the policy of making a flexible government in Kabul that would look after the security interests of Pakistan. Pakistan embarks upon the policy of deterrence for the growing Indian influence in Afghanistan as its prime concern. Pakistan continued to blame the Indian consulates in

Afghanistan to enhance insurgency in Baluchistan, a major threat to the national integrity of Pakistan (Dawn, 2012). The security agencies of Pakistan consider that the increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan can only be curtailed through cultivation of close links with elements that deter India friendly Kabul. Islamabad remained craving on supporting agenda policy of the pro Pakistan groups in Afghanistan that would make sure it's designed objectives in post NATO withdrawal scenario of Afghanistan. Pakistan army evaded to target the Afghan the Taliban, especially the Haqqani network while its military actions in northern and tribal areas of Pakistan despite an immense pressure from the United States.

The Civil-Military trust deficit: The uncertain, dubious and cockeyed civil military links in the politics of Pakistan have emasculated the worth and efforts of the country to combat domestic, regional and home-grown terrorism. Pakistan's political history is full of an incessant race for dominance and control over one another between civil and military leadership. Resultantly army won the power race game and led to define Pakistan's security and defense policy. When the civil elites try to play their independent role in the context of national security decision making process, the military has pushed it back vehemently. The Kerry Lugar Bill 2009, Memo gate scandal 2012 and establishing the institution of NACTA 2013 can be seen as glaring examples of civil military disharmony in the politics of Pakistan. The civil- military discord has made the counter terrorism strategy quite a tough task due to different perspectives on the formulation of counter terrorism policies.

The Civilian counter-terrorism strategy: The civilian political faction in Pakistan prefers the formulation of counter terrorism strategy accorded to the country's law and order situation. This is a huge issue in the civilian domain and it could be handled through the application of sound administration and governance measures.

The Military's standoff: Contrary to the civilian political leadership, the military considers the formulation of counter terrorism strategy on the basis of Pakistan's security issues which is overwhelmingly India centric and can be entertained through proxy war. The military establishment preferred to provide support to the 'strategic assets. The civil- military conflict remained alive on the conduct of different security operations and on the issue of negotiations with the TTP in the FATA and PATA regions. Pakistan army rejects any kind of unconditional dialogues with TTP due to its involvement in the projection of anomic and violent activities against the people of Pakistan whereas the civilian political entities do not offer any kind of pre-conditions to conduct talks with militants. On September 9, 2013 Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PMLN) government convened the meeting of all major political parties at Islamabad. The leading political stake holders attended this APC and decided to arrange peace dialogue with Taliban. The military exposed a careful and conscious response by giving satisfactory impression of civil military relations in the context of Pakistan's internal security and integrity (Daily Times, 2013).

The Ownership of U.S. led "War on Terror": Another important factor leading to the failure of Pakistan's counter terrorism efforts was a lack of development of a national consensus about the term 'war on terror' whether it is Pakistan's war or of the United States. Pakistan army designates WOT as Pakistan's own war and calls

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to articulate support from the masses to win this contest. This can be noted from General Kyani's (former military chief) speech of 14th August 2012. On the other hand, some popular political parties, such as the mandatory PMLN, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), Jama'at-e-Islami (JI) and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) candidly described WOT as an American war rather of Pakistan. Therefore, military's effort to fight the internal threat of terrorism questions its determination and commitment in the absence of support from the masses and political leadership.

Lack of Reliable Investigation and Evaluation Infrastructure: There is a lack of rational value free constant and reliable investigation and evaluation infrastructure of the incidents of terrorism.

Unbiased, Non-Implementation Policy for Countering Terrorism: The Islamabad administration has failed to debate and implement an unbiased national interrogation policy for countering terrorism.

Other Areas of Concern: The multiplicity of players in the arena of counter terrorism struggle, both in the tribal and settled areas of Pakistan, the ideological differences in the decision making circles, limited role of the civil administration in the formulation of national security policies, the ineffective performance of national crisis management cell (NCCM) and NACTA that yet haven't produced an impressive document, accurate data and a workable plan are the other major drawbacks in the Pakistan's counter terrorism strategy.

Unbalanced Multi-Layered Counter-Terrorism Policy: Pakistan has adopted a multi-layered counter terrorism policy, being unbalanced and having unequal powers among a variety of players and actors, along with trust deficit. Any inter agency task force with operational wing has not been found yet.

Lessons yet to be learned: Pakistan's decision making and legislative wing has failed to learn from the practice and policy of the United States and United Kingdom after the dreadful terrorist incidents of 9/11 and the 7/7, respectively. Pakistani authorities did not consult the policies of Turkey, Australia, Norway, Germany and Canada to improve the performance of its local and national law enforcement agencies. Pakistan is lacking behind in indigenous scientific and research environment related to surveillance, sweeping and how to completely uproot potential terrorist organizations. Pakistan has not learnt a lot about how to use the available sources that would enable the country to improve its law and order situation and skills of training required for fighting the terrorist.

Weak Law Enforcement Sector: There is a weak law enforcement sector in Pakistan, especially that of the Police, Frontier Constabulary (FC) and Frontier Corps, which need to improve their infrastructure, fighting capability, training, search skill and equipment.

An Element of Distrust: Another important aspect of Pakistan's counter terrorism policy failure is an element of distrust, hater, anti-American sentiments and incompatibility with international community particularly in the perception and prospects of counter terrorism approach. There is a dire need to improve the working relationship between Pakistan and the countries fighting against the evil of global terrorism. It is also essential to acknowledge the feelings and sacrifices

of the people and the Pakistan army, fighting the war on terror by those states who are often blamed for involvement in conspiracies against Pakistan's nuclear capability, national security and sovereignty.

Conclusion

The global counter terrorism strategy calculus has been affected both directly and indirectly impinged by the scourge of terrorism under the variable and varied socio-political environment. The perception, understanding, evaluation and response towards the terrorist activities has jeopardized the formation of a unanimous global counter terrorism strategy and the diversity of opinion weakened efforts of countering terrorism and strengthened the breeding of terrorism in the beginning of post 9/11 era. The phenomenon of terrorism has existed in a way or many throughout the human history. The horrible and devastating events of Twin Towers on September 2001, of World Trade Centre surfaced as the key issue in the contemporary world politics. The 9/11 carnage has changed the nature and dimension of security politics in the modern international relations. The protection of homeland soil and its inhabitants emerged as the lending determinant of the foreign policy a state. New security parameters have been introduced but no single universally agreed definition of terrorism was developed. However, the giant of terrorism has been declared as the threat use of violence against the civilian people to acquire certain settled targets through the violent victimization and brutal destruction of the non-combatants and innocent targets. Terrorism is the premeditated use of violence and unlawful force to disrupt peace, to destruct materialistic order of a society and to kill common innocent people alienating to create the horrible situation and uncertain social environment terrorism includes multiple reasons, motives and mindset behind its occurrence. Terrorism is generally ranked into state terrorism, anarchist terrorism, religious terrorism, communist terrorism, cyber terrorism, pure terrorism etc. which leaves somatic, social, economic and political implications on the target and victimized society. The 9/11 terrorist incidents have guided different states like America, Britain, Australia, Canada, Germany, India and Pakistan to review their security policy agenda in the emerging regional and global geostrategic environment. The United States introduced the global coalition strategy to root out the menace of terrorism under the joint defense of war on terror. Pakistan joined as the non-NATO ally state in the US led WOT and began to initiate its counter terrorism strategies against the activists of al Qaeda and Taliban across the Pak-Afghan borders. The counter terrorism strategy of the states depends on the perceived threat and its sources forced by the effected Nations. Some countries face terrorist activities, attacks and destruction from within the society initiated by the home-grown dissidents' rebels and the terrorist groups. A state adopts the specific set of counter terrorism strategy, but if terrorism occurs from external means and sources, the counter terrorism policy and measures can be of different nature and intensity. But in both ways, the states require all legal, political, economic and social measures for the punitive actions against the terrorists and their facilitators in letter and spirit to get control over the gigantic issue of global terrorism. it is essential to know clearly that what is terrorism, who is doing it, how much governments and major policy makers are known to this inhuman scourge of terrorism or what is the level of negligence on the part of the concerned governing authorities, stakeholders in the context of terrorist activities especially countries like Pakistan. There is dire

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need to bring maximum social, political, economic and legislature reforms to root out the evil of terrorism. A coherent and comprehensive anti-terrorism policy is required to coup with the problem. Pakistan must learn from the counter terrorism policy both in theoretical and practical approach of the states like Australia, Britain, Canada, Germany and the United States for acquiring definite and determined results. The multifaceted counter terrorism policy is required to be given up along with the discontent civil military leadership while chalking out counter terrorism strategy. A full pledge co-operative regional and global approach needed to be opted by Islamabad administration with the application of different models of counter terrorism i.e. crime war and disease approaches to eliminate terrorism from the social and anthropological environment of Pakistan. Although Pakistan has applied quite serious efforts to combat terrorism but its counter terrorism policy has been attributed non-persistent as compare to the states fighting in the war on terror led by the United States. Pakistan has majorly emphasized on its military operation options sporadically but yet lacked to construct a compact and strong infrastructure of deterrence, exigency, early warning intelligence system, rule of law, diplomatic tactics, zero tolerance policy, physical protective measures, complete border infiltration sealing agenda, permanent anti-terrorism legislation and to change the fundamental and extremist mindset from its socio-political circles for the lasting peace and success in the war on terror. Prime Minister Imran Khan made a special emphasis on Pakistan's contribution in the war on terror since 2001 to 2019 as he categorically addressed during his visit to United States in August 2019 that Pakistan has cost over \$120 billion and nearly 70,000 civilian and military lives, while addressing to the United States Institute of Peace. PM Khan expressed during his address to the United Nation General Assembly 74th session, on September 27 2019, a great concern and enthusiasm towards the solution of the major issues like climate change, money laundering, Islamophobia and Kashmir issue. PM Khan sought the Global support, recognition and acknowledgment for Pakistan's ongoing efforts to pull out the remaining offshoots of the terrorists. Despite a great commitment towards countering regional and global terrorism Pakistan yet need to refine and accelerate its socio-political and legislative approach of countering terrorism to adequate with global counter terrorism strategy and policy perspective.

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