

## **Deterrence in South Asia: A case study of prospects of war between Pakistan & India**

**Muhammad Sajid**

*Assistant Professor*

*Department of Political Science*

*University of the Punjab,*

*Lahore*

**Correspondence:** [sajid.polsc@pu.edu.pk](mailto:sajid.polsc@pu.edu.pk)

### **ABSTRACT**

Two competing arguments exist regarding possibility of war in the presence of nuclear weapons. According to optimists, nukes have stabilizing affect due to high cost. The pessimists however do not rule out chances of occurrence of war due to possible irrationality, offensive nature of military, miscommunication, miscalculation, and absence of second-strike capability etc. This study aims at testing these arguments and assessing the prospects of war between two South Asian nuclear states such as India and Pakistan, amidst post Pulwama tense environment. It also develops a unique triangular model of extended deterrence among three nuclear states, along with assessing traditional dyadic relationship between the two nuclear states.

**Keywords:** *Nuclear deterrence, triangular deterrence, war, South Asia, Pakistan, India, China, Arms Race*

### **Introduction**

South Asia has a strong war history. The border between Pakistan and India is the most volatile in the world after the Korean border. Both countries have fought three full-scale wars with each other. Territorial disputes particularly Kashmir is the major cause of rivalry. The differences over Kashmir are not mere ideological or economic but strategic too. Pakistan is expected to face severe water crisis, which will affect its agriculture and energy sector badly. Since all five rivers of Pakistan emanate from Kashmir, so it is of great economic value to Pakistan. Kashmir is strategically important, as India can cut the only supply line between Pakistan and China through Kashmir i.e. Kara Koram Highway. The cordiality between Pakistan and China affects the strategic thinking of India. Due to border disputes, China and India have fought one war on their border (Racine, 2001). CPEC (China Pakistan Economic Corridor) project has further increased strategic importance of Kashmir. Some recent developments in the region have increased chances of war in South Asian Region. Among them is illegal change in special status of Kashmir by India contrary to UN Security Council's resolutions and border clashes of Pangong Lake in Laddhakh region between China & India. Since all three states have nuclear capability, any war or miscalculation can lead to a nuclear conflict. Despite the Kargil crsisi and latest Pulwama incident, no full-scale war has occurred so far between these countries since the acquisition of nuclear weapons. This paper will study the prospects of war between them. So, the basic research question to be studied in this paper is; given the presence of nuclear weapons, what are the prospects of war between India and Pakistan?

## Literature Review & Theoretical Framework

This literature review focuses on views of scholars of deterrence theory about possibility of occurrence of war in general and South Asia in particular. There are two competing arguments in the literature about the success or failure of nuclear deterrence resulting into two groups of scholars named as optimists and pessimists.

According to Waltz, states are rational, risk averse and self-preserving. Given the presence of nuclear weapons, there are less chances of War Between the States due high cost. This makes the states quite rational. Even, if war breaks up, it will be a limited war (Sagan & Waltz, 2002). Nukes have stabilizing effect due to exceptional cost. The high stakes involved prohibit nuclear states to go to war (Asal & Beardsley, 2007).

The logic of deterrence is said to have minimized the occurrence of pre-emptive war. Pre-emption is only possible if the numbers of nukes are limited and their position is well known. This complete information ensures the destruction of all nukes in a pre-emptive strike. According to waltz, acquisition of this complete information is very difficult. The relationship between threat credibility and deterrence stability depends upon the kind of information known by the players. "Each player is either Hard (preferring confrontation to capitulation) or Soft (preferring the opposite). Under complete information, hard players have completely credible (i.e., rational) deterrent threats and Soft players have completely incredible threats. But under incomplete information, a player knows its own preferences but is uncertain of its adversary's, so that threat credibility depends upon each player's perception of the likelihood that the other is Hard. The higher the perceived probability that a player would actually prefer to execute its deterrent threat, the higher its credibility, and conversely" (Zagare & Kilgour, 1993, p.19). So, the credibility of threat posed due to nuclear weapons actually becomes hindrance against war. In case of incomplete information, states avoid war, as they are risk averse. Even if war occurs, it will be a very limited war due to the high cost (Sagan & Waltz, 2002).


The pessimists however deny this argument. According to them, states may not be essentially rational. The possession of nuclear weapons by the irrational actors is very dangerous. Sagan and Waltz (2002) explain this in terms of organizational theory as unit of analysis. Among the new proliferators, military may have control over the nukes. The offensive nature of military and its complexity as an organization increases the use of nuclear weapons and chances of war. However, this may be managed by civilian control over the use of nuclear weapons. According to them states are also prone to miscalculations and accidents and presence of nuclear weapon itself becomes the cause of war. The logic of non-proliferation also supports pessimists' argument i.e. states are prone to war due to the presence of nuclear weapons. Miscommunication, miscalculation, accident or weakness of second-strike capability may result into the war. (Hagerty, 1996). To conclude, the optimists predict non-existence of war due to the presence of nuclear weapons. Even if war brakes, it will be a limited war according to Waltz. The pessimists however do not rule out the chances of occurrence of war. Rather they go one step ahead and argue that the existence of nuclear weapon itself may become the cause of war. The states may not behave rationally all the time.

## Deterrence in South Asia: A case study of prospects of war between Pakistan & India


Literature about India and Pakistan has no exception. LO (2003) suggests failure of deterrence theory in case of Pakistan and India. Deep hostility and historical alienation creates a dilemma, which undermines the assumption of deterrence theory. This is typical case of Pakistan and India. Miscommunication, misperception, misinterpretation and lack of knowledge about others develop a kind of hostility and psychological alienation (Buzan & Rizwi, 1986). A symmetric deterrence exists between the two. India has an edge of conventional weapons over Pakistan. India is trying to pursue second-strike capability. Pakistan is more vulnerable due to small size. Irrationality of commitment to use nuclear weapons may result into miscalculations. India has already committed of no first use. But Pakistan never ruled out the first strike option due to vulnerability and absence of second-strike capability. The rationality perception also varies from authoritarian to democratic regimes. According to democratic peace theory, democracies do not go in war against each other. India is a better democracy. However, democracy in Pakistan is very fragile and has faced many military coups. So, civil military relations will determine the fate of nuclear weapons in South Asia (Bhimaya 1994). The influence of military on command and control of nuclear weapons in both countries may also cause failure of deterrence in South Asia (Lo, 2003). The case of South Asia is unique due to ideological differences, territorial disputes and hostility. These may result into irrationality; undermine the assumptions of deterrence theory and result into limited war and pre-emptive strike (Rajain, 2005). The literature seems to be predicting the failure of deterrence and suggests third party intervention to stop action reaction cycle between these two countries (Talbot, 1999).

The optimists present quite opposing view. During Kargil crisis in 1990, both states confined themselves to limited war. The Indian military and air force were given strict order not to cross the international boundary. Although, US role is very critical, however, deterrence played a vital role in avoiding war between the two (Ganguly, 2008). After Pulwama incident, Indian aircrafts crossed the line of control and were shot down by Pakistan air force. Despite escalation from Indian side, both states showed restrained behavior (Dawn, 25 February 2020).

While discussing the prospects of war between India and Pakistan in the context of deterrence theory, this paper also presents a trilateral nuclear actors model, which may hinder war or become the cause of war between Pakistan and India due to miscalculations. The triangular relationship between China, India and Pakistan suggests security dilemma that may result into the escalation of a war due to potential miscalculations and misperceptions. China is trying to deter USA & Russia that it views as the chief rivals in international security system. Any kind of military preparation on the part of China creates a security dilemma for India who may respond accordingly. The military preparedness of India to deter China creates a dilemma for Pakistan and the cycle continues. This chain of actions and reactions along with historical rivalries, border disputes and alienation may lead to misperception and miscalculation resulting into a war between these countries (Buzan & Rizvi, 1986).



Most of the literature about deterrence dates back to the Cold War and focuses on the dyadic relationship between the U.S. and Soviet Union. Though literature talks about the extended deterrence and measurement of its credibility but its focus is on dyadic relationship between the two superpowers and their blocks (Danilovic, 2001). Weede (1983) suggests dyadic relationship as a unit of analysis in situations of extended deterrence provided by super power alliances. Harkavy (1998) while measuring the effect of extended deterrence uses triangular analysis, which he terms as triangular or indirect deterrence. However, in his triangular relationship among three countries, one state is essentially non-nuclear. The case of South Asia is different where Pakistan, India and China are all nuclear. So, Pakistan's cordial relationship with China provides it not only extended deterrence capability against Indian second strike capability but it is also aims at creating an extended deterrence to Pakistan to influence India's strategic thinking.



Though the focus of this study is on dyadic relationship between India and Pakistan. However, China has been taken just as a factor along with other factors to study its influence on occurrence or avoidance of war between the two countries. There is divided opinion in the literature about the prospects of war between India and Pakistan due to this factor.

## Deterrence in South Asia: A case study of prospects of war between Pakistan & India

### **Methodology**

Jervis (1989) describes the utility of case study in research work regarding deterrence theory. Policy formulation on one side depends upon the beliefs, perception and subjective expected utility of other side. All these things can just be vaguely measured in a general study, as they are very much contextual. Therefore, case study method can develop better understanding of relationship and decisions of the two countries and hence potentially better contribute in the literature of deterrence theory. This paper also used case study method to test deterrence theory. In this study the validity and scope of deterrence theory pertaining to prospects of war has been assessed. Process tracing method has been used for deeper analysis of possible actions and processes of policy making (George & Bennett, 2005).

### **Data**

This case study has used both primary and secondary resources. The official websites and governmental reports have been consulted. Secondary data has been taken from archives, newspapers and relevant existing studies.

### **Factors used to test theories**

This case study tests deterrence theory while examining the prospects of war between India and Pakistan. Derived from the arguments of pessimists, the impact of three factors i.e. accidental war due to technical or command and control problem, irrationality or miscalculation due to flaws in decision making procedure or imbalance in civil military relations and arms race etc. on the chances of occurrence of war have been studied to test deterrence theory. One more contextual and literature based factor (i.e. triangular deterrence or China Factor) has also been evaluated to study prospects of war between India and Pakistan.

### **Evaluation of Factors**

This part of the paper evaluates the factors discussed above while process tracing different historical events, decisions and process to explain the prospects of war between India and Pakistan.

### **Accidental War (Technical Problem / Command and Control Failure)**

There have been successive tensions between India and Pakistan. A part from three wars fought, the famous recent incidents include attack on Indian parliament, Mumbai attacks, Kargil crisis and shot down of Indian planes by Pakistan air force after Pulwama incident. There are risks and chances of nuclear war due to these hostilities. This is quite evident from the speeches and sayings of responsible representative on both sides about the deployment and use of nuclear weapons as reported by the media. Deployment means attaching the nuclear explosive containing warheads on delivery vehicles (such as aircraft and missiles etc.) to make them ready to use. If the weapons are deployed, the chances of accidental wars increase not only due to technical mistakes but also due to problems of command and control system caused by stress and miscommunication. Any miscommunication or confusion on any side may lead to a nuclear nightmare. Accidental war may occur between India and Pakistan in following situations.

1- The nuclear weapons in both countries are under the control of organizations, which have hierarchical system of command. This may prevent direct vertical flow of information from permission granting authority to the personals actually holding and using the nuclear weapons. Any miscommunication may create a serious problem (Sagan and Waltz, 2002).

2- The compartmentalization of these organizations can be another issue. Lack of concept of horizontal sharing of information among different departments of military in both countries may create problem. Everybody knows the part of whole and an appropriate decision cannot be taken without knowing the whole.

3- Managing nuclear weapons is very hard. The case of India and Pakistan is particularly very tough as any missile carrying nuclear weapon can reach the destination in few minutes due to geographical contiguity. A quick decision may be needed under stress and unpredictable situation. Dealing with communication, signals, and complex sensors under stress may become problematic. Any wrong signal conveyed to the field commander by mistake, may create an accidental war.

4- Effective intelligence and early warning system may be misperceived as happened in case of Norway and Russia. The hostility between these two countries may present a hurdle in establishing an early warning system and an accurate mechanism of translation of these warnings in letter and spirit.

5- A technological or operational mistake (as happened in case of Cuban missile crisis) may create failure in early warning system. A dysfunctional early warning system due to disconnection from satellite during military crisis may also create a dilemma.

6- Despite being covered by a metallic shell; the nuclear weapon may still be vulnerable to external fire or explosion. The places of deployment of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan are not known. Any incident like 9/11 or Mumbai attacks can ignite the bomb. Although chances are minimal, but in case of nuclear weapons, minimum accidental chance may be very fetal.

7- Both India and Pakistan have liquid filled missiles such as Prithvi and Ghouri, which can carry nukes. These are filled with self-igniting and highly volatile liquids, which may create any problem during launching preparation.

8- “The detonation of the high explosive surrounding a nuclear core could trigger in turn a nuclear explosion. This possibility has prompted the US and Russia to build in safety features into the design of their weapon” (Rajaraman, Ramana & Mian, 2002). Similar measures may be needed in case of Pakistan and India.

9- “A safety measure widely used in the US against accidental or unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons is the installation of Permissive Action Link (PAL). PALs are electronic switches that serve to protect a nuclear weapon against unauthorized use, and are meant to be effective even when the weapon is assembled and mated to its delivery system. Recent PALs use a set of multiple, six digit or 12 digit codes with a limited try capability. Since these are electronic locks, the limited try capability stops any effort to keep trying codes until the correct one is determined” (Stein & Feaver, 1987). Pakistan and India are also

## Deterrence in South Asia: A case study of prospects of war between Pakistan & India


hinting about their need for PAL, which should be provided as early as possible to avoid any accidental attack.

The only way to end the risks of nuclear weapon as per pessimists is to eradicate them. Since both the states have now developed these weapons, there is a need to tackle them carefully. The best way is not to deploy the nuclear weapons or disassemble them. These risks of command and control as well as technical issues may result into an accidental war between India and Pakistan. The absence of early warning and PAL system so as to ensure the safety mechanisms can also lead to any incident. The overwhelming role of military in decision making in both countries cannot be ignored which has been discussed in the next part. This study however, concludes that there are chances of war between Pakistan and India due to command and control as well technical issues as suggested by the existing literature. The war is more likely until and unless both develop some safety mechanism doctrine about maintenance, delivery and command and control system and execute it properly.

The decision making Procedure; Rationality, Calculations and Civil military relations in decision making

The excessive role of military in decision making can lead to War Between the States. The civilian government takes decisions on political considerations. It takes all the departments on board before taking any decision about war. In case of any flaw, the consultation with the military fills those gaps of information in decision-making. However, if military is in power, it lacks the counter balancing elements of civilians and may take a hyper decision ignoring the recommendation of civilian departments. This institutional balance is important in taking a rational decision. Any imbalance can lead towards a wrong decision and can result into a war (Schofield, 2007). The literature based on Organizational theory and bureaucratic politics also recommends strong civilian control. Parochial interests, biases and inflexible routines of military personals can lead to wrong decision unless there is civilian institutional check. Control of nuclear weapons by the military particularly in the early proliferators can lead to War Between the States (Sagan & Waltz, 2002)

The military forces of both the states hold the control of nuclear weapons. However a proper decision making procedure prevails. There is civilian control over the decision making procedure in India but it is considered to be less coherent as shown in the figure below.



Source: (Schofield, 2007)


The major criticism is that involvement of lower level bureaucracy may ignore some important aspects. However, the most important thing pertaining to war decision is clear civilian supremacy in decision over the military. Since the beginning, India opted Nehruvian policy, which presents the resolutions of issues through bilateral talks. During the Sino-Indian border clashes, Nehru was reluctant to any offensive air strike and accepted the unilateral cease-fire by the Chinese. Ravi Shatri during 1965 war wanted hyper movement but accepted the UN effort for cease-fire. During 1971 war, Indra Gandhi also accepted the cease-fire. The role of commanders has also been varying. For example during 1971 war, army Chief General Manekshaw was very powerful and enjoyed autonomy in making and execution of war strategy. However, at the end the winner prime minister announced cease-fire although she could have ordered her forces to move to the western borders too. Much debate is going on to revise this policy now. War and hate mongering Indian media, fanatic and hyper religious leadership of Bhartia Janta Party (BJP) and its leader prime Minister Moudi is trying to opt for offensive policies. This kind of fanatic civilian leadership may itself lead to wrong decision despite civilian supremacy and need to be tackled.

The case of Pakistan is quite different. The only war fought under civilian rule is war of Kashmir. The 1965 war was fought under the supervision of field Marshal General Ayub Khan. At the end of the war, general Musa claimed that situation was in favour of Pakistan. Pakistan army was in position to make a break thorough at Sialkot sector. But despite all this, he followed the orders of GHQ for cease-fire. Even during 1971 war, General Tikka wanted to move towards Delhi but general Yahya order him to stop and he followed the orders of high command. The study of these wars shows that although Pakistan army was aggressive but quite rational. The analysis of behavior of both sides in the past crisis shows that both sides took rational decisions. The field commanders followed the orders from the top. Pakistan army has showed a very mature, rational and restrained behavior during recent failed attempt of Indian Air force after Pulwama incident. Formulation of



## Deterrence in South Asia: A case study of prospects of war between Pakistan & India

National Security Council has made decision making set up very inclusive, rational and under civilian control or supremacy.



Sources: [www.pildate.org](http://www.pildate.org) , [www.mod.gov.pk](http://www.mod.gov.pk)

After Kargil incident, both countries opted for limited war doctrine. This doctrine includes strengthening conventional war capabilities. Though it does not rule out the use of nuclear weapons (Ladwig, 2008). The chances of nuclear war are less as both sides always made rational decisions in the past crisis on the basis of cost benefit analysis. A limited conventional war can occur due to the absence of any communication between the governments. The chances of nuclear war cannot be ruled out totally while looking the deployment of nukes by both sides during Kargil incident. However, this can happen only in case of any miscalculation. The past rational decision making and observance of orders from high command by the field commanders shows that there are very less chances of a full scale war between the two states. US intervention may have played a vital role during these crises, however nuclear deterrence was the key in confining the war (Ganguli, 2008). An arms race has started between the two states to develop long-range missiles carrying nuclear weapons. Both have acquired fifth generation aircrafts too for this purpose. This arms race may become the cause of full-scale war.

### Arms Race

The rivalry between Pakistan and India is prevailing since their inception. Both fought first war in 1948. However the arms race between them started during the cold war. US supplied arms to Pakistan to fight in Afghanistan. India started getting these weapons from Soviet Union (Wirsing, 1985). The major supplier of arms and modern military technology to India is Russia and to Pakistan is China. India is considered to have an edge over Pakistan in conventional warfare owing to number of military personals and conventional weapons. A clear military imbalance can be seen in CSIS 2002 report. However, Pakistan has edge in terms of number of nuclear arsenals. According to Stockholm International Peace

Research Institute, Pakistan has more nuclear warheads i.e. 160 as compared to India who has 150. Both states are now in competition of developing technology pertaining to the delivery of their nukes. The focus of this new technology is now on range and accuracy. Both the states are trying to develop efficient and lighter warheads (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Jun 16, 2020). But the question is why both are focusing on ballistic missile system despite having fifth generation aircrafts?

Deterrence can only be created by the credibility of threat. The missiles are more credible than the aircrafts as aircrafts can be called back. Ballistic missile once launched cannot be stopped. The mutual assured destruction offers equal vulnerability on both sides. No one has the incentive to go for pre-emptive strike. But the case of Pakistan and India is different. Pakistan is more vulnerable to pre-emption due to asymmetric power relationship and small territory. This is the reason that India has announced no first use while Pakistan has not shown any such commitment. Rather during Kargil crisis, Shamshad Ahmed Khan the foreign secretary of Pakistan warned the use of nukes in case of any attempt of war by India. The prevailing ambiguity about each other's capability can also lead to any miscalculation and result into a crisis. The ambiguity on both sides can be well judged from the following extracts of speeches of leaders. "India is not impressed with 'missile antics' by Pakista"(Nirupama Rao, Ministry of External Affairs spokeswoman, May 26, 2002). "We were compelled to show then, in May 1998 that we were not bluffing and in May 2002, we were compelled to show that we do not bluff." President Pervez Musharraf, June 17, 2002 (Khan, n.d.)

Due to asymmetric conventional warfare relation, the arms race between both countries is going on. As a next step both the states are trying to get defence missile system. The continuity of this situation is very dangerous as both the states are prone to any crisis and any miscalculation may lead to war.

### **Triangular Deterrence; China Factor**

China is the most important player in triangular relationship of China, India and Pakistan. There are two schools of thought about strategic thinking of China in the region. First is the old thought that shows rivalry between India and china since 1962 border clashes. Since 1962 war, China has aligned itself with Pakistan and has made heavy economic and strategic investment to keep India under strategic pressure. Most of Pakistani modern technology weapons have been developed with the help of china. This joint venture technology has helped Pakistan to take certain actions without fear of Indian retaliation (Garver, 2001). The same school of thought believes that old strategy still prevails. The reason behind it is Chinese hegemonic and economic interests in the region. The presence of this thought in Chinese strategic thinking can also be confirmed by the reporting of a newspaper about the message of Chinese leadership to President Pervaiz Musharraf. "China hopes Pakistan will not initiate any assault. Pakistan should not get involved in wars and instead focus on economic construction. However, if a war does break out between India and Pakistan, Beijing will stand firmly on the side of Islamabad" (Kanwa News, 2002). This is commonly held though on the basis of which I developed the idea of triangular relationship in which China seems providing extended deterrence to Pakistan against India.

## Deterrence in South Asia: A case study of prospects of war between Pakistan & India

The revisionist school of thought focuses on joint economic interests of India and China in the world. More than four-billion-dollars trade is going on between them. The involvement of India in SCO is very important. An attempt has been made for a regional co-operation among Russia, China and India to counter Europe and America in terms of economy (Racin, 2001). This change in policy was not mere economic rather strategic too. "China is very much concerned about the active role of US and NATO in the region. Also China has been influenced by the talk of India as counter weight to China in Washington policy circle, steady rise of India coupled with the growing U.S.-India entente and Pakistan's gradual descent into the ranks of failed states" (Malik, 2002).

China however never ignored Pakistan despite rationalization of its policy towards India. This is quite visible from the statements of Chinese leadership in favour of Pakistan during recent US-Pakistan crisis. CPEC proved to be a game changer. China is investing heavily in Pakistan under CPEC and is expected to defend its own investment in case of any Indian aggression. The latest border clashes at Laddakh has totally changed the strategic environment of South Asia. As per latest strategic thinking, China will continue providing extended deterrence to Pakistan, which will hinder India from any aggression (Racin, 2001). This extended deterrence may create balance despite lack of capability of second strike and deter India from any war.

### Conclusion

This study presents a conceptual and historical overview of prospects of war between India and Pakistan. Two schools of thought i.e. optimists and pessimists exist about the credibility of nuclear deterrence. The pessimists disagree with the optimists that nukes have stabilizing effects. Based on the thoughts of pessimist, few factors, which can lead to war, were chosen and evaluated to test deterrence theory.

The first factor deals with the accidental war. On the basis of technical problems and issues of command and control, the chances of war persist. Therefore, this factor showed positive impact on war between Pakistan and India. But this problem is not intentional rather technical and administrative and can be resolved by developing safety mechanisms. The decision-making factor shows negative impact on occurrence of war. The behaviour of past crises clearly indicates that none of the state took any irrational decision. Rather both took rational decisions. Some aggressive strategies were made, but they were made due to involvement of military in decision-making. This is tricky part of this factor and civil military relations in decision-making will determine the fate of nukes in South Asia. Arms race driven by a symmetric power relationship seems to be imparting positive impact on war. Any miscalculation can result into war. The last factor of deterrence i.e. triangular deterrence (China factor) is very much contextual and developed in this study. The presence of China provides extended deterrence to Pakistan and hinders India from taking any action. Also the rationalization in foreign policy of china about India has made Pakistani approach quite rational about any aggression.

The overall analysis of all factors of deterrence confirms its stabilizing effect. No irrational or intentional behaviour has been observed towards war. Most of the

factors have structural constraints but not the human intentions, which can be removed through certain measures. The arms race issue is the only alarming factor, which needs proper attention of not only Pakistan and India but also of the whole world to pursue both states to stop it.

The combined analysis of the entire factors demonstrates less chances of war between Pakistan and India in the presence of nuclear weapons. However, some strings are attached to this conclusion in the form of some protective and safety mechanisms as well as communication between the governments.

Deterrence in South Asia: A case study of prospects of war between Pakistan & India

**References**

- [1] Asal, V. & Beardsley, K. (2007). Proliferation and international crisis behavior, *Journal of Peace Research*, 44(2), 139-155.
- [2] Bhimaya, K. M. (1994). Nuclear deterrence in South Asia: Civil-Military relations and decision-making. *Asian Survey*, 34(7), 647-661.
- [3] Buzan, B. & Rizvi, G. (1986). *South Asian insecurity and the great powers*, New York : Martin Press, Inc.
- [4] Danilovic, V. (2001). The sources of threat credibility in extended deterrence, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45(3), 341-369.
- [5] Dawn (25 February, 2020). 2 Indian aircraft violating Pakistani airspace shot down; pilot captured. Retrieved from <https://www.dawn.com/news/1466347>
- [6] Ganguly, S. (2008). Nuclear stability in South Asia. *International Security*, 33(2), 45-70.
- [7] Garver, J. W. (2001). *Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century*. University of Washington Press.
- [8] George, A. L., Bennett, A., Lynn-Jones, S. M., & Miller, S. E. (2005). *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences*. MIT Press.
- [9] Hagerty, D. T. (1995). Nuclear deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani crisis, *International Security*, 20(3), 79-114.
- [10] Harkavy, R. E. (1998). Triangular or indirect deterrence/compellence: some Think New in Deterrence Theory, *Comparative strategy*, 17, 63-81.  
<http://www.ceri-sciencespo.com/archive/jan01/racine.pdf>
- [11] Jervis, R. (1989). *Rational deterrence: Theory and evidence*, IN *Review World Politics*, (41)2, 183-207.
- [12] Khan, F.H. (n.d). *Nuclear Signaling, Missiles, and Escalation Control in South Asia*. Retrieved from:
- [13] Ladwig III, W. C. (2008). A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine. *International Security*, 32(3), 158-190.
- [14] Lo, J. (2003). Nuclear deterrence in South Asia: Theory and practice. *International Journal*, 58(3), 395-414.
- [15] Malik, M. J. (2002). *The China factor in the India-Pakistan conflict*. Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies.

- [16] Pakistan seeks China's support in the India-Pakistan conflict (January 10, 2002). *Kanwa News*, Retrieved from: <http://www.kanwa.com/free/2002/01/e0114b.htm>
- [17] Racine, J.L. (2001). The uncertain triangle: India China and Pakistan, The regional and international dimension. Retrieved from:
- [18] Rajain , A. (2005). *Nuclear Deterrence in Southern Asia: China, India and Pakistan* . New Delhi: Sage. IN Review, Ormbaug, C.M. (2007). *Journal of Peace Research*, 44(2), 252-253.
- [19] Rajaraman, R.; Ramana, M. V & Mian, Z. (2002). Possession and deployment of nuclear weapons in South Asia: An assessment of some risks. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 37(25), 2459-266.
- [20] Sagan, S. D. & Waltz, K. N. (2002). *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed*, New York : W.W. Norton. Tahir-Kheli, S. (1980). The Military in Contemporary Pakistan. *Armed Forces & Society*, 6(4), 639-653.
- [21] Schofield, J. (2007). India, Nonmilitarization, and the 1971 War. In *Militarization and War* (pp. 51-63). Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
- [22] Stein, P., & Feaver, P. (1987). *Assuring control of nuclear weapons: The evolution of permissive action links* (No. 2). University Press of America.
- [23] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (Jun 16, 2020). India, China increased nuclear weapons since last year. *The Economic times*. Retrieved from <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-increased-nuclear-arsenal-in-2019-but-has-fewer-weapons-than-china-pakistan-sipri-report/articleshow/76384026.cms>
- [24] Talbott, S. (1999). Dealing with the bomb in South Asia. *Foreign Affairs*, 78(2), 110-122.
- [25] Weede, E. (1983). Extended deterrence by Super Power Alliance, *journal of conflict resolution*, 27(2), 231-253.
- [26] Wirsing, R. G. (1985). The arms race in South Asia: Implications for the United States. *Asian Survey*, 25(3), 265-291.
- [27] Zagare, F. C & Kilgour, D.M. (1993). Asymmetric deterrence. *International Studies Quarterly*, 37(1), 1-27.