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Abstract This paper explores the often-overlooked metaethical and religious foundations of Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī’s ethical philosophy by examining the ontological status of moral values, their epistemic accessibility, and the sources of moral normativity. While Fārābī is frequently studied for his normative and political ethics, this study shifts focus toward the deeper philosophical and theological principles that undergird his conception of the virtuous life (saʿāda) and the just society. Drawing from Aristotelian logic, Neoplatonic metaphysics, and Islamic theological doctrines, Fārābī presents a unique model in which moral values are both objective and intelligible through reason, yet remain grounded in divine order. The central role of the active intellect (al-ʿaql al-faʿʿāl) in moral cognition is highlighted as a metaethical cornerstone, linking rational understanding to spiritual fulfillment. Fārābī’s commitment to moral realism and cognitivism is shown to be consistent with his teleological vision of human perfection, where virtue (faḍīla) is both an intellectual and ethical achievement. Moreover, this paper argues that Fārābī harmonizes revelation and reason by incorporating prophetic knowledge within a rationally intelligible framework, without reducing religion to philosophy. This synthesis affirms the distinct epistemic value of revealed knowledge while preserving the autonomy of philosophical inquiry. By situating Fārābī’s ethical philosophy within contemporary debates on moral realism, religious epistemology, and the rational basis of normativity, this study offers a fresh perspective that repositions him as a significant figure in both Islamic and global metaethical thought. Keywords: Fārābī, metaethics, virtue ethics, happiness (saʿāda), moral epistemology, religion.