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The Associtation of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 1967 as an exclusively regional economic cooperation organization. However, given the circumstances of its birth, its formation was a political act. It is hence somewhat ironical that ASEAN's very success in the political sphere has led to growing disillusionment with its lack of equal success in other areas—notably in economic co-operation where progress has been slow and erratic. While there are various objective reasons for this (Chng 1985) there has also been a growing feeling that inadequate organizational machinery may be partly responsible for this state of affairs. Much attention has thus been directed in the last few years, both officially as well as by outside bodies, towards the question of reforming the ASEAN machinery. To what extent have organizational inadequacies held up ASEAN economic cooperation? Are these inadequacies merely a convenient scapegoat for more basic weaknesses that reside in ASEAN as an economic cooperation organization? Could not organizational weaknesses themselves, like the difficulties encountered in economic co-operation, be a reflection of such basic weaknesses? And if so, to what extent can organizational change be the means to accelerate greater economic co-operation without tackling the basic weaknesses themselves?